Waryam Singh vs State of Punjab

Koshal, J.—The Petitioner was convicted by Shri Aftab Singh, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana, of an offence u/s 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code and was awarded a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months. His appeal was dismissed by Shri Gurcharan Singh Dhaliwal, Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, against whose judgment the present petition for revision has been filed.

The prosecution case may be stated thus. On the 5th of April, 1967 at about 10.30 A. M. Shri K. S. Sidhu, Executive Engineer, Sidhwan Division, Ludhiana (P W. 1) sent for the Petitioner who was employed as an Additional Sub-Divisional Clerk in the Executive Engineer''s office but was found absent from his seat. In the evening, however, the Petitioner became available and was told by the Executive Engineer in the presence of Shri Avtar Singh, Sub-Divisional Officer (P. W. 2) to mend himself or face charges on the basis of complaints which had been received against his unsatisfactory work. The Petitioner flared up and threatened the Executive Engineer with, injury to his person by saying that he would see how the Executive Engineer would remain alive if the Petitioner was charge-sheeted. Getting alarmed the Executive Engineer had a case registered with the police who prosecuted the Petitioner.

In so far as the allegations of fact against the Petitioner are concerned, they stand fully proved and his learned Counsel has not made any attempt to challenge them. He urged, however, that the words attributed to the Petitioner at the most were empty threats such as would not fall within the ambit of Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code which defines criminal intimidation (an offence punishable u/s 506 of the Code) as follows:

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

According to learned Counsel, the threat given by the Petitioner would be culpable u/s 503 only if it alarmed the Executive Engineer or made him drop the idea of charge sheeting the Petitioner. This interpretation of the section however, does not appear to me to be correct. Once it is proved, as is the situation in present case, that a person was threat ened by mother with physical injury, the offence defined to the section would have been committed it the threat was shown to have been extended with the requisite intent. The effect which the threat produces on the person to whom it is extended does not figure in the section at all so that if a person with a feeble mind is threatened by another, without that other having the requisite intent, and gets alarmed or does something which he is not legally bound to do or omits to do something which he is legally entitled to do. the offence of criminal intimidation could not be said to have been committed. On the other hand, if such intent was there but the person threatened did not care a twopence for it because he is either courageous or does not take the threat as having been seriously extended, the threat would nevertheless be culpable. It is to be noted that the requisite intent is not one to execute the threat but has to be only such as -

(a) to cause alarm to another person, or,

(b) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, or

(c) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.

In other words the requiste intent does not go beyond causing alarm or an act or omissson on the part of the adversary; it does not embrace the actual execution of the threat.

In the present case the threat given was that if the Executive Engineer framed a charge-sheet against the Petitioner, the latter would not leave him alive. It is not only a threat of the kind mentioned in the section but also is evidence of the requisite intent which was not merely to cause alarm to the Executive Engineer but also to cause him to omit framing the charge-sheet as the means of avoiding death at the hands of the Petitioner. Whether or not the the Executive Engineer got actually alarmed and made up his mind not to charge-sheet the Petitioner because of the threat, is irrelevant to the determination of the question whether the Petitioner was guilty of an offence u/s 503 of the Indian Penal Code. The threat being of the kind mentioned in the section and the requisite intent being clearly deducible therefrom, the ingredients of the offence are complete

Learned Counsel has relied on Data Ram v. The Empress( 95 P.R. 1882), and Habibullak v. State(1961 M.P.L.J. 1190), in support of his con tention that the effect of the threat on the person to whom it is extended is an important consideration for the determination of the question whether the threat would be covered by the provision of Section 508 However, neither of the two authorities, in my opinion, helps him as they are both clearly distinguishable on facts. In Data Ram v. The Empressd the accused and the complainant had a quarrel. The former ran and fetched his sword but was seized by other persons and disarmed before he could use the weapon and then he asserted his intention of killing the complainant if he were let go. Holding that the requisite intent was absent, Rattigan J., who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench before which the case was argued, observed-

This'' however, cannot, we think, be construed into a threat to the complainant within the meaning of Section 503, Indian Penal Code, for the words used by the prisoner were uttered under circumstances which seem to negative the presence of that intention to intimidate which is required to be present in the mind of the person at the time of using the threat. The words in fact were uttered in ang er by a peron who was powerless at the time to inflict any injury, and which could not, therefore, have created any reasonable alaram in the mind of the complainant.

It was in the particular circumstances of the case that the requisite intent was negatived and those circumstances are certainly not akin to the situation in which the threat was given by the Petitioner in the present case, there having been no quarrel between the Executive Engineer and the Petitioner and and no cause for anger having been given to the latter by the former

In the Madhya Pradesh authority, all that was proved was that the accused had threatened a Tehsildar as follows:

main achhi trah sey dekh loonga aur is baat ka badla loonga .

The context in which these words were uttered is not stated and in holding that they did not fall within the ambit of Section 508 of the Indian Penal Code, S. B. Sen J , observed:

The most important ingredient of this offence is that there should be intention to cause alarm or to cause the person threatend to do any act which he is not legally bound to do. What was the threat in the words used is not clear. The words do not say that the applicant would assault him or would cause any harm to him. A Tehsildar of experience, as the present complainant is, would certainly not be alarmed by the mere use of the words "dekh loonga" and "badla loonga" P. W. Ramchandra Desai, Tehsildar also in his evidence has not stated how he was alarmed and what he thought the applicant would do. They may be words of abuses and empty threats. In the words used, there should be a clear indication as to what the accused was going to do and the complainant must feel as a reasonable man that the accused was going to convert his words into action. The Deputy Government Advocate has not been able to tell as to what the accused meant to do and what precisely the words were indicating the intent. Under these circumstances, therefore, the mere use of those words would not amount to criminal intimidation.

The observations proceeded on the absence of declared intention deducible from the threat itself and not really on the effect the threat had on the person threatened even though they include a remark that "the complainant must feel as a reasonable man, that the accused was going to convert his words into action." However, if the said remark is meant to lay down that unless the threat engender in the person threatened an apprehension that the threat would be put into execution the requisite intent must be deemed to be absent, I must express my respectful disagreement with it. The section talks of the intent of the person extending the threat and, therefore, only of his state of mind. The feelings of the victim of the offence do not come into the picture and can possibly have no relevance to the state of mind of the accused.

No other point has been urged before me and in the result, the petition fails and is dismissed.