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R.D. Kothari, J.—On 3.2.2008, the building of Hotel "Shakunt" situated opposite Kalupur Railway Station, Ahmedabad, collapsed. The Town Development Inspector of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation has lodged the criminal complaint on the same day. It is registered as I.C.R. No. 17/2008. It is stated in the FIR that 17 persons died and 10 persons were seriously injured in that incident. It is the say of the prosecution that there are Plot Nos. 1452 to 1455 adjacent to Hotel Shakunt and these plots are on the north-east side of the Hotel. In pursuant to the plans sanctioned by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 5.10.2007 for construction of multi-storied building, excavation work was carried out at these plots. The complainant alleges in the complaint that excavation work had gone to 20 feet deep and on that count, the adjoining building of hotel Shakunt had become unsafe and collapsed. The complainant further alleges that he had given oral instructions to the owner of hotel Shakunt on 1.2.2008 not to allow any one to stay in the hotel building till the building is declared safe to occupy. It is alleged in the complaint that in disregard to his oral instructions, the owner of the hotel let out the rooms of the hotel and on account of criminal negligence showed by the owner of the hotel this serious incident had taken place. Criminal Misc. Application No. 3110/2008 is filed by five co-owners of the Plots adjoining to Hotel "Sakunt" Another two co-owners have filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 3111/2008. These co-owners were acting through one power of attorney holder. The power of attorney holder has filed separate petition being Criminal Misc. Application No. 3990/2008. The structural engineer has filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 4455/2008.
It may be noted that Mr. A.Y. Kodaliya, who was appointed as Engineer by the petitioners/owners, is not before the Court, nor Mr. Gaurang Jani, owner of hotel Shakunt is before the Court.
In this group of Criminal Misc. Applications, the petitioners have prayed to quash the FIR registered against them before Kalupur Police Station bearing C.R. No. I.17/2008, for the alleged commission of offences punishable under sections 304, 337, 338 & 188 read with section 114 IPC. Section 188 IPC was added later on.
Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr. S.V. Raju for the co-owners,- petitioners in Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 3110/2008, 3111/2008 and 3990/2008, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Yogesh Lakhani for the Structural Engineer,- petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 4455/2008, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Prashant Desai for the complainant, and learned A.P.P. Mr. L.R. Pujari, for the State.
This Court by order dated 16.5.2008 had stayed further proceedings being taken pursuant to the FIR registered as C.R. No. I.17/2008 before Kalupur Police Station so far as the owners of the plots are concerned. The stay was refused in Criminal Misc. Application No. 3990/2008 filed by the power of attorney holder of the plots'' owners.
Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raju, after referring the complaint, submitted that the petitioners submitted plans before the Municipal Corporation and they were duly sanctioned by the Corporation. As per the sanctioned plans, commencement letter (Rajachitthi) was issued by the Corporation. It was submitted that the petitioners have taken all legal steps as required under the law and no illegality is committed by the petitioners. It was also submitted that all the co-owners of the plots are permanently residing at Bombay and, therefore, in the circumstances of the case, they cannot be held liable for any criminal act/negligence on the part of others.
Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Yogesh Lakhani for the Structural Engineer,- petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 4455/2008, submitted that the role and involvement of the Structural Engineer, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is practically nil. Mr. Lakhani submitted that the effective work of Structural Engineer would take place/start on commencement of work. It was pointed out that unlike other technical experts, viz. Civil Engineers, Architect etc. services of structural engineer are practically not required at the stage with which we are concerned.
Learned A.P.P. Mr. Pujari have seriously opposed the present petitions. It was submitted that the petitioners have been ill-advised for rushing up to this Court and for invoking exercise of powers u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was contended that the limited question to be considered at this stage is; whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, any offence as alleged in the complaint is made out or not ? It was submitted that considering the gravity of the incident, it cannot be said that no offence is made out. It was further pleaded that the Code of Criminal Procedure is self-contained Code. It does provide sufficient safeguard for the accused. If the accused are really not guilty, they would be acquitted in the trial and under the Code of Criminal Procedure, even prior to the trial, the accused can apply for discharge also. It was urged that for this Court it would not be just, proper and legal to interfere in such a nature of case at this stage.
