AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
By the order under revision, the Court below dismissed IA No.580 of 1999 filed by the petitioner herein-defendant No.1 in the suit filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 282 days in filing the petition under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree dated 9-9-1998. Admittedly, the notice was served on the petitioner - Municipal Corporation in the suit. The following is the only explanation offered by the petitioner-Municipal Corporation to explain the inordinate delay of 282 days:
".....However in this regard it is submitted that due to oversight the suit proceedings were not pursued by the staff and which resulted in an ex parte decree, but non-filing of written statement is not intentional, it is only accidental and unavoidable and due to over work by the staff of the Municipal Corporation".
In the first place, the explanation offered by the Municipal Corporation is as vague as it could be. The explanation is very bald and it does not contain details and specifics or the circumstances which led the Municipal Corporation not to file written statement and not to represent itself or through a Lawyer in the suit. Secondly, it was revealed that after the Court decreed the suit on 9-9-1998, the plaintiffs, on 5-1-1999, got issued a notice to the Chairman of the Municipal Council and to the respondents 5 and 6 informing them about the passing of the decree and calling upon them to satisfy the decree as the plaintiffs who were suffering for want of money on account of the sudden demise of the husband of the first plaintiff. The notice was served on the Chairman of the Municipal Council, but nothing was heard from the Municipal Council.
Thereafterwards, EPNo.41 of 1999 was filed to execute the decree by way of attachment and sale of moveable properties stocked in the office of the Municipal Council. The Court in the Execution Petition, issued the notice to the judgment debtors including the petitioner herein and all the judgment debtors received the notices, but they did not appear in the EP proceedings. In the circumstances, on 12-4-1999, the Court below ordered attachment of the moveables and when the Bailiff went to the Office of the Municipal Council to attach the moveables, the petitioner refused to receive warrant of attachment. Under the circumstances, the Bailiff could not execute the warrant of attachment. When the facts borned out from the records stood thus, the deponent of the affidavit filed in support of 1A No.580 of 1999 falsely averred that he came to know through his subordinate staff about the passing of the decree on 9-9-1998, just a day before filing IA No.580 of 1999. It was submitted by the learned Counsel at the Bar that IA was filed on 21-7-1999 and by that time too much water had flown under the bridge, and for the reasons best known to the petitioner, all those facts were suppressed in the affidavit, and no explanation, let alone satisfactory explanation, was offered in the affidavit.
I am quite conscious of the fact that the Courts are relatively liberal while dealing with the applications to condone the delay particularly when such applications are filed by the State and State authorities, statutory Corporations, local bodies etc. But, here is a case where the facts narrated above clearly go to show that there was culpable negligence on the part of the officers of the Municipal Corporation occupying important position in it to defend the Corporation. As if that is not enough, the affidavit filed in support of IA No.580 of 1999 falsely claims that the deponent of the affidavit came to know about the passing of the decree only one day before filing of the application. I should state that this conduct itself should disentitle the petitioner to any relief at the hands of this Court. If the Corporation has suffered any loss on account of the negligence of the concerned officers and the staff, it may proceed against them in accordance with law and recover the loss or damage suffered by it, but there is no justifiable ground particularly at this distance of time to interfere with the matter. It is stated that the husband of the first plaintiff died as far back as in the year 1992 and the defendants including the widow of the deceased remain to be unemployed and without any other source of livelihood. Looking from that angle also, any interference is not warranted.
In the result, civil revision petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.