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Judgment
Mr. Jeevan Reddy, J.—This Petition is for the issuance of a Writ of certiorari to quash the notification contained in G.O. Rt. No. 560, Transport (Roads & Buildings), dated 2-6-1977, published in the A.P. Gazette u/s 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of lands mentioned in the schedule thereto, situated in Sdmidi village, Taluk & District Warangal. The notification states that the lands are proposed to be acquired "for a public purpose, to wit. for construction of Railway siding for Food Corporation of India and approach road". Under the notification, the power under sub-section 1(4) of Section 17 has been invoked and the enquiry u/s 5-A of the Act has been dispensed with. Accordingly, the declaration under Section'' 6 has also been published in the same Gazette. The petitioner owns some of the lands covered by the notification. The petitioner says he is the owner of survey Nos. 150, 153 and 156, which are continuous to one another. There is a well in survey No. 156 excavated at a cost of Rs. 25,000/-. On 20-3-1976 the officers of the Food Corporation of India, 3rd respondent in the writ petition, encroached upon the said lands, cut the trees, removed the fencing, and occupied the same. A portion of the above lauds on which a brick manufacturing unit has been constructed by the petitioner is still in possession of the petitioner. In view of the tresspass, he tiled a writ petition, being W.P. No. 1283 of 1976, in this Court and obtained interim directions protecting his possession. In that writ petition, the 3rd respondent filed a counter stating that the Corporation occupied the lands of the petitioner only with his consent and not illegally. During the pendency of that writ petition, talks were held between the petitioner and the Corporation and, according to the petitioner, the Corporation assured him of adequate compensation whereupon be withdrew the writ petition on 8-6-1976. Thereafter, the Corporation constructed and completed the godowns in 1976 itself, but the petitioner was not paid any compensation. While so, the impugned G. O. has been issued.
The petitioner is attacking the validity of the said notification on two grounds, viz., (i) that, the substance of the notification u/s 4 (1) was not published in the locality as required by law, and (ii) that, the Food Corporation of India is neither a department of the Government, nor a ''Company'' as defined by the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, no acquisition can be made for its purposes. Reliance is placed upon a decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Raja Ram vs State AIR 1970, Punjab & Haryana, 361 in support of this contention.
In the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent, the District Collector, Warangal, it is stated that the possession of all the lands concerned was taken on 23-2-1976 with the written consent of the respective owners. A meeting of all the Pattadars was convened by the District Revenue Officer, Warangal, on 15-2 1976, which was attended by the District Manager, Food Corporation of India as well, wherein such an agreement was arrived at. It is stated that, according to Section 34 of the Act, the owners would be entitled to interest on the compensation from the date of delivery of possession. It is stated further that the well situated in the lands of the petitioner has not been acquired and that, the substance of the notification u/s 4 (1) was published in the village, as required by law,. In fact, it is stated that the petitioner has, after voluntarily delivering the lands to the Corporation, reoccupied a portion of the same forcibly and illegally. It is also submitted that the Food Corporation of India is a ''Company'' within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, the acquisition is valid and proper.
So far as the publication of the substance of the notification u/s 4 (1) is concerned, the record produced by the learned Government Pleader before us clearly established such publication and, the first contention raised in the writ petition fails.
Now, we shall deal with the main contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Food Corporation of India not being a department of the Government, or a ''Company'' no land can be acquired for it under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The inspiration for this extreme contention is the Division Bench judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, reported in Raja Ram vs, State.
The expression ''Company'' has been defined by clause (e) in Section 3 of the Act. According to it, "the expression Company'' means a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882(6 of 1882),'' or under the (English) Companies Acts, 1962 to 1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian Law, or by a Royal Chapter or tetters Patent, and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860). and a registered society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (2 of 1912), or any other law relating to co-operative Societies for the time being in force in any State".
The Food Corporation of India has been established u/s 3 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964,. It is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, to contract, to sue, and be sued in the corporate name. Its capital is contributed entirely by the Central Government, and its management vests in a Board of Directors appointed by the Central Government, It is, undoubtedly, a distinct entity and there can be little doubt that it is not a department of the Government. It is a body corporate, incorporated "by an Indian law".
