Zulfikar Ali Bhutto And Others vs State Of H.P. & Others

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 157/2023, dated 29.08.2023, registered at police station Ghumarwin District Bilaspur for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 452, 448, 504 and 506 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police, asserting that the petitioners entered his shop on 29th August 2023 at about 3 PM and gave beatings to Hussain Akhtar The informant had purchased the building from Shehnaz Mohammad, and he was residing with his family in the building. The petitioners had also attacked the informant before the incident, and he apprehended danger to his life. The police registered an FIR against the petiti ners and commenced investigations.

Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the title and possession of the property are already sub judice and subject matter of multiple civil suits pending before various civil Courts since the year 2011. An ad-interim injunction was ranted in civil suit number 101/2011 on 5th December 2011, which was made absolute on 1st June 2012. The entry by the petitioners into the disputed property while asserting their legal right of ownership and possession does not constitute any offence. The petitioners and the informant belong to the same family, and they were residing in the same property. Hence, the essential ingredients of the offences alleged in the FIR are not established. The petitioner no. 1 and his family members were in settled possession of the property, and they were illegally dispossessed by Punjab National Bank on the pretext of default in the repayment of the loan taken by the respondent no. 5 from the bank. The bank illegally dispossessed the petitioner no. 1 and his family members on 09.06.2023 through a judicial process instituted in the absence of the petitioner no. 1. The Bank handed over the possession f the property to the Respondent no. 5 during the pendency of the proceedings pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal Chandigarh. Respondent no. 5 exec ted a sale deed in favour of Respondent no. 4 after obtaining the physical possession. The sale deed is an abuse of the process of law and is subject to the outcome of Civil Suit no. 101/2011 pending before the competent court. The civil dispute is being converted into a criminal case. The petitioners have a bona fide claim over the property, and their entry into the property does not constitute any offence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed.

I have heard Mr Gurdev Negi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

Mr Gurdev Negi, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that civil suits are pending before various courts and the petitioners are within their rights to enter the property. The allegations in the FIR, even if taken to be true, do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. A civil dispute is being converted into a criminal case. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse f the pr cess of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed.

Mr Prashant Sen, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners trespassed into the informant’s property and gave beatings to Hussain Ak tar. This is purely a criminal matter and has nothing to do with the civil dispute pending between the parties. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised s me f the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

“102. In the backd op of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra rdinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable ffence but constitute only a non-cognizable ffence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as con emplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently impr bable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Secti n 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar eng af ed in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the conce ned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

This p siti n was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 S OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of aryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).

This position was reiterated in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being ab sed or likely to be abused or that the ends f justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

It was specifically asserted in the petition that the bank obtained possession from the petitioners. This is also corroborated by the order passed by this Court in Punjab National Bank versus District Magistrate and others, CWP No. 2481 of 2023, decided on 10th May 2023. It was also mentioned in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the petition that the possession was handed over by the bank to Mohammed Shehnaz, who executed a sale deed in favour of the informant. Therefore, the petition shows that the petitioners are out of possession, and the informant has been put in possessi n.

It was specifically asser ed in the FIR that the petitioners entered into the shop and gave beatings to Husain Akhtar; therefore, the c ntents of the FIR show the commission of cognizable offences. This Court is not to go into the validity or otherwise of the allegations because the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction has to treat the contents of the FIR as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -

“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.”

It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U P , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an ffence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].

In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from he complainant's FIR. Even if the cha ge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not.

Once the contents of the FIR are taken to be correct, they disclose the commission of cognizable offences and the FIR cannot be quashed.

It was submitted that the civil suits are pending before the Court, and the FIR was lodged with a mala fide intention. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed:

“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legi imate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”

Xxxx

In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdicti n under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.”

In the present case, the charge sheet specifically mentioned that the allegations were found to be correct after the investigation. Hence, the FIR cannot be quashed because they were lodged by the informant with whom the civil suits are pending.

It was submitted that the civil dispute is being converted into criminal p oceedings. This submission will not help the petitioners. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioners trespassed into the informant’s property and gave beatings to Hussain Akhtar. These allegations show the commission of a cognizable offence and do not show any civil dispute.

It is undisputed that a charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be all wed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of he charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made o t or not.”

No other p int was urged.

In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

T e observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.