Zora Singh and Others vs Amrik Singh Hayer and Others

K. Kannan, J.

I. Disposition by Company Law Board:

The appeals u/s 10F of the Companies Act, 1956, have been brought by parties against of whom complaints of oppression and mismanagement were alleged and found by the Company Law Board as proved.

By a common order passed in C.P. No. 44 of 2006 and C.P. No. 45 of 2006 Amrik Singh Hayer v. Hayer Estates P. Ltd. [2009] 147 Comp Cas 761, the Company Law Board upheld partially the claim of the petitioner-Amrik Singh Hayer who complained of oppression and mismanagement under Sections 397 - 399 of the Companies Act, 1956. It specifically found violations of statutory provisions relating to notice and the articles of association that provided for pre-emptive rights. It held that the meetings held on August 28, 2006, May 9, 2006, May 11, 2006, May 12, 2006, May 19, 2006 and May 20, 2006, had not been properly convened and all the actions in the alleged meetings were in violation of the articles of the association and provisions of the Companies Act. It found that the purported act of increase of the authorised share capital from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 2.5 crores on April 28, 2006 and again from Rs. 2.5 crores to Rs. 3 crores on May 11, 2006, were illegal having been passed without notices to the petitioner, who was a substantial shareholder. By the impugned order, the Company Law Board restored the status quo as regards the share capital of the company. The removal of the petitioner and his son from directorship and induction of other directors were found as having been done in violation of the statutory provisions of Sections 191 and 284 of the Companies Act and the purported removal itself constituted gross oppression. The induction of new directors on November 9, 2005, was also found to be illegal and status quo ante was ordered to be restored. It found its own justification in the nature of orders that were made by references to Sections 402(e), 407 and 402(a) about the extraordinary powers of the Company Law Board and that the directions given by the court and the findings made with regard to the alleged illegality of the meetings and the resolutions, were in conformity with the powers of the Company Law Board vested under the relevant provisions enumerated above.

II. The enumerated points of law by the appellant:

The appeals have been filed under the relevant provisions of Section 10F of the Companies Act on questions of law that were canvassed on the test of oppression and mismanagement as having rested on the principles of equity and the petitioner who had committed fraud and attempted to resile from his express undertakings under the contract was not entitled to obtain any redressal from court. The points of law urged for consideration had been set out elaborately in paragraph 3 as follows:

(i) Whether the memorandum of understanding dated November 9, 2005, which has been entered into by individuals can tantamount to be an agreement regarding the affairs of the company?

(ii) Whether a petition under Sections 397, 398 and 402 of the Companies Act, 1956, can be entertained by the Company Law Board (CLB) when there is an individual dispute of an agreement between two individuals and is not the concern of the affairs of the company?

(iii) Whether the Company Law Board can opine and give findings on intricate and complicated questions of fact which can only be determined by a civil court by recording evidence and cannot be adjudicated in a summary jurisdiction of the Company Law Board whether or not the complete payment has been made as per memorandum of understanding dated November 9, 2005, when majority shareholder, holding 75 per cent, shares, accepts the fact that he has received the same?

(iv) Whether any subsequent acts pursuant to completion of the memorandum of understanding dated November 9, 2005, when full payment has been made by the appellants and received by the respondents can tantamount to acts of oppression and mismanagement by the appellants as alleged by respondent No. 1 when he is a stranger to the affairs of the company?

(v) Whether a finding can be given by the Company Law Board that an agreement between individuals can become unenforceable, even though it does not have jurisdiction in the matter which is clearly a domain of the civil court?

(vi) Whether the refusal on part of minority shareholders to receive the balance sale consideration of shares on number of occasions can be attributed as an act of oppression and mismanagement by the appellants?

(vii) Whether the order dated October 17, 2007, passed by the learned Company Law Board be sustained in view of wrong findings on the acts of oppression and mismanagement which is contrary to the facts and records of the case?

(viii) Whether the commercial disputes be the subject-matter of the petition under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956?

(ix) Whether a single technical member of the Company Law Board can modify, terminate or amend the memorandum of understanding between the shareholders for purchase of entire equity shares with the consent of 100 per cent, shareholders with a third party without obtaining the consent in terms of Section 402(e) of the Companies Act, 1956?

(x) Whether a shareholder who has received part payments of consideration for the sale of shares several times on behalf of other/all shareholders parties to the memorandum of understanding can claim the relief u/s 397/398 of the Act when he is required to comply with the terms and conditions of the memorandum of understanding?

