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Judgment
U.N. Sinha, J.—This writ application has been filed by the workmen of Pure Kustore Colliery represented by Khan Mazdoor Congress under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, praying tha,t an award given by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabbalpur, dated 10 August 1967, in Reference No. 30 of 1964 (Dhanbad Tr.)/Reference No. CGIT/LC (R) (16)/67 (Jabbalpur Tribunal), be quashed, An industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication and the issue was to the following'' effect:
Whether the termination of services of the following workmen with effect from 30 December 1963 lay the management of Pure Kustore Colliery was justified? If not, to what relief are the workmen entitled ?-
(1) Sheodat Chamar.
(2) Chhotu Chamar.
(3) Bishram Chamar.
(4) Rambachan Chamar.
(5) Deodas Ahir (Jadav).
(6) Ramnath Kumbhar.
(7) Darshan Rajbhar.
(8) Wokil Chamar.
(9) Pancham Koeri.
(10) Alku Bhar.
(11) Balkaran Bhar.
(12) Bachan Bhar.
(13) Mithu Kalwar.
Substantially two points were agitated before the industrial tribunal, namely, whether the employer had contravened Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or not. That is to say, the question was whether the employer had followed the principle of retrenching the thirteen workmen in question, in the manner, last to come and first to go. The other question was based on the contention raised u/s 25F of the Act, as according to the Mazdoor Congress, the employer had not followed the requirements of that section in retrenching these workmen. It may be stated at this stage that we are concerned with those sections of the Industrial Disputes Act, as they were before 30 December 1963.
The tribunal has held that the employer had duly complied with Section 25G of the Act, as these workmen were juniormost workmen employed. On the interpretation of Section 25F read with Section 25B of the Act, the tribunal has held that as no one of the concerned workmen had put in one year''s service, Section 25F was not attracted. Although in interpreting Section 25B reference was made by the presiding officer to the Act as it now stands, the ultimate conclusion was not affected, because of the finding that the workmen had not put in one year''s service.
Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to Sections 25B and 25P of the Act and has contended that any of these thirteen workmen who had worked for 240 days before 30 December 1953 was entitled to the benefit of Section 25F, even if he was not in service for twelve calendar months before retrenchment. It is now clear that the question has been settled by the Supreme Court in two cases, where Sections 25B and 25F have been considered and these decisions are Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, and Employers in Relation to Digwadih Colliery Vs. Their Workmen, . The interpretation of Section 25F of the Act was given by the Supreme Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, in connexion with the employees named Nagan Bora and Manoharan. With reference to Section 62F of the Act their lordships have stated thus at p. 370:
On the plain terms of the section only a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer is entitled to its benefit....
Thereafter, their lordships have considered the periods of employment and have stated thus at p. 370:
... The position therefore is that during a period of employment for less than eleven calendar months these two persons worked for more than 240 days. In our opinion, that would not satisfy the requirement of Section 25B. Before a workman can be considered to have completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than twelve calendar months, and next that during those twelve calendar months had worked for not less than 240 days. Whereas in the present case, the workmen have not at all been employed for a period of twelve calendar months it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual days of work numbered 240 days or more. For, in any case, the requirements of Section 25B would not be satisfied by the mere fact of the number of working days toeing not less than 240 days.
This decision clearly indicates that the approach made by the presiding officer of the tribunal was a correct one when he stated that none of the concerned workmen can get the retrenchment benefits, because they had not put in one year''s service. This matter has been considered by the Supreme Court also in the case of Employers in Relation to Digwadih Colliery Vs. Their Workmen, mentioned above. Their lordships have dealt with the arguments advanced on the amendment made in Section 25B of the Act in 1964 and have stated that the amended Section 25B only consolidates the previous Sections 25B and 2(eee) in one place, of course, adding some other matter. The only change which has been made in Section 25F(b) has been referred to by their lordships. Therefore, the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works (P) Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, is conclusive on the question that before the workmen concerned in this case could claim the benefits of the provisions of Section 25F, they had to show that they were in continuous service for not less than one year, and as none of these workmen were in service for twelve calendar months, their claim u/s 25F has rightly failed.
With respect to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners based on Section 25G, the matter stands thus : some lists had been filed on behalf of the employer to show that Section 25G had been complied with, in the sense that, the workmen concerned were junior-most in employment. Learned counsel has argued that after these lists had been filed on behalf of the employer, copies thereof had been forwarded to the Mazdoor Congress and they had been received so late that their objection sent to the industrial tribunal had arrived a day later than the day of the award and therefore, the Mazdoor Congress had no opportunity to prove that those lists were erroneous. I have considered the award of the industrial tribunal in this respect under issue (3) and I have looked into the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of employer respondent 2 and the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the petitioner and it does not appear that the grievance is of such a nature that this Court must interfere at this stage. A copy of the written statement filed on behalf of the workmen has been attached to the counter-affidavit filed by the employer. It was stated in Para. 7 thereof that; the management had not followed the principle mentioned in Section 25G of the Act, having retained junior workmen in service. Not only no particular instances were given, but in Para. 14 of the same written statement it was stated that even assuming without admitting that the workmen concerned were the juniormost in their category in the entire colliery, the Chief Inspector of Mines had demolished the assumption on which the retrenchment was based. A rejoinder to the workmen''s statement of claim has also been appended and in Para. 7 of it, it was stated that the workmen concerned were the juniormost in their category. It was denied that any workmen junior to them were retained in service. In this view of the record, it does not appear from the award that the witnesses examined on behalf of the workmen had given any particular instance where any junior workman was retained while the petitioners were retrenched. With respect to the lists filed on behalf of the employer and dealt with in Para. 8 of the award, it is clear that the presiding officer had not acted on these lists alone. It appears that he had looked into the conciliation report and the presiding officer has stated that his conclusions were based on the lists filed as well as on the registers filed and exhibited as Exs. E. 32 to K. 35.
Therefore, it is clear that the conclusion arrived at by the presiding officer to the effect that the concerned workmen were the juniormost was not based only on the lists submitted by the employer. He had verified this matter from other documentary evidence mentioned by him in the award. I do not think that any ground has been made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner on this point for obtaining any relief.
In the result the application must fail and it is dismissed, but, under the circumstances of the case, without costs.
B.N. Jha, J.
I agree.
