Y. Muidanna vs Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur and another

Kumarayya, J.—The petitioner, a bus operator on the route Nambulpulikunta to Penukonda in Anantapur district, seeks for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting variation to the 2nd respondent by extending his route from Talamarla to Penukonda. The 2nd respondent is a transport operator plying two of his vehicles on the route pulivendla to Talamarla. This route is an inter-district route lying within two districts Anantapur and Cuddapah. As the major portion of the route lay within Anantapur District, the previous permits were granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur. There was a proposal for connecting Penukonda via Talamarla. But that proposal on the objections of the petitioner and two others was rejected on 26-10-1964. Then again on 30-11-1964 the Regional Transport Authority published the application of the 2nd respondent u/s 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act inviting representations from interested persons. After considering the various representations, the Regional Transport Authority reached the conclusion that there was need to connect Penukonda with Pullivendla and granted variation of the permit in favour of 2nd respondent by granting extensions from Talamarla to Penukonda, the extended route being entirely within his district.

The petitioner takes exception to this step for his case is that the variation was effected without considering his representations and without affording to him due opportunity and that when once the Regional Transport Authority had rejected the proposal for variation earlier he could not in law review his own resolution and without fresh material within a short time grant variation to the 2nd respondent, that besides variation could not be granted without the prior concurrence of the Regional Transport Authority, Cuddapah which could be given only after due publication and inviting representations by the Regional Transport Authority Cuddapah as well and that as the petitioner has common sector to certain extent, namely Kadiri to Ketacheru, he is put to loss and hardship by the grant. It is on these grounds that the variation is sought to be set aside.

The 2nd respondent resists this petition firstly on the ground that the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved party as his right to ply stage carriage is not infringed nor any condition of his permit is varied. Further his route is altogether different from the extended route. He has no locus standi to question the variation also because he did not send his representation in response to the publication u/s 57(3). It was further urged that the legal grounds as taken are not tenable for all that is necessary in such cases (and that only because it is a case of variation even though extended route is wholly within the region of Anantapur) is that the permit will not be valid in the other region unless the same is counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region. It is the case of the respondent that the proceedings for counter signature have been in fact started as the Regional Transport Authority of Anantapur has directed him not to ply the bus on the extended route unless and until the permits are duly counter-signed. In these circumstances it is urged that it is not a case for issue of a writ of certiorari especially when the variation was expressly granted in public interest and having due regard to the balance of convenience.

Mr. Adinarayana Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner raised four points in support of his case. Firstly it is urged that when once proceeding u/s 47 ended in favour of the petitioner within a short period thereafter they could not be reopened by acting u/s 57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Secondly proceedings u/s 57(3) were not valid unless there was a decision taken u/s 47. Thirdly when the petitioner had sent his representation the matter could not be decided without giving him a notice. Lastly as the route lies within two districts even in case of variation the procedure to be followed being that of grant of new permit, concurrence of the Regional Transport Authority within the meaning of Rule 209 of the Motor Vehicles Rules was a condition precedent for the grant of permit and that as such a concurrence was not obtained the order of variation is bad in law.

I proceed to consider the above points one by one. I take up the third point first It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that he had sent a representation to Regional Transport Authority on publication of the application. This has been categorically denied by the respondent. Indeed if he had sent a representation in time he should have sent a copy of it to the 2nd respondent also under the provisions of law. (See Section 57(4)). Not only the and respondent has denied the receipt thereof, put also this representation does not find place in the records or the Regional Transport Authority. In the absence of any conclusive proof therefor his contention cannot be accepted. It is obvious at any rate that this court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction would not enquire into questions of fact. It is indisputable that notice can be claimed only if representation was made in response to the publication. It is common ground that notices were given to all others who claim to have been denied the same privilege had his representation reached the authorities. Such being the case, he cannot complain of any infraction of his right or invalidity of me order in question by reason of want of notice to him.

Points (1) and (2) may be conveniently considered together. The contention is that a decision reached u/s 47 by R.T.A. as to the interests of the Public generally cannot be reviewed by him at short interval. It is also urged that a decision u/s 47 is a condition precedent for publication of the application u/s 57(3) for the grant of permit. Reliance however, is placed on the dictum of Supreme Court in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash, AIR 1963 SC 64. The question there was not exactly the same, but somewhat different. At any rate, it was not raised in the like manner. There in an order passed u/s 48, the matter was eventually taken in revision to the Government. The question arose whether the Government, as a Revisional authority, could grant permits beyond the limits fixed u/s 47(3). The answer to this was in me negative. Not a single observation in that Judgment supports the contention that once when the power was exercised by the Regional Transport Authority u/s 47(3), the laid Authority has no power to revise its previous decision.