(xi) Whether the memorandum of understanding where time is not the essence due to penalty clause and amendment clause provided therein and once penalty charged can be adjudged as an agreement where time is essence by the Company Law Board (sic)?

(xii) Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked in the matters where one party has fulfilled the contract and others also acted on the same?

(xiii) Whether an uncompleted/unaccepted power of attorney holder can file petition under Sections 397 and 398 and who opted to exit from being the member of a company in advance (whereas only a shareholder can file the petition)?

(xiv) Whether withdrawal of loan from directors by putting fresh loan by third party in the company, return of share application money out of memorandum of understanding is the payment to company or payment under memorandum of understanding (sic)?

The enumerated questions are unwieldy and fall out of focus to the real controversies. The points that require to be addressed on the basis of arguments advanced by counsel could be paraphrased broadly as under:

(a) Whether a memorandum of understanding (MoU) entered into by individual relating to an asset of a company to be said to be an agreement regarding the affairs of the company?

(b) Whether the Company Law Board could pronounce on disputed questions of facts, pending adjudication of the same issue in a properly instituted civil suit?

(c) Whether presumption of service of notices exist for certificate of posting to say that the petitioner had been duly informed about the various meetings of the board of directors and if actual notices had not been proved, could he be presumed to have constructive notice?

(d) Whether the decision to remove and induct directors, increase the share capital without alleged proper notice amount to oppression and mismanagement?

III. Relevant background facts:

(i) Relationship between parties:

Before adverting to the points of law canvassed, it becomes essential to consider the case from certain facts. The admitted case is that the two companies M/s. Hayer Estates P. Ltd. and M/s. Hayer and Hayer Estates P. Ltd., were a closely held companies, by the members of the family consisting of Ajmer Singh and Amrik Singh. Ajmer Singh and one Malkiat Singh had been married to two sisters, namely, Surjit Kaur and Gurmeet Kaur. Malkiat Singh had a sister by name Swaran Kaur who had been married to Amrik Singh. The possession of the holdings in the company were, Ajmer Singh had 75 per cent, shares and Amrik Singh had 25 per cent, shares. Both Ajmer Singh and Amrik Singh were non-resident Indians; the former was based in UK while the latter was based in USA. Malkiat Singh (who was the co-brother of Ajmer Singh and brother-in-law of Amrik Singh), however, was stationed in India and he was looking after the affairs of the family.

(ii) Introduction of a third party to family in company affairs by a contemplation of sale of property of company:

The company was really dealing in real estate and had obtained allotment of a large extent of land and building within the limits of Chandigarh city. The admitted case is that Ajmer Singh and Amrik Singh wanted to dispose of the property of the company at profit and apprehending that the transactions might result in a huge incident of capital gain tax, decided to adopt a contrivance of sale of shares of the companies to a person named, Zora Singh, who wanted to purchase the property. The decision to sell the property was hence dropped and transfer of shares was to take place in the following manner. Initially on October 29, 2005, a decision was taken at the meeting of the board of directors under which the company had authorised the directors to negotiate and settle the terms and conditions of transfer of the company''s land and building and that memorandum of understanding was to be executed authorising Ajmer Singh, Amrik Singh and Malkiat Singh to act on behalf of the company and further empowering Smt. Manjit Kaur, w/o. late Section Balbir Singh, to receive the consideration amount on behalf of Ajmer Singh in his absence. On the same day, they had further resolved to appoint Zora Singh as an additional director of the company. The induction of Zora Singh was contemplated as a person in whose favour the directors had decided to transfer the shareholding and invest with him the control and management of the companies. It, however, contained the condition that the transfer of shares itself would not be made in his favour until the full payment as mentioned in the memorandum of understanding was made by him. However, when the memorandum of understanding was executed on November 9, 2005, the reference to transfer the property had been dropped and the memorandum of understanding signed by all the three directors of the company referred to transfer the total control and management of the companies.

(iii) Essential terms of memorandum of understanding.

Pursuant to the resolution, the memorandum of understanding was drawn up on November 9, 2005, when Ajmer Singh, Amrik Singh and Malkiat Singh jointly executed the document, along with Zora Singh which declared that all the directors had decided to transfer the total control and management of the company for sound and effective management of the company and that the transfer would be done for a total consideration of Rs. 1,500 lakhs (rupees fifteen crores) and that on the payment of 25 per cent, of the consideration, Zora Singh would be inducted on the board of directors to take care of all day-to-day activities, although he may not hold any shares of the company; 25 per cent, within three months of the execution of the memorandum of understanding and the balance payment within six months or earlier of the execution of memorandum of understanding. The memorandum of understanding also specifies that on the expiry of three months from the date of execution of memorandum of understanding, if the total payment was not made, then a compensation amount of Rs. 7 lakhs per month would have had to be paid additionally by Zora Singh to the first party. There are other terms in the memorandum of understanding that do not require dilation.

