A. Shakila Bai vs The Chief Revenue Controlling Authority-cum-Inspector General (Stamps), The Special Deputy Collector (Stamps) and The Sub-Registrar

D. Hariparanthaman, J.—This writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 02.03.2007 of the second respondent and the order

dated 23.11.2009 of the first respondent.

The second respondent passed an order in S.R. No. 114/2004/Ker.I dated Nil.02.2007, which was signed on 02.03.2007, directing the

petitioner to pay deficit court fee on the ground that there was under valuation, when he registered the property in Document No. 181/04 on

26.02.2004.

Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 30.10.2009 u/s 47-A(5) of the Indian Stamp Act. The appeal was dismissed by

the first respondent by an order dated 27.09.2007 on the ground that the appeal was not preferred within 60 days from the date of receipt of the

order issued by the second respondent.

The petitioner filed another application dated 30.10.2009 requesting the first respondent to reconsider their order and that was also rejected by

the first respondent by an order dated 23.11.2009.

The petitioner has filed the present writ petition to quash the order dated 02.03.2007 of the second respondent and the order dated 23.11.2009

of the first respondent.

Notice regarding admission was ordered on 26.02.2010. Private notice was also permitted.

Heard Dr. G. Krishnamurthy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mrs. Lita Srinivasan, learned Government Advocate for the respondents.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in M. Kaliammal Vs. The Special Deputy

Collector (Stamps) and Another, , wherein it has been held as follows:

A Division Bench of this Court in the judgment Indira Devi Vs. Inspector General of Registration and Others, , dealing with a similar situation

had held that since the provisions of the Limitation Act is not excluded in matters relating to filing of an appeal, Section 5 of the Limitation Act gets

attracted. Having that law laid down by this Court, we perused the entire papers placed before us. Having regard to the nature of the order passed

by the first respondent, which is challenged before the second respondent, viz., demanding difference in payment of stamp duty payable on the

ground of under valuation we are of the firm opinion that ends of justice definitely requires the delay in filing the appeal, whether it is 50 days or six

months, to be condone. We find from the materials placed on record that the appellant had satisfactorily explained the delay. Consequently, the

impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed....

The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the issue involved in the writ petition is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment of the

Division Bench of this Court.

The aforesaid narration of facts makes it very clear that the second respondent signed the order on 02.03.2007. Against which, the petitioner

preferred an appeal and the same was dismissed by the first respondent on 27.09.2007 on the sole ground that the appeal was preferred beyond

60 days.

In these circumstances, the impugned order dated 23.11.2009 of the first respondent is set aside. The first respondent is directed to dispose of

the appeal that was preferred by the petitioner, which resulted in the passing of the impugned order dated 27.09.2007, rejecting the appeal, after

hearing the petitioner. The first respondent is further directed to complete the said exercise within a period of three months from the date of receipt

of a copy of this order.

The writ petition is allowed on the above terms. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.