WHEELS WORLD vs UMDA SINGH LAMBA

WHAT should be the approximately reasonable period within which a revision petition under Section 17(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act should ordinarily be preferred, is the significant threshold question in the case.

THE facts relevant to the issue aforesaid alone merit a brief recapitulation. Way back in the mid year 1990 Sh. Umda Singh Lamba, Advocate had preferred a complaint against the present revision petitioner M/s. Wheels World before the District Forum at Hisar. THE order in the said complaint was rendered against the petitioner exparte as late as the 3rd of August, 1990. Apparently no appeal against the said order was preferred. Partial default in compliance with the order aforesaid having taken place, the District Forum initiated proceedings against the petitioner under Section 27 and directed them to appear before the Forum on the 14th of February, 1991. In a written reply thereto the petitioner took up the stand that they were not liable to pay any interest as well as expenses which had been directed to be paid by the original order. It would seem that no personal appearance or through Counsel was put in and the District Forum construing the stand taken in refusing to comply fully with the earlier order as somewhat contumacious, directed that Sh. Madan Lal, Company Secretary be sentenced to undergo imprisonment for one month and pay a fine of Rs. 500/-. This order was rendered on the 21st of February, 1991. It was as late as the 1st of July, 1991 that the present revision petition has been presented against the very initiation of proceedings under Section 27 of the Act. As already noticed, this would be nearly five months later from the date of the original issue of notice under Section 27 of the Act and equally belated as regards the final order passed in the said proceedings. Inevitably the matter was first listed for arguments on the preliminary issue of limitation.

Mr. Anil Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has primarily contended that under the Act or the rules framed thereunder no specific period of limitation has been prescribed for preferring the revision under Section 17(1)(b). It was sought to be argued that whilst a strict period of 30 days has been prescribed in Section 15 of the Act for preferring appeals, the statute has chosen to remain silent on the period within which a revision is to be presented. On these premises, it was forcefully submitted that the issue of delay in this context does not arise at all.

WE regret our inability to subscribe to what appear to us as a somewhat tall proposition that a revision under Section 17(1)(b) can be presented at any time irrespective of any limitation whatsoever. Such a submission appears to run against the basic premises of legal jurisprudence. It is true that neither the Act nor the Rules framed thereunder have chosen to fix a period of limitation for preferring a revision Petition. However, this fact or if one may term it as a lacuna does not give a carte-balanche to a litigant to challenge the order of the District Forum long after they have attained finality by way of a revision petition. The question of delay or laches in this matter in such a situation cannot be brushed aside and if it has not been prescribed by the framers of the law the gap has to be filled in by sound practice and judicial precedent. The present statute is not done in the context of an application or revision not being governed by an express period of limitation. Nevertheless, practice, procedure, and sound precedent has always laid a time frame within which reasonably a revision may be entertained barring very exceptional circumstances. In the light of the above, one is faced with the somewhat ticklish and vexed question as to what would be the normal period within which a revision under Section 17(1)(b) is to be ordinarily entertained. The broad guidelines, therefore, can be gathered from the large purposes of the statute and the specific provisions of the Act and the Rules. In this context what has first to be borne in mind is the undisputed fact that the very object & intent in bringing the present Act on the statute book is to give expenditious and summary relief to the harassed class of consumers. That object and purpose would obviously be defeated, if litigation under the Act is allowed to be dragged inordinately which would be the necessary result, if revisions can be preferred at any time irrespective of delay. The legislatures'' focus on expeditious disposal is again manifest from the fact that the limitation for preferring appeals both to the State Commission under Section 15 and to the National Commission under Section 19 are confined to the narrowest limit of 30 days only and not more. Yet again the mandate of the rules emphasises the expedition within which the matters are to be decided in the consumer jurisdiction. The proceedings before the District Redressal Forums as laid down in Rule 4(9) of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 (hereinafter called the Rules) mandate that complaints which do not require analysis or testing of the goods should be decided within 90 days and those requiring such tests be disposed of within 150 days. Similarly the solicitude of the framers in the context of appeals is exhibited by the mandate in Rule 8(8) which provides that not more than one adjournment shall ordinarily be given and the appeal should be decided within 90 days from the first date of hearing.

ALL the aforesaid factors are, therefore, a clear pointer to the larger principle that revisions under the Act though not expressly provided for by any strict rule of limitation are nevertheless to be filed by the litigants with reasonable expedition and be disposed of with matching promptitude. It deserves recalling that in many other statutes in which applications or revisions are not governed by an express mandate of limitation, the lacuna is invariably provided by sound practice and procedure laid down by judicial precedent. Particularly in this context one has to notice that even though no period of limitation for presenting a writ petition under Article 226 is provided by the constitution or perhaps by any other provisions, yet the High Courts and the Final Court have been unanimous in holding that delay and unexplained laches in presenting them would become a bar at the very threshold. This larger salutary principle is equally if not more forcibly attracted in the context of the revisional jurisdiction under the Consumer Protection Act. The crucial question however, remains as to what would be the appropriate time-frame within which ordinarily a revision filed by a litigant is to be entertained. We are inclined to take the view that on taking a cue from the prescribed period for disposal of complaints, and the limitation for the presentation of appeals and their disposal, one can with considerable liberality and latitude lay down the rule that ordinarily a revision petition filed by a litigant should be considered only within time if presented within 60 days from the date of the order. A note of caution however, must be struck in the light of the aforesaid mandate. It is trite learning that a judicial guideline will not operate with the precision and strictitude of a Section or Article of an express limitation provision. Exceptional circumstances may well warrant the extending of that period in the context of the peculiarities and other factors of a particular case. The general concept of sufficient cause for not presenting a revision petition within the ordinary rule of 60 days, would equally be attracted on larger principles.

YET again it deserves highlighting that Section 17(1)(b) expressly confers on the State Commission the power to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in its revisional jurisdiction thereunder. This power is not necessarily contingent on the making of a formal application and can be exercised suo-moto by the Commission. No fetter can be easily placed on the conferment of this suo-moto jurisdiction of the Commission to act in this context. Consequently any prescription of the time-frame spelt out above would apply only to revision petitions filed by the private litigants.

APPLYING the aforesaid principle, it would appear that the present revision petition does not in any way measure up to the guidelines laid. As noticed already the original order of the District Forum on the 3rd of August, 1990 had mandatorily directed compliance within one month of its pronouncement on pain of invoking Section 27 in the event of default. The said order was complied with in toto. Notice of proceedings under Section 27 was issued much later on the 29th of January, 1991 and the final order passed on the 21st of February, 1991. In the original revision petition dated the 1st of July, 1991 not a hint or explanation is sought to be given for approaching this Commission after gross delay. Much latitude was given to the petitioner and another application was allowed to be placed on record with additional documents on the 11th of July, 1991. Therein also nothing whatsoever is mentioned to mitigate the gross laches in coming up before this Commission. No supporting affidavit or evidence pointing to any legitimate cause for what appears to us as a cavalier attitude in presenting this after unexplained delay has been even attempted to be place on record. Consequently, in the light of the above we are constrained to hold that this revision petition has been presented after un-explained delay and gross laches and is hereby dismissed on that ground. Revision dismissed.