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K.C. Agrawal, C.J.—This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has been preferred by Yadunath Singh, resident of Bharatpur. He was an operator on the route Bharatpur to Basedi holding one non-temporary stage carriage permit valid upto 21st Sept., 1994. . .
A draft scheme u/s 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was published in the newspaper ''Rajasthan Rajpatra'' on 26.7.1986 inviting objections with regard to the route Bharatpur Basedi via Sevad Fatehpur Mundera Rudawal Badi Mod and portions thereof. An objection to the draft scheme was filed by the petitioner which was rejected by the competent authority. Before the scheme was finalised the old Act was repealed and new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force with effect from 1.7.1989.
Sub-section (1) read with Clause (e) of Section 217 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act) reads as Under:
Any scheme made u/s 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, or under the corresponding law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of the Act.
It has been held in Sardar Singh''s case that to the old scheme initiated under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, new Act will apply.
Sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the New Act lays down that the approved darft scheme has to be published in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route covered by the said scheme and the same shall thereupon become final from the date of its publication and shall be called the approved scheme.
Sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the New Act provides that where a scheme is not published as an approved scheme in the Official Gazette within a period of one year from the date of the proposal regarding the scheme was published in the official Gazette, the proposal shall be deemed to have lapsed.
The submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that as the scheme under Sub-section (4) had not finalised till one year from the date of publication of the proposal the same had lapsed and that the State Government could not treat it to be surviving and acting on its basis. In other words the nationalisation of the proposed draft scheme published on 26.7.86 had lapsed and no right under the same could accrue to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Parivahan Marg, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), for treating the route, Bhatpur Basedivia Sewad, Fatehpur, Mundera Rudawal, Badi Mod, etc. as nationalised.
The submission of the petitioner''s counsel was countered by Sri R.N. Munshi appearing for the corporation. He submitted that under Sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the New Act a draft scheme becomes final from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. It is only a draft scheme being approved by the authority in the manner provided by the New Act, that it becomes the approved scheme on publication in the Official Gazette. The period of one year mentioned in Sub-section (4) has to be counted with effect from the publication of the approved scheme in the Official Gazette.
Learned Counsel for the Corporation, respondent No. 4, urged that the word ''approved scheme'' has a definite meaning and that in order to interpret Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the New Act it is necessary to go by the word of the statute and not by making references to the past history or by the Lipse dixit of law of interpretation.
It is correct that in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, the first question always is that what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute. It is only when that meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for some other possible meaning of the word or phrase.
What was argued by the learned Counsel for the Corporation is literal or golden rule. It is said in Cross Statutory Interpretation by Butter-worths at page 29:
It is plainly a rule in Professor Dworkin''s sense of the word, the natural or ordinary meaning of the word or phrase in question and apply it to the facts of the case unless the result is something Which cannot reasonably supposed to have been intended by the legislature; but the rules is one which leave a lot to the choice of the particular judge.
If the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament, is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in the natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver.
For what I have said above it is clear that the period of one year laid down in Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the New Act applied to approved scheme and not for any other scheme which has not been approved. In the instant case therefore, the limitation of one year has to be taken from that date. The scheme of one year has to be taken from that date. The scheme was approved by the respondent No. 3 by order dated 19.11.1990. The period of one year for filing of objection ran with effect from this date.
Learned Counsel for the Corporation, respondent No. 4, urged that the period of one year referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 100 of the New Act has to be computed in accordance with the Explanation added to it. The Explanation reads as under-
In computing the period of one year referred to in this sub-section any period or periods during which the publication of the approved scheme under subsection (3) was held up on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.
In this connection, I may refer to the observations of Lord Waston in Soloman v. Saloman &Co. (1987) SC 22, 38:
Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which popularly understood may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of Law or Equity what the Legislature extended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from that which it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.
Writ Petition No. 1410 of 1990 (Suresh Chandra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.) was filed in this Court challenging the validity of the approval by the Secretary, Transport Department, Rajasthan on the ground that he had no authority to approve the draft scheme published in the Gazette on 25.7.86 notifying the route Bharatpur Basedi via Sewad, Fatehpur, Mundera, Rudawal, Badi Mod. etc. This writ petition was admitted by this Court on 26.3.90 and the following stay order was passed:
In the meantime, respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are restrained from taking any further proceedings u/s 100 of the Act of 1988 for approving notifying and implementing the draft scheme of Bharatpur Basedi via Sewad Fatehpur Mundera Rudawal Badi Mod. etc. route.