In fact their Lordships on the other hand observed that the Regional Transport Authority has such power and that it could be exercised usually by resolution and even if there be no proof of subsequent resolution in case of new Routes, it may be legitimate to conclude as to the limit of number of carriages from the number of vacancies shown in the advertisement Inviting applications. Their Lordships further observed that if the said authority has limited the number of resolution or otherwise, he like other authorities, whether appellate or revisional, is bound by the same, while purporting to act u/s 48 for the grant of permit. The power to revise by the Regional Transport Authority therefore, should not be confused with the powers which It has, when it is dealing with the grant or refusal of the permits u/s 48. That power to revise the general order passed by it u/s 47(3) is a separate power vested in the authority and certainly not a power arising when it is dealing with the grant of individual permits.

As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in Chittoor Conveyance Corporation v. R.T.A. Chittoor, 1960 Andh LT 1011 the decision to open a new route or to vary an existing route is purely a tentative decision liable to be revised. The Madras High Court inter alia observed in Mudaliandan Mudaliar v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1958-2 Mad LJ (NRC) 59 that the sanction of a new route or the refusal to sanction it is purely an administrative measure and in deciding matters of general interest or policy, the R.T.A. need not hear any parties. of course the discretion has to be exercised having regard to S. 47(1). The proceeding at any rate is administrative in nature. Thus the contention, that when once the Regional Transport Authority comes to a decision u/s 47, he cannot revise the same, cannot merit acceptance. In any event, it is totally misconceived.

The contention that the delimiting of the number of carriages did not precede the grant of permits is equally devoid of force. Here is a. case of variation of the existing route by extending it (the existing route) from Talamarla to Penukonda. There is no question of raising the limit of number of carriages which stood already fixed for the existing routes. The same number has to be maintained on the extended areas, the whole route being one. The R.T.A though originally had thought that the variation is not in the public interest, later on consideration of various circumstances, he the said authority, came to the conclusion that extension is necessary in the public interest. The resolution was passed to that effect and permits were granted thereafter, the number of carriages being already delimited. The petitioner therefore cannot complain of any patent illegality or irregularity in this behalf.

However it may also be remembered that, while decision u/s 47 by way of resolutions is administrative in nature, the grant of permit u/s 48 is of quasi-Judicial nature and has to be made objectively after considering the representations of the persons interested. This aspect of the matter takes me to the third and fourth points raised. I have already dealt with the third point. Now I consider the fourth. Before that I may incidentally notice the scheme of the Act.

The Motor Vehicles Act has been enacted for regulating the transport by means of motor vehicles. Under its scheme no owner of a transport vehicle can use or permit the use of a vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or counter-signed by a Regional or State Transport Authority authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used. The grant or refusal of permit has therefore far-reaching consequences on the transport business. The Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained code embodying the provisions as to the manner in which the permits are to be applied for, the procedure that may be followed by the authorities concerned, the consider the which should move the prescribed authority the grant or refusal of permits and the remedies open to the aggrieved Parties. The applications for various categories of vehicles as prescribed in various provisions have to be made in accordance with Section 87(1) and (2) of the Act and the authority concerned following the procedure laid down in that section, taking into consideration the criteria in Section 47 and other relevant provisions grants the permits u/s 48 or other provisions as the case may be having regard to the description of the vehicles. An application for variation of conditions of permit by the inclusion of new area or route etc. has to be treated u/s 57(8) as a fresh application for purposes of grant of permit and has to be dealt with by the authorities concerned accordingly. So then it the route lies in different regions of the same State compliance with the provisions of Section 45 read with Section 63 is but essential. Such is the scheme of the Act. In the Instant case, we are concerned with the grant of variation of condition of permit by extending the route to a new point which lies within the region of R.T.A. Anantapur. The entire route, however, from Pulllvendla to Penukonda for which a permit has to be granted lies within two districts, viz., Cuddapah and Anantapur. The major portion of the area being In Anantapur district, the application for permit, as made, Is quite In consonance with the provisions of Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act which says that if it is proposed to use the vehicles in two or more regions lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies. When after considering the various criteria laid down u/s 47, the Regional Transport Authority comes to the conclusion that a permit should be granted, Section 68(1) of the Act is brought into play which provides as follows:

Except as may be otherwise prescribed, a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority of any one region shall not be valid in any other region unless the permit has been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region, and a permit granted in any one (State) or by the Regional Transport authority concerned.

That is the only condition attached to the enforceability of the permit as granted. Of course the procedure for counter signature prescribed must also be fully complied with.

It would appear from the counter filed by the Respondents that after the matter was considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Anantapur on 25-6-65 variation was granted as prayed for. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority entered the same in the permits of the petitioner and in proceedings dated 21-7-65 in R.C. No. 4040/A-1/63 directed him at the same time not to ply on the extended portion of the route unless the said permits are countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority. Cuddapah. The respondent accordingly filed an application before the Regional Transport Authority, Cuddapah for grant of counter signature and the proposal was notified in R. No. 10416/ A-1 /65 dated 22-10-65. The last date for filing the representations before the Regional Transport Authority, Cuddapah was fixed as 17-11-65, and the matter was posted for consideration to 6-12-65 which was adjourned on the ground that the writ petition is pending in this court. Thus it would appear after the permit was granted the proceedings for counter signature were started as provided by Section 63(3). Apparently, there seems to be no formal defect under the provisions of the Act either in the grant of the permit, or the proceedings for counter signature started thereafter.

