High CourtsSingle Bench

X vs State of U.P. and Another

Allahabad High Court · Decided on 26 November 2025 · Citation: (2025) 11 AHC CK 1828

HON’BLE JUDGES
Vinai Kumar Dwivedi, J · Salil Kumar Rai, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 313, 378 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 34, 302
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Revision No. 6244 Of 2025
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Judgment

52 paragraphs · 3,441 words

Jai Prakash Tiwari, J

1.

Heard learned counsel for the revisionist, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the entire material available on record.

2.

This criminal revision has been filed under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 for setting aside the order dated 25.08.2025 passed by learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Additional Sessions Judge, Room No. 13, Saharanpur in Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2025, titled X through its natural guardian/mother vs. State of U.P. and another and the order dated 19.3.2025 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Saharanpur in Misc. Case No. 04 of 2025; arising out of Case Crime No. 475 of 2025, under Sections 103(1), 3(5) B.N.S. and Section 3/25/27 Arms Act, Police Station Rampur Maniharan, District Saharanpur, whereby the Juvenile Justice Board determined the age of the revisionist on the basis of radiological report/medical report dated 27.02.2025 as well as 10.03.2025 instead of the date of birth mentioned in the High School Marksheet of the revisionist as '12.12.2008'.

3.

Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that a FIR regarding alleged incident was lodged on 14.12.2024 against the X Juvenile and others with the allegations that on the same day at about 08:00 AM, the son of the informant aged about 17 years went at Chaudhary Medical Stores, where he was sweeping at the shop. At that time, the minor accused came with country-made pistol and assaulted the son of informant by which he received injuries in his stomach, thereafter, he was admitted in the hospital in serious condition and later on died. It is submitted that at the time of incident, the revisionist X Juvenile was minor and he was falsely implicated in the subject case and on the date of incident, he was aged about 16 years and 2 days and as per his educational certificates, his date of birth is 12.12.2008, and there is no discrimination of the date of birth in any document. Thereafter, his mother was filed an application for declaration of juvenility of his son. It is next submitted that after issuance of notices, the Juvenile Justice Board vide its order dated 27.02.2025 directed the Chief Medical Officer, Gautam Budh Nagar to medically examine the X juvenile for determination of his age. Thereafter, vide order dated 19.03.2025, the Juvenile Justice Board, Saharanpur determined the age of the minor as 17 years, 09 months and 4 days as per medical report dated 10.03.2025 of the CMO concerned. It is next submitted that being aggrieved by the order of Juvenile Justice Board, the revisionist filed a criminal appeal on the ground that the date of birth of the X Juvenile as mentioned in the high school certificate should have been given preference instead of determination of age by medical examination of the minor. It is further submitted that the appellate court also failed to consider the above fact and dismissed the appeal of the revisionist affirming the order dated 19.03.2025 passed by Juvenile Justice Board. The order of the appellate Court has been challenged on behalf of the revisionist through his natural guardian before this Court.

4.

It is submitted by the learned counsel for the revisionist that the impugned order has been passed against the settled principles of law and against the provisions of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act and therefore, the impugned order is not sustainable in law.

5.

Learned A.G.A. has opposed the submissions made by the learned counsel for the revisionist and has submitted that the judgment of the appellate court is in accordance with law.

6.

For deciding the present controversy, a perusal of Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is required to be made, which is as follows:-

"94. Presumption and determination of age.-

(1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining-

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board:

Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person."

7.

Here, it would be necessary to mention some legal principles propounded by the Hon'ble Courts regarding the determination of age of Juvenile (minor).

In Jyoti Prakash Rai vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2008 SC 1696, the Hon'ble Court in para '9' held that:-

"9. The 2000 Act is indisputably a beneficial legislation. Principles of beneficial legislation, however, are to be applied only for the purpose of interpretation of the statute and not for arriving at a conclusion as to whether a person is juvenile or not. Whether an offender was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence or not is essentially a question of fact which is required to be determined on the basis of the materials brought on records by the parties. In absence of any evidence which is relevant for the said purpose as envisaged under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, the same must be determined keeping in view the factual matrix involved in each case. For the said purpose, not only relevant materials are required to be considered, the orders passed by the court on earlier occasions would also be relevant."

8.

A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard.Relevant Section 35 of Indian Evidence Act reads as under:-

"35. Relevancy of entry in public [record of an electronic record] [Substituted by Act 21 of 2000, Section 92 and Sch.II, for "record" (w.e.f. 17.10.2000).] made in performance of duty. An entry in any public or other official book, register or [record or an electronic record] [Substituted by Act 21 of 2000, Section 92 and Sch.II, for "record" (w.e.f. 17.10.2000).], stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or [record or an electronic record] [Substituted by Act 21 of 2000, Section 92 and Sch.II, for "record" (w.e.f. 17.10.2000)] is kept, is itself a relevant fact."

9.