The learned A.P.P. has drawn attention of the Court to the oft quoted decisions in the cases of (1) State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, (2) State of Orissa and Others Vs. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, and (3) Union of India (UOI) Vs. Prakash P. Hinduja and Another,
The learned A.P.P has drawn attention to and relied on the following guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal''s case (supra) (Para-108) where the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held thus:--
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers u/s 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated u/s 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provisions in the Code or the concerned act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
In Bhajan Lal''s case (supra), the complaint was lodged against Bhajan Lal, who was a Cabinet Minister in the State of Haryana. In the complaint, serious charges for corruption were levelled. The complainant alleged that the respondent, i.e. Bhajan Lal, before his induction in the Cabinet was a man of ordinary means and did not have any definite source of income. It is important to note that in the complaint itself, the complainant had given 20 instances of accumulating huge properties worth crores of rupees by the respondent. The transactions of these properties were in the names of family members, relations and persons close to the respondent and also in the name of the respondent himself. As steps were taken pursuant to the complaint lodge, Bhajan Lal had filed petition to quash the FIR. The High Court was pleased to allow the petition and quashed the FIR holding that the allegations in the FIR are "imaginary" and "fantastic", (para-21). It was also held that the allegations made are "groundless", (para-71). The State had challenged the quashing of FIR before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowing the appeal had set aside the order of the High Court of quashing the FIR, however, it directed that the officer, who was entrusted the investigation, was not competent to undertake the investigation. Therefore, it directed that,"...the State Government should direct the investigation afresh, if it so desired, through competent police officer empowered with legal authority in strict compliance with Section 5A(1) of the Act...."
In Prakash P. Hinduja''s case (supra), CBI had submitted charge sheet without obtaining approval/sanction of the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC). A question arose, whether cognizance taken on such charge sheet could be set aside or not. It was held that it could not be set aside. It is Bofors case. It has laid down the grounds on which power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings, in para-9 as under:--
Section 482, Cr.P.C. saves inherent powers of the High Court and such a power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The power can therefore be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings. The grounds on which the prosecution initiated against an accused can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of power conferred by Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been settled by a catena of decisions of this Court rendered in R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab, Madhu Limaye Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, Raj Kapoor and Others Vs. State and Others, The matter was examined in considerable detail in State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, and after review of practically all the earlier decisions, the Court in para 108 of the Reports laid down the grounds on which power u/s 482, Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings and basically they are (1) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, (2) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused, (3) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure or the concerned Act to the institution and continuance of the proceedings. But this power has to be exercised in a rare case and with great circumspection. There are some statutes which create a bar on the power of the Court in taking cognizance of an offence in absence of a sanction by the competent authority like Section 6 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or Section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Similar provision is contained in Section 196, Cr.P.C. which mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of the offences enumerated in the Section except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government. Section 197, Cr.P.C. also creates an embargo on the power of the Court to take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by any person who is or was a Judge or a Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. But the proceedings in the present case have not been quashed on any one of the above mentioned grounds. The High Court has not examined the nature of the allegations made in the FIR or the evidence by which the prosecution seeks to establish the charge against the accused during the trial. There is not even a whisper in the impugned order of the High Court that the FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence. Similarly, there is no reference to any statutory bar like want of valid sanction etc. to the taking of the cognizance of the offence. In fact the respondent-Prakash Hinduja is not public servant and consequently no sanction is required from any authority for his prosecution. The only ground on which the High Court has proceeded and has quashed the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and all consequential proceedings is that the CBI had filed the charge-sheet without placing the same before the CVC and, therefore, an illegality had been committed in the course of investigation which entitled the High court to quash the cognizance taken by the Special Judge and all proceedings of the case.
In Ujjal Kumar Burdhan''s case (supra), Vigilance Department of the State Government had initiated investigation into the allegations of irregularities in the receipts of excess quota, recycling of rice and distress sale of paddy by one of the mills in question belonging to the respondent. Pending inquiry against the respondent, the respondent had filed writ petition before the High Court and pursuant to the order passed, inquiry came to a standstill. With regard to powers of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C. the Court has laid down in brief the principles as laid down in Prakash P. Hinduja''s case (supra).
Reference may be made to few relevant facts as emerges from the record and from the submissions made by the learned advocates for the parties.
12.1 That, a power of attorney was executed by the owners of the plots in favour of one Mr. Yasin Patel on 29.5.2007. The said power of attorney was in respect of Plot Nos. 1452 to 1455. The plans were submitted before the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in June, 2007, which were sanctioned by AMC on 5.10.2007. The commencement letter (Rajachitthi) was issued by AMC on 5.10.2007.
