Wassan Singh vs Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab

G.C. Garg, J.—Challenge in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to the orders dated 3.5.1977 Annexure P1,

26.12.1977 Annexure P2; 31.1.1979 Annexure P3 and 16.10.1984 Annexure P4 passed by respondent 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively.

The only controversy involved in this writ petition is whether the petitioner is entitled to transfer of land in his favour under Rule 34D of the

Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955 (for short the Rules) as a sublessee.

The authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (for short `the Act''), on a consideration of the matter

rejected the prayer of the petitioner for transfer of land to him on the ground that he did not fulfil the condition of being in continuous possession of

the land w.e.f. 1.1.1956 as contemplated by Rule 34C of the Rules ibid.

This case has a chequered history but bare facts are being noticed in order to highlight the controversy raised. Petition Wassan Singh son of

Mehar Singh applied for the transfer of urban agricultural land in his capacity as sublessee. His claim was accepted vide order dated 29.11.1968

for transfer of some land. Dharam Singh Bhalla son of Charan Dass Bhalla felt aggrieved by that order and he, therefore, filed appeal under

Section 22 of the Act. The Regional Settlement Commissioner, Jalandhar allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 29.11.1968. It also

deserves to be noticed that land measuring 26 kanals and 14 marlas was offered to one Gurdevi for Rs. 7020/ on 30.11.1957. This offer was

finally withdrawn on 5.9.1965 as Gurdevi did not respond to the offer made. Gurdevi, stated to have died on 6.3.1960 was survived by her

sisterinlaw Bachittar Kaur who was declared as her successorininterest vide order dated 21.5.1961. Aforesaid Bachittar Kaur also died on

17.11.1961 and as a consequence thereof, one Charan Dass made an application dated 30.8.1962 for transfer of the land in question as her legal

heir. Charan Dass was declared as successorininterest of Bachittar Kaur in July 1965. The Authorised Settlement Commissioner also declared one

Dilawar Singh son of Nihal Singh as the successorininterest of the aforesaid Bachittar Kaur. Charan Dass also died intestate and he was succeeded

by his son Dharam Singh.

Petitioner Wassan Singh submitted an application in 22.2.1968 for transfer of urban agricultural land to him as a subleassee. As already noticed,

he was held eligible for transfer of land as sublessee vide order dated 29.11.1968 but that order was set aside in appeal and the matter was

remanded for fresh decision after hearing the concerned parties. Revision field by the petitioner against the order of the Regional Settlement

Commissioner was dismissed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and it was ordered that the case be decided after hearing the parties.

The Assistant Settlement Officer by his order dated 3.5.1977 dismissed the application of the petitioner for transfer of land after coming to the

conclusion that he came into possession of the land as sublessee in Kharif 1957, and after observing that he (petitioner) was not in cultivating

possession from the crucial date i.e. 1.1.1956 in view of the revenue record produced before him in the shape of khasra girdawri. Oral evidence

produced by the petitioner in that behalf was not considered as valid. Appeal there against was dismissed by Shri M.L. Gottra, Settlement

Commissioner Punjab, Jalandhar by his order dated 26.12.1977. Learned Settlement Commissioner also came to the conclusion that possession

of Wassan Singh over the land in question was continuous from Kharif 1957 onwards and prior to that, his father Mehar Singh was in possession

of the said land. Oral evidence produced by the petitioner was considered and rejected and not relied upon by observing that the witnesses

produced by the petitioner were interested in him being his relations. Revision against the order of the Settlement Commissioner Punjab was

dismissed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab by order dated 31.1.1979. Chief Settlement Commissioner also recorded a finding that

the petitioner was never in possession of the land from 1.1.1956 onwards and, therefore, his claim for transfer of land as sublessee could not be

accepted.

Petitioner still aggrieved by the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, filed a petition U/s 33 of the Act against the order of the Chief

Settlement Commissioner passed on 31.1.1979. Learned Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary to Government Punjab Rehabilitation

Department by his order dated 16.10.1984 dismissed the petition U/s 33 of the Act filed by the petitioner. Learned Financial Commissioner

noticed that claim of the petitioner for transfer of land could only succeed if he was proved to be a sublessee of the land in dispute since 1.1.1956.

