Abdul Gafoor vs Ullattil Raveendran

A. Badharudeen, J

This Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred as 'Cr.P.C.', for short), by the revision petitioner, who is the sole accused in S.T. No.145/2016 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalpetta, arraying the original complainant as the 1st respondent and State of Kerala as the 2nd respondent.

The revision petitioner impugns judgment in S.T.No.145/2016 dated 23.05.2018 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalpetta and the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.43/2018 dated 24.09.2022 on the file of the Sessions Court, Kalpetta arising therefrom.

Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor on admission. Notice to the 1st respondent stands dispensed with.

I shall refer the parties in this revision as 'complainant' and 'accused' for easy reference.

Bereft of unnecessary details, the specific case put up by the complainant before the trial court was that there were business dealings in between the complainant and the accused. While so, the accused and his wife borrowed Rs.25 lakh from the complainant as hand loan and for the repayment of the said sum, cheque for the said sum was issued. On dishonour of the said cheque, initially prosecution was launched under Section 142 of Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred as 'NI Act', for short) alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kalpetta. The said case was transferred to Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-V, Kozhikode for want of jurisdiction. Thereafter there was mediation and the whole matter was settled for Rs.5 lakh. As part of settlement, the accused herein issued cheque for Rs.5 lakh dated 25.11.2015. But the said cheque also was dishonoured for want of funds. Though notice was issued demanding the said sum, the accused failed to repay the same and, thus the prosecution.

The trial court proceeded with trial. During trial, PW1 was examined and Exts.P1 to P6 were marked.

On completion of prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and provided opportunity to adduce defence evidence. But no defence evidence was adduced.

The trial court ventured the matter and the accused was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rs.5,50,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh Fifty Thousand Only). Out of the fine amount Rs.5,40,000/- was ordered to be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and the balance should be remitted to the Government. It was ordered further that in case of default in payment of fine, the accused would undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six months.

The judgment in S.T.C.No.145/2016 dated 23.05.2018 was challenged before the Sessions Court, Kalpetta. The learned Sessions Judge also confirmed the said conviction and sentence as per judgment dated 24.09.2022 in Crl.Appeal No.43/2018.

The concurrent verdicts entered into by the trial court as well as by the appellate court are under challenge in this revision petition. While impeaching the veracity of the concurrent verdicts of the trial court, the learned counsel for the accused sought 5 months time to pay the amount. Though he argued that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and the capacity of the complainant to advance Rs.25 lakh as contended earlier, in fact, those are matters to be considered on re-appreciation of the evidence. Therefore, this Court cannot look into those aspects by exercising the limit of power of revision.

In this matter, this Court is exercising power of revision and the power of revision is not available to appreciate or re-appreciate to have a contra-finding.

It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5):

“5. …... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”

In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135):

“14. …...  Unless  the  order  passed  by  the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda. Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is non-consideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available.

In this matter, the courts below observed that the accused herein settled a previous prosecution for the offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act and issued the present cheque. Further, the courts below given benefit of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act in favour of the complainant, on finding that the evidence of PW1 is believable to act upon the same to hold that the said evidence is sufficient enough to discharge the initial burden cast upon the complainant.

Regarding law on presumptions, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], Rangappa v. Sri Mohan. In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act and held as under:

“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may  not  need  to  adduce  evidence  of  his/her own.”

In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197  :  2019  (1)  KLD  420  :  2019  (2)  KLJ  205  : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under:

“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”

In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE  434  :  ILR  2021  (1)  Ker.  855  :  2021 (5) SCC  283  :  2021  (1)  KLT  OnLine  1132], Kalamani Tex (M/s.) & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian the Apex Court considered the amplitude of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act it was held as under:

“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative.

In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay.

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Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:

“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”

Thus the law is clear on the point that when the complainant discharges the initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities.

In this matter, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly appreciated and re-appreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the evidence available established commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of NI Act by the accused and, accordingly, the accused was convicted. In fact, there is no reason to revisit the concurrent verdicts of conviction.

On scrutiny of the materials available with the limited power of revision, nothing substantiate to interfere with the concurrent findings of conviction. However, it is noticed that the sentence requires modification to meet the ends of justice.

Therefore, I am inclined to modify the sentence. In the result, this revision petition is allowed in part, as under:

i. The concurrent verdicts of conviction stands confirmed.

ii. The sentence is modified. Thereby the accused is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a day till rising of the court and to pay fine of Rs.5,50,000/- (Rupees Five lakh fifty thousand only) for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, out of which Rs.5,40,000/- would be given as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) of Code of Criminal Procedure.

iii. In default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months.

iv. Acting on the request of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, two months' time from today is granted to undergo the sentence and to pay the fine.

v. The accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 01.02.2023 before the trial court to undergo the sentence and to pay the fine.

vi. Execution  of  the  sentence  shall deferred till 31.01.2023.

vii. If the accused fails to appear before the trial court as directed, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence as per law, without fail.

Registry is directed to forward a copy of this order to the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalpetta, for information and compliance.