A.B. Manual vs Mrs. Libian Margaret Manual and Another

M. Anantanarayanan, C.J.—This is a case referred u/s 10 and Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, IV of 1869, by the learned District

Judge of South Arcot, for confirmation of the decree nisi dissolving the marriage. The facts are simple. The petitioner and the first respondent were

married, according to the rites of the Christian religion, on 8th August 1951, at the Royapettah Purification Church, Madras. They lived together as

husband and wife from 1951 till 30th September 1964. The petitioner had taken up employment in the Neiveli Lignite Corporation and, they were

living together at that place. According to the sworn testimony of the petitioner (P. W. 1) on 30th September 1964, his wife informed him that she

was no longer willing to live with him in matrimony, and, she left his house and deserted him. Thereafter, according to the petitioner, the first

respondent and the second respondent were openly living together as husband and wife in a village near Neiveli. In his evidence, the petitioner

gives the actual address, viz., 15/1 Gangaikondan colony.

The respondents were ex parte, and did not contest the application at any stage, in spite of summonses taken out several times, and publication

in a daily newspaper of Madras. The learned District Judge accepted the evidence of P. W. 1, as Proving the fact of adultery between the first

respondent and the second respondent, recorded a finding that there was no collusion between the parties, and granted the decree dissolving the

marriage subject to Our confirmation. ''

We have been exercised by the fact that the evidence o� the petitioner (P. W. 1) stands alone, and uncorroborated. It is true that, under the

Indian Evidence Act, no particular quantum of evidence is legally required for proof of a fact, and the Court can accept and act upon

uncorroborated evidence of a witness, u/s 7 of Act IV of 1869, the practice of our Courts, in such matters, has been approximated to the practice

of the Matrimonial and Divorce Courts in the United Kingdom, as far as practicable. There are authorities to the effect that the evidence of the

husband should be corroborated by some other evidence, if this is at all feasible, or at least, by the circumstantial evidence of surrounding

probabilities.

In the present case, the evidence of the husband is not corroborated by that of any other witness, but, it is noteworthy that the husband has

given explicit information about the particular address at which the two respondents are jointly living together, in adultery, after the first respondent

had deserted the petitioner. That direct evidence is corroborated by the circumstantial evidence of the returns on the summonses, available in the

record. We have scrutinised this aspect, and we find one return made by the second respondent and signed by him, in which he explicitly states

that the first respondent was, at the time of the service of the summons, staying with her mother elsewhere, and that she had earlier left him (second

respondent). This relates to the address of the second respondent, as given by the petitioner, and, it is powerful corroboration, as circumstantial

evidence of the averment of the petitioner, on oath, that the first and the second respondents had been living together as man and wife at that given

address. In this case, we are, therefore, relying both on the evidence of P. W. 1 and on the corroboration by circumstantial evidence, that we have

referred to, as an adequate basis for acceptance of the evidence. Nevertheless, we must sound a note of caution that, in all such cases, the mere

fact that the respondents did not care to contest the proceeding and remained ex parte, is no justification for the Court to treat the proceeding as

purely formal and to act upon the evidence of the plaintiff or petitioner, uncorroborated, as though it were evidence given by the plaintiff in a civil

proceeding in which the defendant had remained ex parte. It should be unnecessary for us to point out that this is not a mere civil proceeding,

where an adjudication of rights as between two parties alone is involved; this is a proceeding relating to the status of matrimony, and it involves the

interests of society, as well as the interests of the concerned individuals. For that reason, the Court must never act in a purely formal sense, in such

proceedings, and the finding that the Court is satisfied that there is no collusion between the parties should not also be a mere mechanical inference

or conclusion. Having said all this, we may state that, in the present case, we are satisfied that the ground for dissolution was proved by adequate

evidence, circumstantial and direct, and that, there has been no collusion between the parties. Accordingly we accept the reference and confirm the

decree for dissolution. No costs.