Mangal Singh Kapoor vs State of Punjab

S.S. Grewal, J.

This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of F.I.R. No. 273 dated 1671981 registered against the petitioner under section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), at Police Station Rajpura, district Patiala, Annexure P. 3, as well as other resultant proceedings, taken thereunder including summoning order, Annexure P. 2.

In brief, facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, which emerge from the impugned First Information Report, are that the present petitioner misutilising his official power and post and without the sanction of Pesticide Advisory Committee purchased 46500 litres insecticide/medicines for killing big ants from M/s Zimidara Chemical Rajpura, of which Mohinder Kumar brotherinlaw of the present petitioner was a Salesman, with effect from 13121972 to 474. Insecticide purchased from the said firm was of lowest quality. Thereafter in violation of Insecticide Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) and the recommendations of the Pesticide Advisory Committee empty tins of the insecticide already purchased, to the aforesaid firm at the rate of 30 Paisa per tin instead of 50 paise per tin thereby petitioner caused illegal benefit to the tune of Rs. 4570.60 to the firm. Besides, the petitioner was also responsible for making other purchases from the said firm in violation of the Rules. On this basis case under section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5 (2) of the Act was registered against the petitioner.

The petitioner retired from his service as Joint Director Agriculture Punjab, on 31121978, Challan in this case was initially presented in the Court of Special Judge, Patiala on 2391981. The petitioner, however was discharged by the said Court on 5121983 on the ground, that no case can be filed against the accused (petitioner) without taking sanction from the Government as required under Section 197 of the Code. The Court had also directed that the authorities would be at liberty to proceed in the matter after obtaining proper sanction, if, so advised. After obtaining proper sanction on 241988 from the State Government fresh challan was presented in the Court of Special Judge, Patiala in January, 1989. Learned counsel for the State did not file any reply in this case in spite of the fact that the State was duly represented and numerous adjournments were granted to the State for this purpose.

Learned counsel for the parties were heard and record was perused.

Submission made on behalf of the petitioner is two fold. Firstly it was submitted that the alleged charges of corruption against the petitioner relate to the year 197273 and first information report in instant case was lodged after inordinate delay of 8 years, and, secondly, even though the petitioner was discharged on 5121983 for want of obtaining proper sanction under Section 197 of the Code, the Investigating Agency in this case took more than five years before presenting the second challan in this case in January, 1989 though it had obtained the sanction for prosecution of the petitioner on 2nd of April, 1988. It was further submitted that no plausible explanation whatsoever has been furnished for this inordinate delay and the impugned first information report as well as the subsequent proceedings now pending in the court of Special Judge, Patiala, including the summoning order in clear violation of constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution.

On the other hand on behalf of the State it was contended that at the petitioner had filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1088 of 1984 concerning his pension and gratuity and sufficient time was also consumed for obtaining sanction from the State Government and that delay in initiating the present proceedings against the petitioner has been duly explained in this case.

It is significant to note that even though the State in this case was duly represented throughout by a counsel and it had ample time to submit its, written reply, no such reply was submitted on behalf of the State. It is thus too late in the day for the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State to contend that due or proper explanation has been furnished by the Investigating Agency for its lapses. Admittedly, no specific stay order had been passed in the aforesaid Civil Writ Petition which might have caused any hindrance for obtaining proper sanction from the State Government. The inordinate delay of over 8 years in lodging the first information report has not been properly explained at all, and it would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court at this lute stage to permit the trial to continue with regard to offences which were committed as far back as in the year 197273 or there about. Beside, the allegations in the first information report against the petitioner are quit vague and do not constitute a prima facie offence punishable under section 5(1) (d) read with section 5(2) of the Act.

This delay is in clear violation, of constitutional guarantee of it speedy trial as contemplated under Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when inordinate delay, referred to above, does, not arise from the default of the petitioner, nor the same is occasioned by any extraordinary of exceptional reason. I find support on this point from Single Bench authority of this Court in Amarjit Singh Dhingra, Executive Engineer v. State of Punjab, 1989(2) Recent Criminal Reports 193 , and Amar Nath and others, v. State of Punjab, 1988(2) Chandigarh Law Reports, 419, wherein reliance was placed on Full Bench authority of Patna High Court in Madheswardhari and another v. State of Bihar, 1990(3) RCR(Crl.) 302 (Patna) : 1986 Crl. LJ. 1771 and it was held that the right of a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been ruled that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones plainly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned first information report, Annexure P. 3, and the resultant proceedings taken thereunder including the summoning order, Annexure P2, are directed to be quashed and this petition is accordingly allowed.