Yashwant Sanwaria and Another vs Poonamchand Agrawal

Sunil Kumar Sinha, J.—The Petitioners/Plaintiffs are challenging the validity of order dated 14-11-2005 passed in Civil Suit No. 37-A/2005 by the IInd Civil Judge, Class II, Raigarh (Chhattisgarh).

By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge has allowed an application (I.A. No. 6) filed u/s 13(1) of the M.P. (C.G.) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act''), and simultaneously rejected an application (I.A. No. 5) filed u/s 13(6) of the Act.

In a suit for eviction u/s 12 of the Act, 1961, the Respondent made a default in payment of monthly rent as directed by the Court. Therefore, the Respondent filed an application u/s 13(1) of the Act praying for the condonation of delay of 8 days in making the said deposit. At the same time, the Petitioners filed an application u/s 13(6) of the Act for striking out the defence of the Respondent on account of his failure to deposit the monthly rent in time.

The learned Civil Judge allowed LA. No. 6 filed by the Respondent and condoned the delay in payment of monthly rent. At the same time, I.A. No. 5 was rejected and the Court denied to strike out of the defence on that account.

It was argued before me that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to condone the delay in view of the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act, therefore, the impugned order was bad in law. It was further argued that since the Respondent could not comply the provisions of Section 13(1) of the Act and his defence was liable to be struck out in terms of Section 13(6) of the Act, therefore, the Court below erred in law in passing the impugned order.

I do not find force in the said argument. In Shyamcharan Sharma Vs. Dharamdas, , the Supreme Court held that "Section 13(6) vests, in the Court, the discretion to order the striking out of the defence against eviction. In other words, the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, may or may not strike out the defence. If Section 13 were to be construed as mandatory and not as vesting discretion in the Court, it might result in the situation that a tenant who has deposited the arrears of rent within the time stipulated by Section 13(1) but who fails to deposit thereafter the monthly rent on a single occasion for a cause beyond his control may have his defence struck out and be liable to summary eviction. Section 13 quite clearly confers a discretion, on the Court, to strike out or not to strike out the defence, if default is made in deposit or payment of rent as required by Section 13(1). If the Court has the discretion not to strike out the defence of a tenant committing default in payment or deposit as required by Section 13(1), the Court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit. Such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence".

In view of the above, it is clear that the Court has ample power to extend the time for payment or deposit in terms of Section 13(1) of the Act, therefore, if the time was extended by allowing I.A. No. 6, there was no jurisdictional error on the part of the Trial Court. The Trial Court has exercised its jurisdiction to condone the delay in deposit of monthly rent and not to strike out the defence on account of the above default which simultaneously stands condoned. The discretion exercised by the Trial Court is based on sound reasonings which do not call for interference by this Court in superintending jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in the writ petition. The petition is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed.

Consequently, the interim order granted on 6-2-2006 stands automatically vacated.

No cost.