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Judgment
Nainar Sundaram, J.—Except one writ appeal, W.A. No. 842 of 1984, the other cases are writ petitions. The appellant in the writ appeal
was the petitioner in W.P. No. 6674 of 1984. The petitioners in all the writ petitions including W.P. No. 6674 of 1984 out of which W.A. No.
842 of 1984 arises, are tenants within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, hereinafter referred to
as the Act. The tenants are facing proceedings under the Act, instituted against them by their landlords. They have come to this Court impeaching
the prosecution of the proceedings before the Controllers under the Act, who are seized of them, and who in the instant cases, are the respective
Judges of the Court of Small Causes, Madras.
The decision in W.P. No. 6674 of 1984 has gone against the tenant/the petitioner therein. In W.P. No. 6674 of 1984 two contentions were
raised before the learned Single Judge, who heard and disposed of the same and they are as follows:
(1) Section 2(3) of the Act empowers the Government to appoint ""any person"" as a Controller under the Act and the conferment of such sweeping
powers on the Government, without prescription of qualifications for the person to be appointed as Controller amounts to conferment of arbitrary
and unguided powers on the government.
(2) Under the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, Central Act 15 of 1882 a Judge of Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit
for recovery of immovable property and yet in violation of this provision, the Judge of Small Causes Court has been conferred powers of eviction
under the Act. These points have been repelled by the learned single Judge.
Before us, the first point raised by Mr. K.V. Padmanabha Rao, learned Counsel for the tenants, is as follows:
The words ""any person"" occurring in Section 2(3) of the Act when read and understood in the context of the provisions of the entire statute do not
contemplate the appointment of a few Judges of the Court of Small Causes Ex-Officio or otherwise to perform the functions of the Controllers.
Section 2(3) of the Act reads as follows:
Controller"" means any person appointed by the Government, by notification, to exercise the powers of a Controller under this Act for such area
as"" may be specified in the notification.
A plain reading of the wordings of the above provision gives the unambiguous impression that the power conferred on the Government to appoint
''any person'' could not and should not be controlled by bringing in a concept that Judges of a Court be it so, a Court of Small Causes cannot fall
within the expressions ""any person"" and hence they cannot be appointed to exercise the powers of the Controller under the Act. The expressions
any person"" are plainly and generously couched and there is no warrant for limiting the scope and meaning of the said expressions. The common
Dictionary meaning of the word ""person"" is ""a human being"". The Judge of a Court of Small Causes, is certainly a human being and hence a person
coming within the expressions ""any person"" found in Section 2(3) of the Act. Balakrishna Ayyar, J., in The Coonoor Mosque Vs. M.G. Abdul
Hamid Sahib and Another, observed as follows:
Under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, Government can appoint any person to perform the functions of a controller under the
Act. The person so appointed may be a Tahsildar, he may be a District Munsif or he may be a Revenue Divisional Officer. In fact he may be
anybody.
It must be noted that there is no express embargo in Section 2(3) of the Act with regard to appointing a Judge or Judges of the Court of Small
Causes to exercise the powers of the Controller under the Act. When such being the position, we have not been persuaded to spell out such an
embargo by implications by reference to any other provision of the Act. We cannot also find fault with choice of the Judges. Depending on the
workload for the Controllers, and other factors relating to administration of Justice, the choice has been made. Hence, we are not in a position to
sustain the first point urged by the learned Counsel for the tenants.
The second point put forth by the learned Counsel for the tenants is as follows:
The Notifications under which the Judges of Court of Small Causes are appointed as Controllers under the Act are invalid as they do not have any
authority under the Act or any other law for enabling the State Government to extend the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Court of Small
Causes or of any of the Judges thereof thereby bringing about a contrariety between the Act and the Central Act 15 of 1882 and transgress the
various provisions of the Constitution of India."" With regard to the learned Counsel appearing for the tenants, we must state that this point omits to
take note of the fact that there is no extension or enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Judge or Judges of the Court of Small Causes as such and
the Judge or Judges of Court of Small Causes as persons are being only conferred and vested with the powers of the Controller. With regard to
their powers as Judges of the Court of Small Causes, they shall always stand settled governed and circumscribed by the provisions of the Central
Act 15 of 1882 and the rules, if any framed thereunder. By Official designation, the Judges of the Court of Small Causes are conferred the powers
of the Controller and nothing more. We could not conceive of this conferment of the powers of the-Controller on them as extension or enlargement
of their powers as Judges of the Court of Small Causes. Hence, the second point is eschewed.
5.The third point urged by the learned Counsel for the tenants is as follows:
Inasmuch as the State Legislature of the Tamil Nadu has merely defined the word ""Controller"" without prescribing any qualification or any other
guidelines whatsoever to enable the State Government to appoint a Controller the said provision, namely, Section 2(3) of the Act is invalid for the
reason that it confers unbridled and arbitrary powers on the State Government to appoint any person as a Controller. The provision does not by its
terms contemplate the Controller to be appointed to possess any particular qualification. In such a contingency if the Government pursuant to that
power appoints any person to exercise the powers of j the Controller, such exercise of power need not necessarily be frowned upon on the
ground that there is lack of guidelines for such exercise. It could not be a case of lack of guidelines for the very exercise of powers. It is a case of a
plain conferment of a straight and simple power of appointment. The substance of the grievance, seems to be lack of prescription of qualifications
for the person to be appointed as Controller and the guidelines therefor. The legislation having conferred such a straight and simple power On the
Government, we cannot insist for a rider to the provision so as to say that there has got to be delineation or prescription of particular qualification
or qualification for the person to be appointed to exercise the powers of a Controller. Further-I more, the Government is expected to exercise the
power of appointment properly keeping in mind the functions of the Controller and nature of his duties, and the proceedings to be prosecuted
before him. There are inbuilt guidelines in this behalf in the Act itself. It would be a different matter if any individual appointment is tainted with
arbitrariness or other vitiating factors. As a result, we reject the third point raised by the learned Counsel for the tenants.
The fourth point raised by the learned Counsel for the tenants runs as follows:
The power to constitute a Court or to extend or to add to the powers, authority or the jurisdiction of an existing Court or the Judges thereof being
an essential legislative function, in the instant case, assuming that by the words any person the State Legislature intended to mean the Presiding
Officer of the Court already constituted, it has abdicated such an essential legislative function in favour of the State Government, and hence Section
2(3) of the Act is invalid."" The above point though makes an interesting reading, does not appeal to us at all. Our reasons are as follows: The Act
delineates the powers to be exercised by the Controller. The Act, by Section 2(3) had delegated the power of appointment of the Controller to the
Government. It is well settled proposition that delegated legislation if we can use it in the popular sense, has become a necessity the present day. It
is an inevitable and indispensable feature with regard to making of laws. The legislature can frame the main statute and with regard to working of
the details of the statute, it is always competent for the legislature to delegate the powers to the appropriate authority, set out in the statute. We are
not impressed that with regard to the Act, the delegation of the power of appointment of Controller, it has got to be frowned upon by any
acceptable ground. Apart from making a statement with regard to the point raised, learned Counsel for the tenants has not enlightened us by any
expectative argument as to why the power of delegation has got to be eschewed as suffering from any infirmity. As a result, we are not able to
appreciate and sustain the fourth point urged by the learned Counsel for the tenants. No other point is urged before us.
The writ appeal as well as the writ petitions lack merits and they deserve dismissal and accordingly we dismiss them with costs.