The stay order was subsequently vacated on 20th August, 1990. If the period of stay order from 26th March, 1990 to 20th August, 1990 is not computed as is required by the Explanation added to Sub-section (4) it would result in excluding 148 days. The scheme was published on the Gazette on 24.11.90. Hence the publication of the approved scheme was within time and did not lapse.
The second submission of the petitioner''s counsel was that the Secretary, Transport Department Rajasthan Jaipur had official bias in the hearing of the objection, in its disposal in respect of approving the scheme and nationalising the route. The scheme could not be deemed to have approved lawfully in absence of the same, it was a waste paper.
A common problem is where an adjudicator has already been concerned with the case in some other capacity. That could be ligitimately considered and that he was bias the decision taken by him shall vitiate.
In the instant case there were two stages one was that of the approval of the scheme and the second was deciding the objection filed against the scheme. The first was an administrative action and the second was quasi-judicial which were distinct and different acts indulged into by the Secretary, Transport Department Rajasthan. They should not be limbed up.
Rebutting the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the learned Counsel for the Corporation relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in H.C. Narayanappa and Others Vs. The State of Mysore and Others, , Dosa Satyanarayanamurty etc. Vs. The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, and T. Govindaraja Mudaliar Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Others, .
In H.C. Narayanappa''s case (supra) it was observed:
Section 68 D undoubtedly imposes a duty on the State Government to act judicially in considering the objections and in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the transport undertaking.
It is also true that the Government on whom the duty to decide the dispute rests is substantially a party to the dispute but the Government or the authority to whom the power is delegated act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme, the approval or modification is not open to challenge on a presumption of bias.
The Minister or the Officer of the Government who is invested with the power to hear objections to the scheme is acting in his official capacity and unless there is reliable evidence to show that he is biased, his decision will not be liable to be called in question, merely because he is a limb of the Government.
In Kondala Rao''s case [supra) the Supreme Court held:
Though under the provisions of the Act, the State Government has some control, if cannot be said either legally or factually that the State Road Transport Corporation, which is a body corporate having a perpetual succession and common seal, is a department of the State Government. The State Government, therefore, in deciding the dispute between the said undertaking and the operators of private buses u/s 68D(2) is only discharging its statutory functions and the decision of the Minister in charge of the portfolio of transport in approving the scheme of nationalization of bus services by the State Road Transport Corporation cannot, therefore, be said to be vitiated by legal bias.
Nor is the fact that the Minister concerned presided over the sub-committee constituted to implement the scheme or nationalization of bus services, in itself, sufficient to establish that he was actuated by personal bias so as to disqualify him from hearing the objections under Chap. IV A.
In T. Govindaraja''s case (supra) the Supreme Court observed as under:
Although the Secretary to Government, Home Department was a member of the Committee to prepare a scheme of road transport and published it, in his capacity as Secretary for disqualify him from hearing objections u/s 68 D.
There is no doubt Section 68 D of the Motor Vehicle Act imposes a duty to act judicially in considering the objection and in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the transport undertaking but the Secretary, Transport Department Rajasthan to whom the power of granting approval was accorded, he could not be held to be guilty of bias simply because the scheme had been earlier approved by his Department. There was no evidence in this case that the Secretary was bias. His decision was not liable to be called in question, merely because he was a limb of the Government. The aforesaid proposition of law is supported by the decision cited by above. So the second submission of the petitioner''s counsel has also no substance.
The third argument argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the publication of the notified scheme being not in accordance with Rule 6.5 of the Rajasthan Motor Vehicles Rules, 1990, the approved scheme under challenge was illegal. I am unable to accept the submission. Two forms one under the old rule and the other under the new did not vary from each other. This has also no merit to hold the approved scheme as illegal.
For the reasons given above the writ petition fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs. Interim stay order dated 17.1.91 is vacated.