12.2 Mr. Mehta, Town Development Inspector (TDI) has filed common affidavit in all the four petitions. Following main assertions emerge from his affidavit;-
On 1.2.2008, he had visited the site in question at about 10.30 am. At that time, the owner of hotel "Shakunt" was present there. The owner had told the deponent that due to the excavation work at the adjoining place, there was damage to his building. Therefore, he went inside the hotel building. Upon inspection, it was found that on north-east wall of the ground floor and at the cellar, there was a crack and the cellar was sunk and the plaster of the wall had come out. One person, who introduced himself as brother of Salimbhai, was present there. Mr. Mehta (deponent) asked him to stop the excavation work forthwith. Mr. Mehta was informed by the brother of Salimbhai and the owner of the Hotel that they have begun the exercise to support the building as per the advice of the structural engineer. The deponent further alleges that he had asked the owner of the hotel to stop the use of the building immediately and to vacate the building completely forthwith. He says that he had instructed the hotel owner not to use the building till it is declared as safe to use. At that time, the employees of the Bank were also present there and they were also instructed to stop the use of the building and vacate the premises immediately. The deponent says that excavation work was carried out very close to the foundation wall of the hotel. At one place, the deponent says that excavation work had gone deep upto 20 ft. In later paragraph, he says that excavation was more than 15 ft. deep. He says that the accused had excavated more than half of the width of the hotel, i.e. 10 meters out of 18.97 meters. The deponent also says that it was within the knowledge of the accused-owner of the hotel-that it may not be safe for any guest to stay, yet the owner allowed the guests to stay inside the hotel and as a consequence of that, 17 customers died and 10 customs received serious injuries when the building collapsed. He says that the Bank officials had responded positively to the warning and they had vacated the building immediately. It is also his say that during the investigation, police had recorded statements of various witnesses. The deponent says that he had given written notice on the next day, i.e. 2.2.2008, to the owner of the hotel and also to the power of attorney of the plot owners.
The petitioners in their reply to the above affidavit filed by Mr. Mehta, - Town Development Inspector,- had denied all the assertions made by the deponent. Besides formal denial, it is stated that issuance of notice by the Town Development Inspector on 2.2.2008 is not correct. It is stated that this notice was issued only after collapse of the building on 4.2.2008. It is the say of the petitioners that ante-dated notice was issued by the authorities to save their skin. The petitioners have produced copy of the notice and also copy of RPAD cover, wherein the stamp of postal department shows the date "4.2.2008". It is the say of the petitioners that the notice dispatched on 4.2.2008 was received by them on 6.2.2008. It is also the say of the petitioners that no illegality of any nature was committed by them in carrying out the excavation work. That excavation work was carried out as per the plans sanctioned by AMC. It is also alleged that hotel Shakunt collapsed on account of weak foundation and unauthorized construction carried out by the owner of the hotel. It is alleged that hotel Shakunt was constructed in the year 1972. Initially, the said hotel had only ground floor and first floor. Thereafter, it had constructed second floor. Thereafter it had constructed third floor over it. In 2004, construction of third floor was regularized by accepting impact fees. Further it is alleged that originally the said hotel building had no cellar. Later on, the cellar was created and it was let out to the Bank.
I.O. Mr. Rathod has also filed an affidavit supporting the case of the prosecution. The I.O. besides stating the facts of the case and the incident, says that despite imminent danger to the hotel building, the power of attorney continued the work of digging the plots. That, despite warning given to the hotel owner, the owner permitted his customers to stay in the hotel. However, considering that the building was not safe, the Bank had shifted its business, says I.O., at another place on 31.1.2008. The I.O. also says that from the statements of the witnesses recorded during the investigation it transpires that the work of excavation adjacent to the wall of the hotel continued for two days. It was on account of this, danger to the safety of the hotel building had arisen. That, despite the danger, excavation was carried on. That, the foundation was not to be excavated beyond depth of 8 to 10 meters, however, the petitioner,-power of attorney holder,- excavated upto the depth of more than 15 meters and further excavation was in progress.