On a consideration of the matter, learned Financial Commissioner again came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not proved to be in

possession since 1.1.1956. Not only this, he also noticed that during the pendency of the petition, an application was moved by respondents 6 to

10 in this writ petition, stating that the petitioner had entered into an agreement with them whereby he gave possession of the land in dispute to

them who in turn purchased the land in auction on 25.1.1977. The writ petitioner in his reply dated 31.10.1983 to the aforesaid application stated

that even if some temporary arrangements had been made with the intervention of the respectables of the village regarding delivery of possession of

the land but it was not agreed to by him that he would give up his claim regarding transfer of the said land in his favour. It is in this situation the

present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the orders passed by the authorities under the Act.

Rules 34C and 34D of the Rules relating to allotment of evacuee agricultural land situated in urban areas under which the petitioner applied for

transfer of land read thus :

34C. Allotment of agricultural land of the value of Rs. 10,000/ or less Where any land to which this Chapter applies has been leased to a

displaced person and such lands consist of one or more Khasra and is valued at Rs. 10,000/ or less, the land shall be allotted to the lessee :

Provided that where any such land or any part thereof has been leased to a displaced person and the sublessee has been in occupation of such

land or part thereof continuously from the first January 1956, such land or part thereof, as the case may be, shall be allotted to such sublessee.

34D. Allotment of agricultural lands consisting of more than one Khasra, the value of which exceeds Rs. 10,000/. (1) Where any land to which the

Chapter applies has been leased to a displaced person and such land consists of more than one Khasra, the aggregate value of which exceeds Rs.

10,000/, such portion of the land, the value of which does not exceed Rs. 10,000/ as the Regional Settlement Commissioner may select, shall be

allotted to such person :

Provided that where any such land or any part thereof has been sub leased to a displaced person and the sublessee has been in occupation of that

land or part thereof continuously from the first January, 1956, such land or part thereof, as the case may be, the value of which does not exceed

Rs. 10,000/ as the Regional Settlement Commissioner may select, shall be allotted to such sublessee.

(2) In selecting the area for allotment under subrule (1), the Regional Settlement Commissioner shall have regard to the compactness of the area

and other relevant matters.

(3) For the purposes of allotment of land under this rule, no Khasra shall be subdivided.

In the written statement filed on behalf of the official respondents, claim of the petitioner for transfer of land was contested by averring that he is

not entitled to transfer of land under rules 34C and 34D of Chapter VA of the Rules ibid. It was highlighted that the authorities after considering the

evidence adduced by the petitioner have concurrently recorded a finding of fact that he was in possession of the land from Kharif 1957 and not

from 1.1.1956 as required by Rules 34C and 34D of the Rules. It was also stated that the land had already been offered for transfer to the original

lessee and her successorininterest.

Learned counsel for the petitioner by reference to a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 S.C.

2012 submitted that it is not the requirement of Rule 34C of the Rules that a person claiming transfer under the said rule must show that he is

recorded to be in possession in the revenue records. According to the learned counsel the condition to be fulfilled under the proviso for a sublessee

is that he is in occupation of land continuously from 1.1.1956 and that the entry in the revenue record is an important piece of evidence on the point

of possession and is not conclusive of the fact to be decided under rule 34C. According to the learned counsel the petitioner is admittedly

recorded to be in possession of the land as sublessee w.e.f. Kharif 1957 and prior thereto he was in possession w.e.f. 1.1.1956 though his father

is recorded to be in possession during the period 1.1.956 to Kharif 1957. The petitioner led evidence in the shape of oral evidence to show that in

fact he was in possession of the land from 1.1.1956 and the authorities have rejected his claim on wholly illegal and untenable ground by ignoring

the evidence produced by him regarding his possession.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case I am of the opinion that the contention

raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no merit. The petitioner has been found to be in possession of the land in question as sublessee

from Kharif 1957 and not prior thereto, by the authorities. The revenue record supports the conclusion of the authorities that the petitioner came in