(iv) Induction of Zora Singh as a director of the company:

The admitted fact is that Zora Singh was inducted as a director in the meeting of the company on October 29, 2005, even without transfer of shares in his favour.

IV. The genesis of dispute:

The memorandum of understanding was executed under the terms of which the entire shareholding in the hands of Ajmer Singh and Amrik Singh were to be transferred to Zora Singh for a consideration of Rs. 15 crores. All other issues have been denied. Even the date of execution of the memorandum of understanding is denied by Zora Singh by pointing out that although a recital of the document on the first page is made as though it was November 9, 2005, the document had been signed on the last page by Zora Singh only on November 10, 2005. This, according to the appellant will have a bearing on the last date before when the amount was to be paid.

Ajmer Singh admits the payment of the entire sale consideration before the date stipulated under the memorandum of understanding and this fact was denied by the respondent by stating that the payments alleged to have been made on various dates either to Ajmer Singh or Malkiat Singh purported to be on his behalf are not any payments in the eyes of law, since he had not given any such authority for receipt on his behalf. It is also contended on behalf of the respondent that all the payments which were supposed to have been made by cash could not have been true and that they were falsely receipted by Ajmer Singh or Malkiat Singh to oust Amrik Singh from the company and join with Zora Singh to carry on with the affairs of the company.

V. In the absence of agreement payment to one of joint payees is payment to all:

It must be pointed out that there is no specific mode of tender that the memorandum of understanding envisages. The memorandum of understanding also does not refer to any specific amounts as being individually payable to the first party under the documents, who are Ajmer Singh, Amrik Singh and Malkiat Singh. The document also does not stipulate that Amrik Singh could be paid only 75 per cent, of the total consideration being proportionate to the shareholding by him and that Amrik Singh shall be paid 25 per cent. The document merely stipulates a composite payment and, therefore, so long as any one of the parties states that he has received the entire amount, the remedy of the person who is entitled to a fractional share shall be to proceed against the person who claims to have received the entire sale consideration.

One elementary aspect of the case cannot be missed. The contention of learned senior counsel is that the whole amount has not been paid within the time stipulated and Zora Singh did not have the money to pay the entire 15 crores before the last date specified in the document. The memorandum of understanding contained forfeiture clause and the non-payment of whole consideration would according to learned Counsel for the respondent, relieve the obligations of the first party to transfer the holding and the respondent had only the interest of the company in refusing the tender made after the due date, by which conduct, it would have become possible for company to negotiate a better price elsewhere.

The attempt of learned senior counsel for the respondent was to show that apart from the amount which was deposited to the credit of the company by him after receipt of the amount from Zora Singh, no other amounts have been brought to the coffers of the company. According to him, this would show that the contention of Ajmer Singh and the Malkiat Singh that they had received whole of the consideration was false and there was no proof apart from the fabricated receipts that the money had given to the company.

VI. Shareholders have no direct ownership over the assets of the company:

The fallacy in such a line of argument on the side of the respondent is that the memorandum of understanding does not contemplate sale of the property of company. It is a fundamental percept that can suffer no dent is that the shareholders are distinct from the company and the shareholders are not the owners of the property of the company. Company and shareholders are distinct entities Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, . A shareholder that buys shares buys no interest in the property of the company which is a juristic person entirely distinct from the shareholder. The true position of a shareholder is that on buying shares as an investor, he becomes entitled to participate in the profits of the company in which he holds the shares if and when the company declares, subject to the articles of association, that the profits or any portion thereof should be distributed by way of dividends among the shareholders. He has undoubtedly a further right to participate in the property of the company which would be left over after winding up but not the assets as a whole In the matter of the Estate of Saradambal Ammal and Others, . The ownership in the property is only with the company and the memorandum of understanding itself does not contemplate the sale of the property by the company to Zora Singh. The memorandum of understanding contemplates transfer of shares and the management of the company. Consequently, the ownership in the property was to reside in the company itself and it was only the management of the company that could have gone to the hands of Zora Singh on the transfers of shares. Again, the contention that the shares had been transferred in violation of the articles of association that provided for rights of pre-emption is meaningless because, if the only two shareholders of the company had decided to transfer the entire shareholding to a third party, the right of pre-emption does not reside with any one party. If only the transaction had contemplated the transfer of shares of Ajmer Singh only and Amrik Singh had not contemplated joining him, it could have protected his right of pre-emption by seeking for the shares of Ajmer Singh to be transferred to him. The right of pre-emption itself is a weak right and the person who has offered to sell his shareholding cannot himself contend that there existed right of pre-emption in his favour. The finding rendered on this aspect by the Company Law Board is untenable and I have no hesitation in finding that it is bound to be set aside. VII. Effect of institution of civil suit for specific performance:

The problem arises also by the wrong perception of Zora Singh that since the major shareholder had admitted the receipt of the entire consideration, he was entitled to assume that the memorandum of understanding had come to full operation and that Amrik Singh had ceased to be a shareholder. While the alleged receipt of the entire consideration by Ajmer Singh could constitute an admission against him for his liability to transfer 75 per cent, of the shares in favour of Zora Singh, it cannot constitute valid discharge and enable the Zora Singh to assume that he has obtained the entire transfer of shares in his favour. Transfer of shares are required under the Companies Act to follow a particular procedure and so long as the requirements of law for transfer of shares of Amrik Singh has not been carried out, Zora Singh cannot assume that his shares are also deemed to have been transferred to him.

Indeed, the suit filed by Zora Singh subsequent to the initiation of proceedings before the Company Law Board for specific performance for transfer of shares constitute an admission that Amrik Singh continues to be a 25 per cent, shareholder. While he may have appropriate remedy through a civil court, he is not entitled to contend that the continuation of the proceedings before the Company Law Board itself has become untenable by the pendency of a civil suit. Such an argument made by learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants is not tenable in the eyes of law for, a person who is complained of as having caused oppression and mismanagement cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Company Law Board by subsequently instituting a civil suit. Before the civil court, the relevant issue could be whether the plaintiff had performed his part of the contract and the non-execution of transfer of shares by Amrik Singh was justified or not. So long as Amrik Singh continues to be a shareholder, all the trappings of the Companies Act relating to the rights of such shareholders by entitlement to statutory notices and his own entitlement to participate in the proceedings of the board cannot be ousted.

VIII. Proof of service of the statutory notices by certificate of posting-weak evidentiary value:

Several meetings of board under which new persons had been inducted into the board, removal of Amrik Singh and his son from the board, increase of share capital of the company have all serious consequences relating to the administration of the company and its functions. The Company Law Board has found that no proof had been adduced for the services of notices to Amrik Singh or his son for the requirements of law for convening of special meetings or other meetings. Learned senior counsel for the appellants points out to certificates of posting as affording sufficient proof of his acts. According to him, the observation of the Company Law Board that there had been no proof of despatch of notices was clearly erroneous and against the documentary evidence tendered before it. Even otherwise, according to him, Section 53 of the Companies Act the notices sent through certificate of posting to the addressees at the correct address shall be presumed to have been delivered to that of an addressee. Section 53 of the Companies Act reads as under:

Section 53. Service of documents on members by company.--

(1) A document may be served by a company on any member thereof either personally, or by sending it by post to him to his registered address, or if he has no registered address in India, to the address, if any, within India supplied by him to the company for the giving of notices to him.

(2) Where a document is sent by post,--

(a) service thereof shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting a letter containing the document, provided that where a member has intimated to the company in advance that documents should be sent to him under a certificate of posting or by registered post with or without acknowledgment due and has deposited with the company a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of doing so, service of the document shall not be deemed to be effected unless it is sent in the manner intimated by the member; and

(b) such service shall be deemed to have been effected--

(i) in the case of a notice of a meeting, at the expiration of forty-eight hours after the letter containing the same is posted, and

(ii) in any other case, at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.

(3) A document advertised in a newspaper circulating in the neighbourhood of the registered office of the company shall be deemed to be duly served on the day on which the advertisement appears, on every member of the company who has no registered address in India and has not supplied to the company an address within India for the giving of notices to him.

(4) A document may be served by the company on the joint-holders of a share by serving it on the joint-holder named first in the register in respect of the share.

(5) A document may be served by the company on the persons entitled to a share in consequence of the death or insolvency of a member by sending it through the post in a prepaid letter addressed to them by name or by the title of representatives of the deceased, or assignees of the insolvent, or by any like description, at the address, if any, in India supplied for the purpose by the persons claiming to be so entitled, or until such an address has been so supplied, by serving the document in any manner in which it might have been served if the death of insolvency had not occurred.