Investigating Officer has indulged in exaggeration quite liberally. As to the last referred fact of depth of digging, as per the say of the Town Planning Inspector, i.e. complainant, depth of digging by the petitioner was 15 to 20 ft. I.O. has read and has stated in his affidavit ''feet'' as ''meter'', nor continuance of digging after 1.1.2008, as stated by the I.O., found support from the affidavit of the complainant nor does it find support from the statements of the witnesses. One Ganesh Bhajanlal, JCB Machine operator says in his statement that he had left the site at early morning at about 4.00 am along with JCB Machine on 31.1.2008. Thus, continuance of digging by the petitioner after 1.2.2008 does not find support from any material on record. Even the complainant does not say in his affidavit that digging was in progress by the petitioner,-power of attorney holder, after 1.2.2008 also.
Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 3110/2008 and 3111/2008 may be considered separately. These two petitions are filed by the owners of Plot Nos. 1452 to 1455. The petitioners in Criminal Misc. Application No. 3111/2008 are lady co-owners of the plots. They are permanently residing at Bombay. Besides that, they are "aged housewives". It is not necessary, in the circumstances of the case, to consider the case of these petitioners in detail. So far as petition of these lady owners is concerned, on the basis of facts of the case discussed, it may be allowed. It may be stated that one of them has died during the pendency of the petition and proceedings against her is abated. Criminal Misc. Application No. 3111/2008, therefore, deserves acceptance.
The petitioners of Criminal Misc. Application No. 3110/2008 are other co-owners,- other than lady owners,- of the plots, all residing permanently at Bombay. Going with the principles laid down in the above referred binding decisions, is it possible to say that accepting the assertions/averments made in the FIR at their face value and accepting them as true, any offence is made out against the present petitioners ? The complaint is filed for the offences punishable under sections 337, 338, 304 & 188 r.w. Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence under sections 337 & 338, prosecution has to show that there was rashness and negligence on the part of the accused. It is the say of the complainant in the complaint that the excavation work in the plots in question was carried out upto the depth of 20 ft. It is not in dispute between the parties that the plans were submitted by the petitioners and the same were duly sanctioned by the AMC. A copy of the sanctioned plan is produced at Annexure-D. If we refer the said plan, digging upto 6 mtrs from the ground floor is sanctioned. The plan is sanctioned for cellar and ground + three floors. Thus, digging upto 20 feet cannot be said to be unauthorized or in excess of the sanctioned plan. It may be recalled that Mr. Mehta,- respondent No. 2,- in his affidavit at one place says that depth of digging was more than 15 feet deep.
At the time of hearing, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the Corporation and also by the learned A.P.P that the petitioners were supposed to carry out the excavation work by leaving few feet space from the wall of the Hotel, but instead of that, the excavation work was carried out right from the wall of the Hotel and that was illegal. This submission is not possible to accept. From the statements recorded by the police during the investigation so far, it would appear from the statement of respondent No. 2 itself that the petitioners were expected to leave "O" ft distance from the wall of the Hotel, however, for the cellar, says respondent No. 2, petitioners were required to keep distance/margin of 1.75 meter from the building of Hotel Shakunt. So, as per the respondents themselves, petitioners were not required to left margin from Hotel Shakunt so far as new construction and development of property other than cellar is concerned. For cellar only, they have to left margin of 1.75 meters from the hotel building. There are photographs showing digging at petitioners'' plot. It shows position as on 2.2.2008. The photographs clearly shows that the petitioner has left margin and digging is not carried out without keeping distance.
So far as the submission that the petitioners had excavated more than half of the width of the hotel, i.e. 10 mts. out of 18.7 mts., it was submitted that this assertion also is misleading. Referring sanctioned plan of petitioners'' property (i.e. Plots No. 1452 to 1455), it was pointed out that width of 18.97 mts. to which respondent refers is of just one of the plots. Total width of these plots is over 29 meters. But, it may be that the width that the prosecution is referring, is not of the petitioners'' plots, but of the Hotel. That more than half of the width of the Hotel may have been found dug. This submission is also not possible to accept. First, the petitioners have left margin of 1.75 mtrs, or so from the wall of the Hotel, that being so, rigour of submission of over digging of the width would be reduced considerably. Further, when the plan was sanctioned for digging of width upto 29 mtrs, digging upto 10 mtrs cannot be said to be bad, unsafe or illegal.
In view of the above assertions of the respondent as to failure to keep margin or digging at extra depth or extra width, is not possible to accept.