A Corporation can also be a ''Company''. In the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, the expression "Corporation" means :-
"a body or society authorised by law to act as one individual, a town council; a company".
In the United States of America, all the Joint Stock Companies, which are generally referred to in our country as Companies, are referred to as Corporations. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 18, at page 366, the expression ''Corporation'' is defined as "an artificial being created by law, composed of individuals united under a common name and haying succession while it exists". It is stated further: "the term ''Corporation'' as used in various statutes and constitutions, usually refers to private Corporations only, and............oridinarly does not embrace a "Municipal Corporation", Reference may also be had to the definition of the said expression by Marshall, Chief Justice, in Dartmouth College vs. Woodward to the following effect:
"A Corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a Corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transiting if from band to hand. It is chiefly, for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities that corporations were invented, and are in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of feting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being...........".
Of course, in India, the word ''''Corporation" is of a wider import than the word "Company". Even the local authorities like Municipal bodies are referred lo as Corporations; but, that is no reason for confining the said expression only to such bodies; nor is there any reason to confine the definition of ''Company'' in the Land Acquisition Act only to companies registered under the Indian Companies At, 1956. The very definition contained in the Act makes it clear that it takes in the Companies not only registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, but also those incorporated under an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian Law, or by a Royal Charter or Liters Patent as the case may be. Now, if a Company incorporated by Royal Charter or Letters Patent can be called a Company, there is no reason why a body incorporated under an Indian law should not be called a "Company". The expression ''Corporation'' is not a term of art. It has not also been defined by the General Clauses Act, If we look to the basic characteristics of the Food Corporation of India, it is akin to a Government Company registered under the Indian Companies Act.
In Valjibhai vs. State of Bombay 1 it has been held that the State Transport Corporation incorporated under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950, is a ''Company'' as defined in clause (e) of Section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is held that it is a Corporation incorporated by an Indian Law. and therefore, within the said definition and further that, it is not a ''local authority'' as defined in Section 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
This decision of the Supreme Court should, obviously, conclude the discussion but for the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Raja Ram vs. State 2 where it has been held that the Food Corporation of India is not a ''Company'' within the meaning of clause (e) in Section 3. The Full Bench evolved two tests which, according to it, must be satisfied before an artificial person can fall within the four corners of the expression "Company" as defined in the Act. Those two tests are stated to be; " (i) it should be a Company as understood in ordinary law, and (ii) it should be registered under any of the statutes mentioned in clause (e) of Section 3 of the Act, or incorporated by an Indian Law". The Food Corporation was said to satisfy the second test, but not the first test. It was observed that the expression "Company" as ordinarily understood, means that it is a fluctuating or successive body of persons who, from time to time, form the company and that, the expression involves two ideas, viz.,(4) that, the association is of persons so numerous as not to be aptly described as a firm, and (b) that, the consent of all the other members is not required for transfer of a member''s interest. In as much as Food Corporation is not so composed and constituted, it was held, it is not a ''Company''. When the decision of the Supreme Court in Valjibhai vs. State of Bombay 1 was brought to its notice, it was held that in the decision only the second test evolved by the Full Bench was considered, hut not the first one. It was, therefore, held to be not conclusive on the question. With respect, we are unable to agree. We see no warrant for importing the ordinary notions of Company Law, prevailing under the Indian Companies Act, and thereby abridging and curtailing the scope and sweep of the definition. In fact, the Companies registered under the Indian Companies Act are only one of the categories comprised in the said definition. The very evolving of the two tests by the Full Bench appears to us, with great deference to the learned Judges who constituted the Full Bench, not really warranted. Even under the Indian Companies Act there are Government Companies, whose capital is wholly contributed by the Government whose entire share capital is held by the Government or its officers, and the management whereof also vests in a body similar to the Board of Directors appointed for the Food Corporation of India This aspect clearly shows that the earlier notions regarding Company are undergoing change with the progress of times and, therefore, there appears to be no reason to continue to stick to the conventional meaning of the said expression.
