Beema Busthana vs Rahul

A. Badharudeen, J

This Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C., by the revision petitioner, who is the sole accused in S.T.No.7045/2014 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Perumbavoor arraying the original complainant as the 1st respondent and State of Kerala as the 2nd respondent.

The revision petitioner impugns judgment in S.T.No.7045/2014 dated 27.09.2018 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Perumbavoor and the judgment in Criminal Appeal No.375/2018 dated 24.09.2021 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Muvattupuzha, arising therefrom.

Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner as well as the learned Public Prosecutor.

I  shall  refer  the  parties  in  this revision as 'complainant' and 'accused' for easy reference.

Brief facts of the case put up by the complainant before the trial court is as under:

On dishonour of cheque for Rs.3,50,000/-dated 02.01.2014 alleged to be issued by the accused to the complainant in discharge of the said sum, alleged to be borrowed by the husband of the accused, the complainant launched prosecution alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'NI Act' hereinafter), when the accused failed to repay the amount covered by the said cheque even on demand.

The trial court proceeded with trial. During trial, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.P1 to P5 were marked. Though opportunity was given to the accused to adduce defence evidence, after questioning him under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C, no defence evidence was adduced.

The trial court appraised the evidence and finally found the accused guilty for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he was convicted thereunder. He was sentenced to undergo imprisonment till rising of court and to pay fine of Rs.3,65,000/-(Rupees Three Lakh Sixty Five Thousand Only) and the fine was ordered to be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. It was ordered further that in case of default in payment of fine, the accused would undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of six months.

The judgment in S.T.No.7045/2014 dated 27.09.2018 was challenged before the Additional Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha. The learned Sessions Judge also confirmed the said conviction, while modifying the sentence, on re-appreciation of the evidence as per judgment dated 24.09.2021.

The learned counsel for the accused, who attempted to impeach the veracity of the concurrent verdicts, in fact, failed to substantiate any points to unsettle the concurrent verdicts by the limited power of revision available to this Court. However, it is argued that the complainant failed to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque and the complainant is acting as an agent of one Bibin of Thodaparambu and the transaction took place at the house of the above said Bibin.

Going by the grounds raised in the revision petition and the argument mooted by the learned counsel for the accused, the same are matters which would require re-appreciation of evidence and power of this Court, while exercising revision is not wide enough to do the said exercise.

It is the settled law that power of revision available to this Court under Section 401 of Cr.P.C r/w Section 397 is not wide and exhaustive to re-appreciate the evidence to have a contra finding. In the decision reported in [(1999) 2 SCC 452 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], State  of  Kerala  v.  Puttumana  Illath  Jathavedan Namboodiri, the Apex Court, while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, laid down the following principles (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5):

“5. …...  In  its  revisional  jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ...”

In another decision reported in [(2015) 3 SCC 123 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19], Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, the Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. Following has been laid down in para.14 (SCC p.135):

“14. …... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaring unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

The said ratio has been followed in a latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in [(2018) 8 SCC 165], Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda. Thus the law is clear on the point that the whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence and, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence had already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice. To put it otherwise, if there is non-consideration of any relevant materials, which would go to the root of the matter or any fundamental violation of the principle of law, then only the power of revision would be made available.

In this case, the courts below given emphasis to the evidence of PW1 to the effect that the husband of the accused borrowed Rs.3,50,000/- for his business purpose and for repayment of the said sum, the cheque for the said sum was issued on 11.02.2013. She deposed about the dishonour of the cheque, issuance of notice, its acceptance and reluctance on the part of the accused to repay the amount, despite have accepted the notice. It is relevant to note that the courts below also given emphasis to the evidence of PW2, who being an eye witness to the transaction, supported the evidence of PW1 without any ambiguity. It is at this juncture, the courts below given benefit of the twin presumptions in favour of the complainant. In fact, the said presumptions not stand rebutted by the available evidence. The courts below negatived the contention raised by the accused for want of evidence.

Regarding law on presumptions, I would like to refer a 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court in [2010 (2) KLT 682 (SC)], Rangappa v.Mohan. In the above decision, the Apex Court considered the presumption available to a complainant in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I Act and held as under:

“The presumption mandated by S.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [2008 (1) KLT 425 (SC)] may not be correct. This is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. S.139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While S.138 of the Act specified a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under S.139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by S.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under S.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own.”

In the decision reported in [2019 (1) KLT 598 (SC) : 2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, the Apex Court while dealing with a case where the accused has a contention that the cheque issued was a blank cheque, it was held as under:

“A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of S.138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence.”

In a latest 3 Bench decision of the Apex Court reported in [2021 (2) KHC 517 : 2021 KHC OnLine 6063 : 2021 (1) KLD 527 : 2021 (2) SCALE 434 : ILR 2021 (1) Ker. 855 : 2021 (5) SCC 283 : 2021 (1) KLT OnLine 1132], Kalamani Tex (M/s.) & anr. v. P.Balasubramanian the Apex Court  considered  the  amplitude  of  presumptions under  Sections  118  and  139  of  the  N.I  Act  it was held as under:

“Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the Trial Court completely overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under S.118 and S.139 of NIA. The Statute mandates that once the signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable instrument are established, then these `reverse onus' clauses become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed upon him. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the cheque and the Deed, the Trial Court ought to have presumed that the cheque was issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The Trial Court fell in error when it called upon the Complainant-Respondent to explain the circumstances under which the appellants were liable to pay.

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Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated. It is useful to cite Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar (2019 (1) KHC 774 : (2019) 4 SCC 197 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 (2) KLJ 205 : AIR 2019 SC 2446 : 2019 CriLJ 3227], P.36., where this Court held that:

“Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under S.139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt.”

Thus the law is clear on the point that when the complainant discharges the initial burden to prove the transaction led to execution of the cheque, the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I Act would come into play. No doubt, these presumptions are rebuttable and it is the duty of the accused to rebut the presumptions and the standard of proof of rebuttal is nothing but preponderance of probabilities.

On evaluation of the materials available, nothing substantiated to revisit the concurrent verdicts of conviction as well as sentence imposed by the trial court as well as the appellate court in any manner. Therefore, the same did not require any interference. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed.

Faced with the situation, the learned counsel for the accused sought six months' time to pay the compensation.

In the interest of justice and taking note of the fact that the transaction is of the year 2014, I am inclined to grant two months' time from today to pay the compensation.

Therefore, the revision petitioner/the accused is directed to appear before the trial court on 06.02.2023 to undergo the sentence and to pay fine.

In default to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the sentence as per law without fail. Till 05.02.2023, the execution of the sentence shall stand deferred.