It will be wrong to read from this provision that there is any presumption regarding the service on an addressee even otherwise there is an express denial of receipt of the notices. However, a presumption is made u/s 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, with regard to service of notices sent through registered post. But even there, the courts have been very cautious in spelling out the nature of presumption and how the burden of proof is discharged. In Puwada Venkateswara Rao Vs. Chidamana Venkata Ramana, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court had held that a letter sent by registered post, with the endorsement "refused" on the cover, could be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without examining the postman who had tried to effect service. But it is a rebuttable presumption. If the addressee states on oath that he had not refused the letter as it was not brought to him the sender cannot succeed without further evidence. In appropriate cases, on a closer examination of the evidence on record, the court can reach the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary, in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admission or conduct. This statement made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, in spite of specific provisions contained u/s 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, would demonstrate that even in cases of statutory presumptions, they will always be subject to appropriate inferences in cases where, there are denials of receipt of notices. This decision finds emphasis in a still later judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in M.S. Madhusoodhanan and Another Vs. Kerala Kaumudi Pvt. Ltd. and Others, . In this judgment, the Hon''ble Supreme Court made a distinction with reference to service by certificate of posting and observed that evidence by certificate of posting was not reliable when relationship between the parties are already embittered. However, it stated that a rebuttable presumption would be raised if the basic fact regarding due posting of the document is proved. While stating that the onus of proving that a notice addressed to the addressee was not received by him, it cautioned that raising a presumption did not itself amount to proof. The Hon''ble Supreme Court also stated that judicial notice had to be taken that certificate of posting are notoriously easily available. According to it, "what, was seen as a possible but rare occurrence in 1981 is now seen as common. Section 53 of the Companies Act, which provides that if a document is sent by post in the manner specified, service thereof shall be deemed to be effected. These are rules of evidence which attempt to assist the judicial mind in the matter of weighing the probative or persuasive force of certain facts proved in relation to other facts presumed or inferred. Sometimes a discretion is left with the court either to raise presumption or not as in Section 114 of the Evidence Act. On other occasions, no such discretion is given to the court so that when a certain set of facts is proved, the court is bound to raise the prescribed presumption. But that is all. The presumption may be rebutted. Raising of a presumption, therefore, does not by itself amount to proof. The result of a mandatory requirement for raising a presumption cast on the court, as there is u/s 53(2) of the Companies Act, is that the burden of proof is placed on the person against whom the presumption operates for disproving it. It is only if such person is unable to discharge the burden, that the court will act on the presumed fact."

The Hon�ble Supreme Court also held in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema Vs. Shri B.B. Gujaral and Anr, , that there was no conclusive presumption that the letters posted under certificate of posting were served on the addressee. Therefore, in this case, the fact that certificates of posting are produced for notices dated May 12, 2006 and for dispatch of mails sent on April 4, 2006 and April 12, 2006, under annexures R14 and R15, respectively, do not come to support the case of the appellant in the face of express denials of receipts by the Amrik Singh. I, therefore, find that there have been no service of notices to the alleged meetings purported to have been held, on May 9, 2006, as regards the subject of appointment of additional directors, on May 11, 2006, as regards the subject of increase of share capital and on May 19, 2006, as regards the subject of removal of the petitioner and his son from the board of directors.

IX. The effect of want of notices for board meetings:

If the finding regarding the alleged conduct of meetings were done without issuing notices to the petitioner, the next issue would be the effect of such want of notices. The crucial decisions regarding induction of new directors, increase of capital and removal of the petitioner and his son as directors were purported to have been done by various resolutions in such meetings. Although learned senior counsel for the appellants stated that transfer of shares did not require any board meeting to be held nor was there a requirement that a resignation of a particular director itself could be done only in a board meeting, the issue is far more serious when we examine the resolutions which are purported to have been passed in the various meetings which are denied by the petitioner. The meetings related, to removal and induction of directors and increase of share capital all of which had a direct bearing to the conduct of the affairs of the company itself. It has been held in the decision in Dankha Devi Agarwal (Dead) throurgh LRs. Vs. Tara Properties Pvt. Limited and Others, , that a decision taken in a meeting without due notice of such meeting for removal or induction would be instance of oppression and mismanagement. In the decision in Kamal Kumar Dutta and Another Vs. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. and Others, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court dealt with the effect of want of due notices to NRI directors to whom the notices had not been served, where it went out to hold it to be an instance of oppression and mismanagement. In a decision of the Madras High Court in Micromeritics Engineers P. Ltd. v. S. Munusamy [2002] CTC 661 : [2003] 116 Comp Cas 465 Mad, wherein it is held that a decision of the Company Law Board inferring oppression and mismanagement of the act of the majority in a closely held family company in removing the directors that had minority shareholding without adequate notice was not merely invalid but would be an instance of oppression and mismanagement. Holding board meetings without proper notice of removal of erstwhile directors and several other acts like change in clauses of articles of association giving room to a chain of events having serious consequences would operate as oppression and mismanagement. In the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Smt. Claude-Lila Parulekar Vs. Sakal Papers Pvt. Ltd. and Others, , the Hon�ble Supreme Court cautioned that the majority cannot ride roughshod over the minority without adequate notices u/s 173 of the Companies Act.