We are also of the opinion that the question whether the Food Corporation of India is a ''Company'' within the meaning of clause (e) of Section 3, or not, is not of much significance in the facts and circumstances of this case. In this case, the acquisition is made avowedly for a public purpose, and not for the Company in accordance with Part VII of the Act. When an acquisition is made under Part VII it is not stated to be for a public purpose, and not a pie is contributed from out of public revenues. The entire compensation has to be paid for by the Company for whom the acquisition is made. In fact, even the costs of acquisition proceedings are also charged against the Company. Before proceeding to acquire a land for a company, under Part VII the previous consent of the appropriate Government shall have to obtained, which consent can be given only if, on the appropriate Government is satisfied (a) that, the purpose of acquisition is to obtain the land for erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company, or for provision of the amenities, directly connected therewith; or (b) that, work is likely to prove useful to the public. After the decision of the Supreme Court in R.L. Brora vs. State of U P.2 clause (a) was added in Section 40, according to which consent can be given by the appropriate Government if such acquisition is needed for the construction of some buildings or work for a Company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself of any industry or work which is for a public purpose. But the provisions in Part-VII do not preclude the appropriate Government from acquiring land for a Company otherwise than under Part-VII, It can acquire it for public purpose provided the whole or part of the compensation is paid out of the public revenue; (See: Fatilal Shakarabhai vs. State of Gujarat (5). That is also the decision of a Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court-----consisting of Bhagwati. C.J., N.K. Vakil & D. A. Desai. JJ...... in Ramji Popatbhal vs. Jamnadas 1. It is observed therein :-
"It is now well settled that an acquisition of land may ''be made for a public purpose or for a Company. If the acquisition is for a public purpose, the compensation has to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. On the other hand, if the acquisition is for a company, the compensation has to be paid by the company and the provisions of Part-VII of the Act have to be complied with. But that does not necessarily mean that an acquisition for a company for a public purpose cannot be made otherwise than under the provisions of Part-VII if the cost or a portion of the cost of acquistion paid comes out of public revenue or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority Such an acquisition would be an acquention for a public purpose to be executed by a company and the only condition for the validity of such an acquisition would be that the cost of the acquisition must be borne wholly or in part out of public revenue or some fund controlled or man aged by a local authority and it would not be necessary to comply with the provisions of Part-VII. It is only where an acqnisition for a company is to be made entirely at the cost of the company that such acquisition would, come under the provisions of Part-VII and would have to satisfy the requirements of that Part........."
We are in respectful agreement with the above enunciation.
Now, it must be noticed that, in the Punjab case, while proposing to acquire the land for the Food Corporation of India, as required for a public purpose, no part of the compensation was contributed from out of public revenues. It was probably for that reason that the Full Bench had to go into the question whether the Food Corporation of India is a ''Company'', or not. But, in the present case, the petitioner has not alleged that no part of the compensation is being paid from out of public revenues. Once the acquisition is being made for public purpose it does not matter whether the beneficiary, if any, is a Company, or an institution, or an un-incorporated organisation. So long as it is for a public purpose, it is not necessary to go into and enquire further who the beneficiary, if any, is. It is for this reason that it is really unnecessary to go into the question whether the Food Corporation of India is a ''Company'' or not, within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act; but, since the said question was elaborately argued before us, we had to express our opinion on the question. It should be noticed further that, in this case, the petitioner himself had voluntarily put the Food Corporation of India in possession of the land, permitting it to construct its godowns thereon. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that his client agreed to and put the Food Corporation of India in possession of his land on the assurance being given that compensation will be settled by private negotiations and paid accordingly, we do not find any specific allegation to the effect in the writ petition, nor has any material been brought to our notice in support of the said contention. Obviously there was no agreement that compensation would be determined only with the consent of the owner, and not otherwise. In the circumstances, there was nothing preventing the competent authority under the Land Acquisition Act from acquiring the said land according to law. The construction of godowns has also been completed several years back. In these circumstances, it would also not be just to permit the petitioner to question the acquisition by way of this writ petition.
The Writ petition, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with cost.