Offences under Sections 337, 338 & 304 IPC falls in Chapter - XVI of IPC. Heading of the Chapter is "Of offences affecting the Human Body". Generally speaking, such offences are not possible to commit, unless there is physical presence of such person. One cannot inflict bodily harm to the other by being elsewhere than from the place of occurrence. Principle of vicarious liability is generally not applicable in criminal law. Unless some typical or special fact of the case points to such liability or some special statute creates such liability, a person cannot be held liable for criminal offence on the principle of vicarious liability, more so, in the case of causing bodily injury or harm.
Recently, in Mrs. Aparna A. Shah Vs. Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Another, the principle of vicarious liability came to be referred to by the Supreme Court. Briefly stated, the question arose, as the respondent-Company had paid to the appellant Rs. 25 Crores for joint development of the land. The said amount was paid to the appellant and her husband. Ultimately, the deal did not materialize and it failed. The respondent-Company wanted to move into another project and, therefore, it demanded back the said amount of Rs. 25 crores. The husband of the appellant had issued a cheque for Rs. 25 Crores, which was bounced. After completing the formalities, criminal complaint was lodged against the appellant and her husband. In the petition filed u/s 482 of the Code, High Court refused to quash the proceedings and it had directed the Magistrate to consider the objections raised by the appellant after hearing both the sides. The Supreme Court was pleased to allow the appeal preferred against the order of the High Court and by referring the case of Sham Sunder and Others Vs. State of Haryana, , it quoted approvingly as under:--
...The penal provision must be strictly construed in the first place. Secondly, there is no vicarious liability in criminal law unless the statute takes that also within its fold. Section 10 does not provide for such liability. It does not make all the partners liable for the offence whether they do business or not.
20.1 Quashing the complaint filed against the wife, non-signatory of the cheque, it has held thus:--
The above discussion with reference to Section 138 and the materials culled out from the statutory notice, reply, copy of the complaint, order, issuance of process etc. clearly show only the drawer of the cheque being responsible for the same.
Reference may be made to R. Kalyani Vs. Janak C. Mehta and Others, The offence alleged was under sections 420, 463 and 405 of IPC. The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the order of quashing of proceedings passed by the High Court and it has held in para-32 thus:--
Allegations contained in the FIR are for commission of offences under a general statute. A vicarious liability can be fastened only by reason of a provision of a statute and not otherwise. For the said purpose, a legal fiction has to be created. Even under a special statute when the vicarious criminal liability is fastened on a person on the premise that he was in charge of the affairs of the company and responsible to it, all the ingredients laid down under the statute must be fulfilled. A legal fiction must be confined to the object and purport for which it has been created.
If we further dig into the mine of case laws, one would come across Srish Chandra Sircar Vs. Emperor, In that case, the appellant owned a house in Banaras. He himself was permanently residing at Calcutta. He wished to rebuild his house and gave a contract to the contractor. Foundation work was carried out upto four feet. It was found "foundations were sunk to a depth of four feet." The next-door neighbour''s house had a foundation of only two feet depth. The contractor did not prop up the next-door neighbour''s wall and failed to take the ordinary precautions, which a builder ought to have taken, with the result, the neighbour''s wall was sank and there was fair amount of damage to it. A complaint came to be lodged against the owner alleging that digging upto four feet was intentionally carried out so as to cause damage to the neighbour''s wall. It was also alleged that there was malice on the part of the owner inasmuch as the owner had asked the neighbour to sell her house, however, the neighbour had refused to sell the house and it was on that account the owner had caused damage to the neighbour''s house. Two courts below did not agree with the assertion of malice on the part of the owner. However, the Court was pleased to convict the owner for the offence of mischief (Section 427). By the short judgment/order, the High Court was pleased to allow the owner''s appeal holding that it was not that on account of any negligence or malice on the part of the owner, the damage was caused to the neighbour''s wall. It held that, "If anybody was liable criminally for the act, it was contractor who omitted to do his duty. In digging the foundations four feet deep, he must have known that he was likely to cause damage unless he took the proper precautions to support the neighbouring wall. The appellant cannot be said to be liable for the contractor''s omission to do this...."