When the receipt of all the notices were denied by the respondent, the mere production of such certificates do not satisfy the requirement of law. The actual services of notices on the respective dates is a matter of inference from a given set of facts and a rendering of situation by a Company Law Board that had decided to discount the value of certificates of posting cannot be trampled in appeal. The contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants is that the Companies Act itself does not stipulate any particular mode of service and consequently the certificates of posting produced for the notices to the respondent ought to be taken as established. In my view, such a contention is a clutch at the last straw, as it were, and does not merit acceptance. The notices required to be sent to parties shall be understood as a fact to be established and there is no presumption that a notice sent by certificates of posting is received by the addressee especially when they are denied by the addressee. On the contrary, such a presumption arises under the General Clauses Act, 1897, for despatch of notices by registered notices. The finding of the Company Law Board that the several resolutions alleged to have been passed in the meeting of the board of directors on various dates cannot be held to be validly convened or passed and the decision rendered by the Company Law Board in that regard requires no intervention.

The petition is therefore well founded and the grievance seeking for intervention of the Company Law Board under Sections 397 and 399 are, therefore, tenable in law. Hence, the persons who were admittedly the directors of the company as on October 29, 2005, were entitled to be served with due notices on every shareholder found mentioned on the Registrar of Companies as on that date before taking any decision. It shall be open for the appellants to take such action in his personal capacity as transferee of shareholding of Ajmer Singh to give notices in the manner required by the law and take appropriate decisions after due notices in the manner sanctioned by law. The entitlement or otherwise of Zora Singh to obtain transfer of shares pertaining to 25 per cent, held by Amrik Singh will be decided in the civil suit which is pending and no observation made by this court shall be construed as constituting any remark in favour of or against either of the parties to contend that one way or the other about the respective merits of the case before the civil court.

X. Concluding summary:

From the discussions made above and the findings rendered for the points raised in appeal by capturing them under relevant sub-headings, the following is summary of the conclusions:

(a) The memorandum of understanding dated November 9, 2005, did not involve or contemplate transfer of asset of the company. It was an instrument to transfer the shares of the company to the parties to the document and a chosen medium for total control over the affairs of the company to one of the parties to the document. It did not operate to transfer the assets of the company to either of the parties. The findings rendered by the Company Law Board, and found expressed in paragraph 51 of the impugned order are set aside.

(b) The actual payment of consideration under memorandum of understanding and the entitlement to obtain transfer of all the shares of the company to Zora Singh including the shares of Amrik Singh and Malkiat Singh to give a valid discharge on behalf of Amrik Singh (respondent No. 1 herein) shall be matters which shall fall for adjudication only in the civil suit pending between the parties and nothing mentioned in this judgment nor the Company Law Board will operate to be final against the respective interests of the party.

(c) The findings rendered by the Company Law Board that Amrik Singh had no due notice of the meetings of the board of directors and the notices alleged to have been sent to him for meetings on May 9, 2006, May 11, 2006 and May 19, 2006, are, confirmed and consequently the resolutions alleged to have been passed on the respective dates are set aside. Amrik Singh cannot be imputed with constructive notices of the meetings to be bound by any of the decisions in the said meetings.

(d) The effect of non-services of the notices on Amrik Singh, admittedly, a 25 per cent, shareholder and the purported decisions to appoint additional directors, removal of existing directors, including Amrik Singh and his son and increase in share capital shall constitute oppression and mismanagement of the affairs of the company, actionable before the appropriate forum.

In the result, the appeal is disposed of in the above terms.

The application for appointment of receiver has also been filed but having regard to the dismissal of the appeal, application is also dismissed leaving it open to the appellants to take appropriate action permissible under law in respect of management of the assets of the company and for realising appropriate income for the benefit of the company.