Prodduturi Sujatha vs Prodduturi Mohona Rao

P. Ramakrishnam Raju, J.—This is a reference made u/s 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 -- hereinafter called ''the Act'', by the District Judge, Vijayawada in D.O.P. No. 496 of 1994 filed u/s 10 of the Act. Petitioner is the wife of the respondent, who are Christians. Their marriage took place on 19-1-1988 at Kankipadu as per Christian usage and custom. Two children were born during the wedlock. Respondent got addicted to vices, started harassing the petitioner, and finally, deserted her. He is living in adultery. Therefore, petitioner filed the O.P. seeking dissolution of marriage.

Respondent remained ex parte.

Petitioner examined herself as P.W. 1 and marked Exs. A-1 to A-3. Ex. A-1 is the Marriage Certificate; while Exs.A-2 and A-3 are the notices exchanged between the petitioner and respondent. Learned District Judge allowed the petition in a cryptic order without assigning reasons, which is as follows:

"The evidence of P.W. 1 is in support of the petition allegations and her evidence coupled with Exs. A-1 to A-3 are sufficient to believe her contention that the respondent is living in adultery and that there is no scope for the re-union of the petitioner and the respondent, and as such it is a fit case where the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is to be dissolved by a decree of divorce."

Dissolution of Christian marriage by a decree for divorce is a very serious matter affecting not only the rights of the parties to the lis, but their progeny; as well as their relatives and the Society in general. The status of the parties in particular and their heirs in general will be seriously affected. Therefore, it is the bounden duty of the Court to evaluate the evidence before recording a finding that the respondent to the petition is guilty of adultery, if the petition is filed by the husband, or the respondent has gone through a form of marriage with another woman, if the petitioner is the wife, or other grounds mentioned u/s 10 of the Act. To prove adultery by direct evidence is normally nearer to impossibility, except in exceptionally rare cases. However the same can be proved by circumstantial evidence which may point out to an irresistible inference that the respondent is living in adultery. The observations made by the Special Bench in D.K. Ratnamma Vs. Konluri John, , may be usefully extracted :

"This certainly is not the matter in which a matrimonial matter which has far reaching consequences has to be disposed of. The Court has a duty to scrutinise the pleadings and the evidence and to consider all aspects of the matter and also to see whether there is collusion between the parties."

Therefore, District Courts cannot dispose of O.Ps. arising under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 in a routine manner granting decrees for dissolution of Christian marriages between the parties on the ground that the respondent is set ex parte or on the allegation that the petitioner has come to know that the respondent is living in adultery, or on some other similar circumstances. Courts should observe due care and caution while recording findings on vital issues like adultery between the parties and they would be well within their bounds if they insist on strict proof by the petitioner either by direct or circumstantial evidence leading to an irresistible conclusion. Short of this and on trivial evidence, it would be most inappropriate and unwarranted to record findings in proof of adultery.

We are not satisfied the way in which the finding is recorded by the District Court. We instead of remitting the matter back to the District Court once again, which was filed in 1994, deem it appropriate to appraise the evidence by ourselves and dispose bf the matter.

P.W. 1 in her evidence corroborates the averments disclosed in the O.P. She asserts that after the birth of the second child, the respondent got addicted to vices and used to return home late night and ill-treat her by beating her. He is also living in adultery with other females. Her efforts for re-union through mediators proved futile. She got issued a registered notice on 23-6-1994, office copy of which is marked as Ex. A-2, the respondent having received the same, sent a contentious reply under Ex. A-3. The respondent did not choose to contest the O.P. The petitioner who is the mother of two children would not normally leave the matrimonial home unless there are compelling circumstances. Except a bold allegation that the petitioner is leading an immoral life with one Anandha Rao of Kankipadu, he did not choose to adduce any evidence worth-mentioning in support of the said allegation. In the absence of any such allegation even in the reply, Ext. A-3, issued by him, the allegation of the respondent that the petitioner is also leading an adulterous life has to be mentioned only to be rejected. The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is not disputed. The evidence of the petitioner remained unchallenged. She is not even cross-examined. No suggestion about her conduct or about the conduct of the respondent is put to her. If the allegation made by the respondent is true, he would not have failed to take any action against her. Not even a notice was issued to her pointing out the lapses on her part. Even though he alleged that he had sent mediators, none of them was chosen to be examined. The conduct of the petitioner in juxt a position of this is narrated in her registered notice, Ex.A-2, followed by the filing of the petition also lends support to her case. In view of her categorical evidence, coupled with Ex.A-2 and other circumstances narrated above, we are inclined to agree with the finding of the learned District Judge that the respondent is living in adultery and confirm the judgment and decree of divorce granted in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent. The Reference Case is accordingly ordered but in the circumstances without costs.