The petitioners in Criminal Misc. Application No. 3110/2008 also cannot be held liable for any criminal offence. The fact that they are permanently residing at Bombay and they have given power of attorney to one Yasinbhai, who is the petitioner in Criminal Misc. Application No. 3990/2008, is sufficient to allow the petition. It is not the say of the complainant that the petitioners of Criminal Misc. Application No. 3110/2008 have carried out the work without submitting the plans and/or without getting the plans sanctioned. If the excavation work was carried out without obtaining any sanction from the Corporation or if there is any apparent contravention or it is in disregard of the plans sanctioned by the Corporation, then in that case, it can be said that case has been made out. In that case, the petitioners even though are residing at Bombay, may have difficulty in defending the allegations of rashness and negligence. In the present case, the plans were duly sanctioned by the Corporation and as referred to above, prima facie, excavation/digging work was not carried out by the parties in contravention of the sanctioned plans.
So far as Criminal Misc. Application No. 3990/2008 is concerned, it is filed by the Power of Attorney Holder of the plot owners. He was in charge of the work carried out at the time of the incident. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raju has seriously urged for allowing this petition also. It was submitted that the parties engages experts, viz. Engineer, Architect, and carries out the work as per the advice given by the experts. The layman may not have any knowledge about technical aspects and details of construction work. Once the plan is duly sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation and if the work is carried out as per the plan, then the party cannot be faulted with, much less for committing criminal offence. In any case, the present case cannot be said to be a case falling u/s 304 IPC and at the most, it can be said to be a case falling u/s 304A IPC. Invoking the theory of direct and proximate cause for occurrence of incident and relying on Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwalla Vs. State of Maharashtra, it was submitted that even accepting all assertions made by the State to be true, the petitioners cannot be held liable even for the offence u/s 304A IPC.
Interestingly, facts of Kurban Hussein''s case (supra) come close to the facts of the present case. In that case, fire caught in the factory situated at Dongri, Bombay. It happened on 10.4.1962. Factory known as "Carbon Dry Colour Works" had licence to produce dry colour. Factory was engaged in manufacturing dry colour by cold process. However, at the time of the incident, it was manufacturing wet colour by heat process. That had led to the occurrence of the incident. In the opening paragraphs of the judgment itself, the Supreme Court has stated the incident clearly and precisely thus:
This appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Bombay High Court raises questions regarding the interpretation of Section 304A and Section 285 of the Indian Penal Code. The facts are not now in dispute and may be briefly set out as found by the Courts below. The appellant alongwith three partners is the owner of a factory styled as Carbon Dry Colour Works which manufactures paints and varnish. The factory was licensed by the Bombay Municipality in the year 1953 to manufacture paints involving a cold process and was located at 79/81 jail Road, Dongri. The factory was also licensed to store 455 liters of turpentine, 455 litres of varnish and 14,000 gallons of paint. The licence was issued subject to certain conditions to which we shall refer later. The appellant is the manager and working partner. He converted the factory from the cold process of manufacturing wet paints by heating. For that purpose four burners were used for the purpose of melting rosin or bitumen by heating them in barrels over the burners and adding turpentine thereto after the temperature cooled down to a certain degree. On April 20, 1962, this process was going on in the factory which had no licence for manufacturing wet paints through heating. Hatim Tasduq was the person looking after the operation. According to him the rosin was melted on one burner and lime was added and the whole thing was boiled for half an hour. Thereafter the burner was extinguished and the barrel in which the rosin was melted was allowed to cool. This began at about 4 p.m. The barrel in which the rosin is melted is about 4-1/2 feet high and after the temperature comes down to a certain level turpentine is added in the barrel to prepare Black Japan. Hatim Tasduq takes a drum of 5 gallons of turpentine which is poured into the barrel. As turpentine is poured, the mixture begins frothing and in order to keep down the froth the whole thing is stirred all the time. One man helps Hatim Tasduq in this operation. On April 20, 1962, rosin was melted and the barrel was allowed to cool from 4 p.m. At about 5 p.m. Hatim started pouring turpentine into the barrel. It may be mentioned that 5 p.m. Is the closing time and the process of pouring turpentine started just about that. As soon as Hatim started pouring turpentine the mixture began to froth. Hatim was unable to stir as according to him his assistant had gone some distance and he could not give the drum of turpentine to him so that he might stir the mixture. The result was that froth over-flowed out of the barrel and because of heat, vanish and turpentine, which were stored at a short distance, caught fire. Seven men were working in a loft which is reached by a ladder and where manufactured paint is stored. The material in the premises being of combustible nature, the fire spread rapidly. Those who were working on the ground-floor managed to get out with burns only but those who were working in the loft could not get out in time with the result that all seven of them were burnt to death. The fire-brigade was sent for, but in view of the combustible nature of the material stored; it took 2-1/2 hours to bring the fire under control. After the fire was controlled, bodies of four workmen were recovered the same night. Next morning two more bodies were recovered and in the afternoon one more body was found. Thus seven of the workmen lost their lives while seven other workmen suffered burns and were sent to hospital where they were treated as indoor patients. It may be mentioned that the appellant was not present on the premises when the fire took place, though he came there as soon as the information about it reached him.