But the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on Rule 209(2) contends that the permit itself could not be granted without the previous concurrence of the Regional Transport Authority of Cuddapah and hence the impugned order is bad in law. Rule 209 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1964, is to the following effect:

Permit endorsement when not necessary within the State Rule 209(1):

The Regional Transport Authority of one region may subject to the provisions of Section 45, grant a permit to be valid in any other regions within the State without the counter signature of the Regional Transport Authority of the other region or of each of the other regions concerned and shall as soon as possible, send copies of proceedings relating to the issue of such permit. Provided that no..........

(2) The Regional Transport Authority granting a permit under sub-rule (1) shall before granting a permit.

(a) in case of a stage carriage permit, obtain the concurrence of the Regional Transport Authority concerned;

(b) notify under sub-section (3) of Section 57 the whole of the route or area which lies within the State and in respect of which an application for the grant of permit has been received by publishing the same on the notice board of the Regional Transport Authority of that other region and shall hear the application by any other person making representations.

I have already referred to Section 63 which validates the permits being used outside the region in the State for which they are granted, provided they have been countersigned by the Regional Transport Authority of that other region following the procedure enjoined in Section 63. That section is exhaustive of the terms and conditions of validation. Its opening clause which controls sub-clause (1) however purports to say that a permit may even without counter signature be valid if it is so prescribed in the rules. This clause evidently obviates the necessity of counter signature imposed by the provision if the rules so prescribe. Thus it is clear that if the rules provide otherwise, the countersignature of the R.T.A. of the other region will not be necessary and the permit will be validly enforced without going through that procedure. Such cases of exception are determined and regulated by the rules. Rule 209 is the relevant rule which we have extracted above. This rule has been made in exercise of the powers u/s 68(hh).

Relying on this rule Mr. Adinarayana Reddy learned counsel for the petitioner contends that permits granted by the R.T.A. are invalid as no concurrence of the R.T.A. concerned was obtained before granting the same.

It is difficult to give effect to this contention. If the learned counsel''s contention is to be accepted in cases of this kind both concurrence and counter signature would be necessary tor the validation of the permit. That is not however, the intention of either the section or the rule. The opening clause of section 63 permits rule making power so far as it dispenses with the condition of counter signature and certainly not for supplementing or adding another condition to the condition already imposed. There may at the most be some substitution but never supplementation. The rule making power contained in S. 68(hh)(1) under which the said rule has been framed also does not contemplate such supplementation. It reads thus:

(1) the conditions subject to which, and the extent to which, a permit granted in another State shall be valid in the State without counter signature;

It is obvious, therefore, that the condition laid down in rule 209 (2) relating to concurrence is for validating the permits granted in one region without the counter signature of the Regional Transport authority in other region. Cases where permits are granted to become valid only on counter signature of the R. T. Authority of the other region are not governed by this rule at all. Thus section 63, S. 68(hh) and R. 209 are express and explicit and admit of the only interpretation as above. This view of mine bears ample support from the dictum of Gopalakrishnan Nair, J., in Writ Petition No. 343 of 1965 (AP). In this premises there is no force in the argument that the permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority Anantapur, with the specific direction that the vehicle cannot be plied on the extended portion of the route unless the stage carriage permits are counter-signed by the Regional Transport Authority, is invalid in law even though the steps for getting the counter signature are in progress in the other region. The grant of permit by R.T.A. Anantapur at any rate is not bad for want of prior concurrence of R.T.A. Cuddapah. The 4th point also thus fails.

It is thus clear that the contention of the learned counsel based on various grounds to the effect that the Regional Transport Authority could not grant the variation of the route is not tenable in law. The writ petition must therefore fail on this basis. There is yet another ground which is fatal to the petitioner, The petitioner is not obviously the person directly interested in the matter. Besides he made no representation when called upon to raise objections if any by the R.T.A. The extended route is altogether different from the route for which he has got the permit. He cannot therefore complain of an infraction of his personal legal right. That being the case, it is not open to him to seek to remove the order of the Regional Transport Authority on certiorari. In this connection, I may refer to a decision of this court to which I was a party in The Executive Officer, T.T. Devasthanams Tirupathi Vs. K. Ramachandra Naidu and Others, Therein it was held the person who is not directly interested cannot seek to remove the order on certiorari. Then again even if it be assumed that he was interested to any extent he did not avail of the opportunity to make representation at the time of the grant of the permit. He cannot therefore complain of the grant of permits on the ground that any of his legal right has been infringed. The petition thus at all events is liable to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocates fee fixed at Rs. 100.