Adarsh Kumar Batra vs The State of Punjab

S.S. Grewal, J.—This petition u/s 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Code'') read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as ''the Constitution'') relates to quashment of the impugned First Information Report No. 29 registered at Police Station, Nangal, district Ropar on 21-3-1989 against the petitioner.

According to the allegations in the petition, the petitioner was working as Junior Engineer P.W.D., Public Health. He was posted as Junior Engineer, on 9-2-1971 and remained posted at Nangal upto the year 1978 when he was transferred to Himachal Pradesh and remained there upto 1981 when he was again transferred to Nangal. The allegations against the petitioner, are that the enquiry by the Vigilance department is pending against him regarding purchase of plot No. 97 at Nangal for Rs. 3,300/- and the construction made thereon in the year 1980 by spending Rs. 1,48,858/-, purchase of motor cycle in the year 1978 for Rs. 8,000/-; installation of telephone at his house in" the year 1980 and purchase of Maruti Van for Rs. 81,000/-. According to the allegations in the F. I. R., the plot was purchased by his wife Smt. Indira Kumari for Rs. 3,300/- and building was constructed over it after spending Rs. 1,48,858/-. It is also stated there in that during the period 1978 to 1987 the known sources of income of the petitioner were Rs. 2,94,000/- whereas he had spent Rs. 4,20,855/- thereby an amount of Rs. 1,28,543/- was made by him by Corrupt and illegal means and he has committed: an offence punishable u/s 5(1) (e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

The State in its reply admitted the registration of the case against the petitioner vide impugned First Information Report and pleaded that the amount of Rs. 1,28,543/- was made by the petitioner by corrupt and illegal means and he is, thus, liable to be proceeded under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.

Counsel for the parties were heard.

The learned counsel for the petitioner relying on authority of the apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Kailash Nath, submitted that the main allegations concerning the construction of the house in this petition relates to the year 1980 and even according to such allegations the construction was made by his wife on her plot which was. purchased by her for an amount of Rs. 3,300/-. It was further submitted that the wife of the petitioner was working as a Government teacher in the Himachal Pradesh and at present earning Rs. 2,700/- per month and that income of the petitioner''s wife prior, or, during the relevant period i.e. from 1978 onwards has not been taken into consideration It is pertinent to note that there is no specific allegations in the impugned F. I. R. that the building was constructed by the present petitioner over the plot purchased by his wife or that the petitioner had actually spent, huge amount on the construction of the said house or that the income of the wife of the petitioner too was taken into consideration while balding that he had made or spent more money during the relevant period over the aforesaid items, in excess of his known sources of income or that of his wife. For the purpose of quashment of the impugned F. I. R. mainly the allegations contained there in have to be considered and not, those taken up in the writter statement for the first time. Thus from the aforesaid allegations set out in the impugned F. I. R., it cannot be said that the petitioner himself had spent any amount on the construction of the said house, or, that he had made or spent money during the aforesaid period in excess of his known sources of income, in order to make out a prima facie case u/s 6(1) (e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, 1 find support on this point by the authority of the apex Court in State of Bihar Vs. Murad Ali Khan and Others, , wherein it was held:-

"that jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr. P. C, which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or, otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or net. That is the function of the Trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to- regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings, would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the court or not."

Another important aspect of the case is that the impugned F. I. R in this case has bean lodged on 21-3-1989 i.e. after more than 8 years of the aforesaid items relating to construction of house, purchase of motor cycle and installation of telephone in his house, which constitutes allegations u/s 6(1) (e) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Patently the F. I. R. in the instant case, in respect of the aforesaid main allegation concerning the construction of the house was lodged after more than 8, years of the commission of the alleged offence. The other two items also relate to a remote period besides, the challan, in the instant case, has not so far been presented. This is in violation of constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial contemplated under Article 20 of the Constitution, particularly when inordinate delay of more than 8 years, referred to above, does not arise from the default of the petitioner, nor, the same is occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason, as held in Amarjit Singh Dhingra, Executive Engineer v. State of Punjab 1989 (2) RCR 193 and Amar Nath and Ors. v. The Slate of Punjab 1988 (2) Ch. L.R. 419 , wherein reliance was placed on Fall Bench authority of Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and Another Vs. State of Bihar, and it was held that :-

"the right of a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been ruled that a calk us and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedly public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution"

For the foregoing reasons the impugned first information report and resultant proceedings taken thereunder against the petitioner are directed to be quashed and this petition is accordingly allowed.