(2). These facts have been found by Courts below to be proved. Originally the other three partners were also prosecuted but the Magistrate acquitted them as the appellant was the managing partner and was directly incharge of work in the factory. On these facts the appellant was convicted u/s 304A and Section 285 of the Indian Penal Code and it is the correctness of that conviction which is being assailed in the present appeal. The appellant appealed to the High Court but his appeal was summarily dismissed. His application for leave to appeal to this Court having been refused, he came to this Court and was granted special leave.
The attractive submissions made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raju are not possible to accept. It is one thing to say that the petitioner, i.e. power of attorney holder has also very good case on merits however, to quash the FIR, in the circumstances of the case, is different thing and it is not just and proper,-though it may be legal. There is distinction between good case for acquittal and no case for trial. Further, it was rightly pointed out by the learned A.P.P and the learned counsel for the AMC that if after investigation police does not find any case against the present petitioner, the police may file summary or if the police files charge sheet, even though there is virtually no case against the petitioner, the petitioner has remedy to apply for discharge.
26.1 As to Kurban Hussein''s case (supra), it helps the petitioner to considerable extent. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Raju for the petitioner has rightly placed reliance on it. In that case, it may be noted that the appellant was managing partner. It was he who converted the use of preparing/manufacturing dry colour by cold process to manufacturing wet colour by heat process. Heat process use had led to fire. It was not in dispute that the factory had no licence to manufacture wet colour by heat process, yet the Supreme Court has held that one Hatim, who was looking after the execution of work at that time may be held responsible and not the appellant. The petitioner,-power of attorney holder herein,- is perhaps better placed than the appellant in that case But, the trouble in the way of the petitioner is, trial is yet to take place. The prayer of the petitioner is to quash FIR. It may be noted that in Kurban Hussein''s case (supra) also the High Court had dismissed the appeal against conviction summarily. In the circumstances of the present case, in my opinion, it is not a fit case to exercise powers u/s 482 Cr.P.C. Hence, this petition is dismissed.
So far as Criminal Misc. Application No. 4455/2008 is concerned, it is filed by the Structural Engineer. Learned Senior Advocate Shri Y.S. Lakhani submitted that the work and duty of the petitioner-structural engineer, commences only upon commencement of construction work. It was vehemently urged that no duty or responsibility of the petitioner arises prior to commencement of work. In this regard, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Lakhani has drawn attention of the Court to Form No. 3 (on page 31) which requires to be submitted along with the plan. It was pointed out that signatory of the said Form is Architect, Engineer and Surveyor. It was submitted that the structural designer is distinct and different from the Architect and Engineer. That he is not required to sign, send Form and other similar Form. The learned A.P.P, in support of his submission that the petitioner is liable for criminal negligence, has drawn attention of the Court to the GDCR. Mr. Lakhani relying upon the said GDCR submitted that if we closely read and compare the duties and responsibilities of the Architect, Engineer and Structural Designer, it would appear that the structural designer is not liable for any occurrence that had taken place during the excavation. The said GDCR are produced at page 22 of the compilation. The duties and responsibilities of the Architect are as under:--
(a) He/she shall be responsible for making adequate arrangements to ensure not only that the work is executed as per the approved plans, but also is confirmation with the stipulations of the National Building Code and the I.S.I. standards for safe and sound construction and non-hazardous, functioning of the services incorporated in the building and for making adequate provisions for services and equipment for protection from fire hazards as per the stipulations of the National Building Code in the buildings and shall obtain N.O.C. from the Chief Fire Officer or concerned designated Authority/Consultant before applying for occupation certificate.
(b) He or she shall, on behalf of the owner, submit the progress certificates, completion certificates and the occupation certificate and obtain the same as required under the regulations.
(c) If the services of the registered architect are terminated, he shall immediately inform the Competent Authority about his termination and the stage of work at which his services have been terminated. The registered architect appointed as replacement of the proceeding, architect shall inform about his appointment on the job, and inform the Competent Authority of any deviation that might have occurred on the site with reference to the approved drawings and the stage at which he is taking over the charge. After Competent Authority has inspected the site for his report, the newly appointed architect shall allow the work to proceed under his direction.