In Vishnu vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 1 SCC 283, Hon'ble the Apex Court in para '20' opined that:-

"20. It is urged before us by Mr. Lalit that the determination of the age of the prosecutrix by conducting ossification test is scientifically proved and, therefore, the opinion of the doctor that the girl was of 18-19 years of age should be accepted. We are unable to accept this contention for the reasons that the expert medical evidence is not binding on the ocular evidence. The opinion of the medical officer is to assist the court as he is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the medical officer is really of an advisory character and not binding on the witness of fact."

In Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit reported in AIR 1988 SC 1796, the Apex Court has held that:

"To render a document admissible under section 35 of the Evidence Act, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law.An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under section 35 of the Act, but the entry regarding the age of 3 person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded."

In BholaBhagat vs. State of Bihar [AIR 1998 SC 236], the Apex Court has held that:-

"Keeping in view the beneficial nature of the socially-oriented legislation, it is an obligation of the court where such a plea is raised to examine that plea with care and it cannot fold its hands and without returning a positive finding regarding that plea, deny the benefit of the provisions to an accused. The court must hold an enquiry and return a finding regarding the age, one way or the other. We expect the High Courts and subordinate courts to deal with such cases with more sensitivity, as otherwise the object of the Acts would be frustrated and the effort of the Legislature to reform the delinquent child and reclaim him as a useful member of the society would be frustrated."

In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi vs. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 584, it was held by the Apex Court that:-

"21. Determination of the date of birth of a person before a court of law, whether in a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Such a date of birth has to be determined on the basis of the materials on records. It will be a matter of appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. Different standards having regard to the provision of Section 35 of the Evidence Act cannot be applied in a civil case or a criminal case."

In Birad Mal Singhvi vs. Anand Purohit (supra), the Apex Court has further held that:

"Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act lays down that entry in any public, official book, register, record stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty specially enjoined by the law of the country is itself the relevant fact. To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record, secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding to the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded."

In State of Maharashtra vs. Gajanan Hemant Janardhan Wankhede (2008) 8 SCC 38, in para '14', it is held that:

"There is no requirement at the time of admission documents are to be produced as regards the age of the student."

In Babloo Pasi vs. State of Jharkhand and another [AIR 2009 SC 314], it is held that:-

"16. Age of accused-Determination- Medical Board's opinion based on radiological examination is a useful factor- However, opinion per se is not conclusive proof of age."

In P. Yuvaprakash vs. State Rep. By Inspector of Police [2023 INSC 676] [Criminal Appeal No(s). 1898 of 2023, it was held by the Apex Court that:-

"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

15.

In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,3 this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

“20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the

JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.

16.

Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

“Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category."

In Rajni vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1183], the Apex Court has held in paras 25.1 and 33 (33.2.3) that:-

"25.1. Thus the process of age determination is provided in sub-section (2) of Section 94 which is identical to the procedure prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007. Sub-section (2) of Section 94 says that to undertake the process of age determination, the child welfare committee or the JJB shall seek evidence in the following manner:

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned Board, if available;

(ii) in the absence thereof, the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) in the absence of (i) and (ii), the age shall be determined by an ossification test or by any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the child welfare committee or the JJB."

33(33.2.3.) When an application claiming juvenility is made under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 before the JJ Board when the matter regarding the alleged commission of offence is pending before a court, then the procedure contemplated under Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would apply. Under the said provision if the JJ Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Board shall undertake the process of age determination by seeking evidence and the age recorded by the JJ Board to be the age of the person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of the JJ Act, 2015, be deemed to be true age of that person. Hence the degree of proof required in such a proceeding before the JJ Board, when an application is filed seeking a claim of juvenility when the trial is before the criminal court concerned, is higher than when an inquiry is made by a court before which the case regarding the commission of the offence is pending (vide Section 9 of the JJ Act, 2015)."

10.

A bare perusal of the aforesaid section shows that only after the documents provided under Sub Clause (i) or Sub Clause (ii) of Section 94(2) of the Act are not available, the ossification test of the accused can be ordered. In the present case, the documents as per sub-clause (i) were produced before the Board but were not considered. As per the aforesaid sub clauses only in the absence of the documents mentioned sub-clause (i) or (ii) resort to ossification test should be made. In the present case, the board as well as Appellate Court committed patent error of law in relying upon the ossification test report as per sub-clause (iii) when the documents produced before the board as per sub clauses- (i) and (ii) were brought on record.

11.

So in the present case, medical opinion was improperly relied upon despite the existence of valid document, i.e. High School certificate available on record.

12.

Accordingly, the revision is allowed.

13.

The order dated 25.08.2025 passed by learned Special Judge (POCSO)/Additional Sessions Judge, Room No. 13, Saharanpur in Criminal Appeal No. 28 of 2025, titled X through its natural guardian/mother vs. State of U.P. and another and the order dated 19.3.2025 passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Saharanpur in Misc. Case No. 04 of 2025; arising out of Case Crime No. 475 of 2025, under Sections 103(1), 3(5) B.N.S. and Section 3/25/27 Arms Act, Police Station Rampur Maniharan, District Saharanpur, are hereby set aside and the matter be remanded back to the court concerned to decide the matter afresh, in accordance with law.

14.

Office is directed to communicate this order to the concerned court.