possession only in Kharif 1957. The petitioner can only succeed for transfer of land under Chapter VA of the Rules ibid in his favour if he proves

that he was in possession of the land as sublessee w.e.f. 1.1.1956. The petitioner has produced his father and another relation as witnesses to

show that in fact it was he who was in possession of the land w.e.f. 1.1.1956 till Kharif 1957. All the authorities have rejected this evidence by

taking a view that the witnesses produced by the petitioner were interested to support the petitioner''s claim and thus no reliance could be placed

on their evidence. This is a pure finding of fact and is not liable to be interfered with. Even if two views are possible, the one taken by the

authorities below deserves to be accepted as it is not for this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to reappraise the

evidence and come to the conclusion different than the one arrived at by the authorities under the Act. In the reported case, the situation was

entirely different as the entries in the revenue record had been ordered to be corrected by the authorities and it was on that basis held that correct

entries were required to be taken into consideration and it were not only the original entries in the revenue record that were to form the basis of the

claim made. In the present case, nothing has been brought on the record of the writ petition or on the record of the authorities below that the

entries in the revenue record were corrected in favour of the petitioner at any point of time either by the revenue authorities or by civil court. The

oral evidence produced by the petitioner was considered and was not found satisfactory to conclude that the petitioner was in possession of the

land in question w.e.f. 1.1.1956. Once it is concluded that the petitioner is not proved to be in possession of the land w.e.f. 1.1.1956, he is not

entitled to transfer of the land under Rules 34C and 34D of the Rules. As already noticed, a firm finding which is a finding of fact has been arrived

at by the authorities that the petitioner has failed to prove that he was in possession of the land in question w.e.f. 1.1.1956. Thus no exception can

be taken to the view taken by the authorities under the Act.

Present is not a case where oral evidence or the evidence other than the revenue record produced by the petitioner was not considered by the

authorities before recording a finding that the petitioner has failed to prove his possession w.e.f. 1.1.1956. In the reported case it was only held

that the evidence other than the revenue record can also be looked into for coming to the conclusion as to whether the claimant is in possession of

the land w.e.f. the stipulated date. The evidence other than the revenue record has been considered by the authorities and the finding has been

recorded thereafter. But this apart, the petitioner himself surrendered possession of the land in dispute in favour of respondents 6 to 10 who had

purchased the land in auction on 25.1.1977 after entering into an agreement with them. This fact could not be denied by the learned counsel for the

petitioner. He, however, only submitted that this act of the petitioner did not debar him to have the land transferred in his favour on his proving that

he was in possession of the land w.e.f. 1.1.1956. In my opinion, this act of the petitioner whereby he entered into an agreement with the action

purchasers and surrendered possession of the land in their favour, also disentitles him to the grant of the discretionary relief by this Court in

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Apart from the above, it deserves to be noticed here that the petitioner may have remained in possession of the land for years together but the

perusal of the agreement, Annexure R1 attached with the written statement goes to show that the petitioner entered into an agreement with the

auction purchasers and even voluntarily surrendered possession of the land to them. In the agreement the petitioner agreed that he shall not raise

any dispute regarding possession of the land in question and in case he interferes with their possession over the said land, he would be liable to pay

all expenses that the auction purchasers may spend in that behalf. From the very wording of the agreement it is clear that some sort of arrangement

or compromise was arrived at between the petitioner and the auction purchasers, apparently on payment of some money in lieu of his voluntarily

surrendering possession of the land in their favour though on the intervention of the respectables of the village. This sole development of petitioner''s

having entered into an agreement and the fact of his voluntarily surrendering possession of the land speaks volume of his intention of not staking his

primary claim for transfer of land any more. In other words, it can well be inferred that the petitioner after having miserably failed before the

authorities under the Act, almost felt satisfied with his claim on entering into an agreement with the auction purchasers and thereby voluntarily

surrendering possession of the land even before approaching this Court, and by filing the present writ petition the petitioner seems to have taken a

final chance, of course, by making a false submission that he was in possession of the land in question in Rabi 1956. Thus, having regard to this

later development also, I am not inclined to interfere in the matter and grant any relief to the petitioner.

For the reasons stated above, this writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.