(d) The registered architect appointed on the work shall inform the Competent Authority immediately on termination of the services of the registered/structural designer, construction contractor, clerk of works, site supervisor, plumber or electrician and shall not allow the work to continue till the vacancy is filled by appointment of another person and the certificate of appointment of such person is submitted in the appropriated Authority.
(e) He or she shall instruct the relevant agency that adequate provisions are made for ensuring the safety of workers and others during excavation, construction and erection.
(f) He or she shall instruct the relevant agency that adequate provisions are made for providing safe and adequate temporary structures required for construction and development.
The duties and responsibilities of the Engineer are as that of the Architect, as mentioned above. Thus, the duties and responsibilities of Architect and Engineer as envisaged are the same.
The duties and responsibilities of the structural designer as mentioned in the GDCR are as under:--
(a) to prepare a report of the structural design.
(b) to prepare detailed structural design and to prescribe the method and technique of its execution strictly on the basis of the National Building Code or relevant Indian Standard specifications.
(c) to prepare detailed structural drawings and specifications for execution indicating thereon, design live loads, safe soil bearing capacity, specifications of material, assumptions made in design, special precautions to be taken by contractor to suit the design assumptions etc. whatever applicable.
(d) to supply two copies of structural drawing to the site supervisor.
(e) to inspect the works at all important stages and certify that the work being executed is up to the satisfaction of the Architect/Engineer.
(f) to certify the structural safety and overall structural soundness of the building to the Architect/Engineer.
(g) to advise the Owner/Architect/Engineer for arranging for tests and their reports for soil, building material etc. for his evaluation and design consideration.
(h) He shall prepare the revised calculations & drawings in case of any revision with reference to the earlier submission of drawing & design in a particular case.
(i) to submit the certificate of structural safety and offer all structural soundness of building to Competent Authority.
(j) to inform in writing the Competent Authority within 7 days, if for any reason he is relieved of his appointment/responsibilities as the registered structural designer for the development.
(k) Not to provide services to further or advance work of any type on any development that does not comply with the regulation or is unauthorized as per the GDCR.
What is apparent is the duties and responsibilities during excavation, construction and erection for safety etc., as envisaged qua Architect and Engineer in the above referred GDCR, exclude the Structural Engineer from the responsibility of safety etc. during excavation, construction and erection.
Further, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Lakhani has also drawn attention of the Court to the affidavit filed by the petitioner and one certificate issued by UV Consultant. It was submitted that at the relevant time, i.e. from December 2007 to February, 2008, the petitioner was at Hyderabad. It is the say of the petitioners that he was employed as Project Manager and during the said period, he was working there. This assertion of the petitioner is not controverted by the State by filing affidavit. On behalf of the Corporation it was urged that this plea can be said to be a plea of alibi and such plea can be considered at the time of trial and such plea ought not to weigh with the Court in the present proceedings. It is true that the plea of alibi is to be considered at the time of trial and burden is upon accused to establish the same, but, when the plea is supported by the documents and assertion of plea is made on oath in the affidavit and the same goes uncontroverted, then such a plea assumes importance. The learned A.P.P. submitted that in the statements of the witnesses, name of the present petitioner figures and, therefore, say of the petitioner that he was not present at the time of the incident ought not to be believed. I am inclined to rely on the uncontroverted affidavit of the petitioner in this regard and the certificate produced by him. Further, no duty or responsibility is fasten upon the petitioner in respect of excavation and construction work. This is sufficient to exclude the petitioner. Assuming for a moment that the assertions made in the statements of the witnesses recorded by the police are true, presence of the petitioner upon occurrence of the incident is different thing. It would not be correct to say that digging etc., were carried out at the instructions or instance of the present petitioner. In view of the above discussion, applying the test laid down in Bhajan Lal''s case (supra), which is referred to and relied on in recent case, i.e. S. Khushboo Vs. Kanniammal and Another, Criminal/Misc. Application Nos. 3110/2008, 3111/2008 and 4455/2008 are allowed. FIR lodged against the petitioners of these petitions are hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute.
Criminal Misc. Application No. 3990/2008 is hereby dismissed. Ruler is discharged. Interim relief, if any, would stand vacated.