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Judgment
G. Rajasuria, J.—This writ petition has been filed to call for the records relating to the impugned order of the 1st respondent in his
proceedings in Muu.Mu. No. 42160/N4/07 dated 27.09.2008 and quash the same and to direct the first respondent to entertain and decide the
Appeal on merits and in accordance with law.
Heard Mr. K.Balasundharam, learned Counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. R. Janakiramulu, learned Special Government Pleader, who took
notice on behalf of the respondents.
The grievance of the petitioner as aired by the learned Counsel for the petitioner placing reliance on the averments in the affidavit accompanying
the writ petition, is to the effect the petitioner filed appeal before the appellate authority viz., the first respondent as against the order of the second
respondent, challenging the quantum of stamp duty fixed by the second respondent; however the first respondent rejected the appeal on the ground
that there is no provision for condoning the delay under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Undervaluation of Instrumental Rules. Hence, this writ
petition.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in S. Ramachandran v. Special Commissioner and
Commissioner for Land Administration, Chennai and Anr. reported in (2007)7 MLJ 409 would develop his arguments to the effect that in matters
like this, interlocutary application could be filed for getting the delay condoned, by placing reliance on Section 5 of Limitation Act. An excerpt from
the said decision would run thus:
In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in P. Sarathy Vs. State Bank of India, . In that case,
the suit came to be filed after the prescribed period of limitation and the appellant therein took a stand that the period during which he was agitating
before the appellate authority constituted under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, should be excluded while working
out the period of limitation. The Supreme Court accepted the claim of the appellant. The Supreme Court, while construing Section 14(1) of the
Limitation Act, where the expression ""Court"" has been used, held that the said expression would take within its fold all those quasi-judicial
authorities who have all the trappings of the Court. Paragraph 13 of the said judgment of the Supreme Court is relevant for our present purpose,
which reads as under:
In Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and Another, this Court, while considering the question under
the Contempt of Courts Act, held that the Registrar under the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act was a court. It was held that the
Registrar had not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he was given the same powers as was given to an ordinary civil court by the
CPC including the powers to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents and to hear the parties. The
Court referred to the earlier decisions in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi Vs. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and The Bharat Bank
Employees'' Union, Delhi, ; Maqbool Hussain Vs. The State of Bombay, and Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti Narain, . The Court approved the rule
laid down in these cases that in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart
from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has Finality and Authoritativeness
which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.
If the principles set out in the said paragraph are applied to the facts of this case, it can be safely held that the jurisdiction exercisable by the first
respondent as a revisional authority would satisfy all the requirements that have been set out in the above referred to decision of the Supreme
Court. Even u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, the expression used is only ""Court"" and not a ""Civil Court"". Therefore, it can be safely held that there is
every jurisdiction vested in the first respondent to condone the delay involved in preferring the revision petition by invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
Having regard to the said legal position, it is just and proper that the petitioner is permitted to move the first respondent by way of an application
u/s 5 of the Limitation Act seeking for condonation of the delay in filing the revision petition by adducing the reasons which prevented the petitioner
from filing the revision within the prescribed period of 30 days. Accordingly, while setting aside the order impugned in this writ petition, and
permitting the petitioner to file appropriate application for condonation of delay, along with the revision petition, the first respondent is directed to
dispose of the petitioner''s application for condonation of delay, in accordance with law and pass appropriate orders before entertaining the
petitioner''s revision petition and to decide the same on merits. The petitioner shall re-present the revision petition along with the application for
condonation of delay within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
No contrary opinion is forthcoming from the learned Government Advocate and there is also nothing to show that any appeal was filed by the
Government as against the precedent cited supra by the petitioner. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that the first respondent has to consider
the interlocutary application on merits, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, the matter is remitted back to the first respondent
to consider the application for condoning the delay on merits.
The learned Counsel for the petitioner would make a further submission to the effect that pending such appeal, the original sale deed may be
ordered to be returned after making necessary endorsements as contemplated in the decisions of this Court. An excerpt of the decision of this
Court in B. Rajappa and Anr. v. The Special Deputy Collector (Stamps), Madras and Ors. reported in 2002 (3) CTC 544, is extracted here
under for ready reference:
While appreciating the anxiety expressed on behalf of the State by the learned Advocate General, this Court directs that:
i) It is open to the Registering Authority to affix a seal, while releasing the original deed or conveyance or any other document indicating that a
reference is pending u/s 47A with respect to under-valuation and assessment of Stamp Duty payable, as and when the proceedings reach finality,
the same shall be intimated to the person who is liable to pay stamp duty demanding payment of deficit Stamp Duty payable on the instrument.
ii) The Registrar to make corresponding entries under Sections 54, 55 of the Registration Act, 1908, in the Register of indexes as to pendency of
proceedings u/s 47a.
iii) On completion of adjudication as to the under-valuation by the competent authority as well as appeal or revision, if any, thereof, and depending
upon the ultimate decision, the said authorities to recover deficit stamp duty according to law.
iv) Till such proceeding reaches finality and deficit is paid, there will be a charge for the deficit stamp duty, which is the subject matter of transfer or
conveyance.
v) On payment of deficit stamp duty, if any payable, the Registrar may once again, on production of the original deed of transfer, make appropriate
entry and recording the additional stamp duty paid and release of charge and also make consequential entries in the registers/indexes maintained
under Sections 54, 55, etc., of the Registration Act.
Accordingly I further direct that in the event of appeal being numbered, the original document shall be released after making necessary
endorsements.
With the above directions, this Writ Petition is disposed of. No costs.