Ajay Kumar vs State of Uttarakhand & Another

Sharad Kumar Sharma, J.

The parties to the C482 application are present in person. They have been duly identified by their respective counsel. The complainant/respondent

no. 2 has lodged an FIR being FIR No. 153/2012 under Sections 452, 325, 504 & 506 of IPC for an offence said to have been committed on

12.06.2012, raising an allegation pertaining to a house trespass said to have been committed by the present applicant. After conclusion of the

investigation a Final Report No. 40 of 2012 dated 28.09.2012 was submitted, against which a protest petition was filed, the Trial Court allowed protest

petition, and a cognizance order was issued on 06.12.2014 for the offences under Sections 325, 452, 504 & 506 of IPC against the present applicant

and one Mr. Nirmal. On cognizance being taken, a case has been registered as Criminal Case No. 1838/2014 ‘Pappu vs. Nirmal & Another’,

and the same is pending consideration before the Judicial Magistrate, Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar.

They have come up in the present C482 application, whereby the applicant has sought relief to the following effect:

“It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to allow this application and quashing the F.I.R. No. 153 of

2012, Criminal Case No. 1838 of 2014 Pappu Vs. Nirmal and another, under Section 452, 325, 504, 506 of I.P.C., P.S. Gadarpur, pending before the

Court of Judicial Magistrate, Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar (against the applicant only), to secure the end of justice.â€​

The C482 application is accompanied with the compounding application, duly signed by both the parties. Both the complainant and the applicant are

the residents of the same village and are neighbourers, and on account of the interference by the people of locality during the pendency of the trial, the

parties have come to terms of settlement and they have resolved to decide the dispute amicably. Consequently, on 11.10.2018 a settlement deed has

been executed between them. Terms of which is decipher hereunder:

“jkthukek

;g vkilh le>kSrkukek vuqcU/k i= vkt fnukad&11-10-2018 dks LFkku :nziqj ftyk m/ke flag uxj esa fuEu i{kksa ds e/; fu’ikfnr gqvk gS&

Jh fotsUnz izlkn iq= Lo0 Jh gj oju fuoklh&xzke egrks’k] etkj ds ikl] rg0 xnjiqj] ftyk m/ke flag uxj bl vkilh le>kSrkukek vuqcU/k i= esa ÞizFke

i{kß gSA

iIiw iq= Jh jke yky fuoklh&xzke egrks’k] etkj ds ikl] rg0 xnjiqj] ftyk m/ke flag uxj bl vkilh le>kSrkukek vuqcU/k i= esa Þf}rh; i{kß gSA

;g fd fnukad&12-06-2012 dks le; jkf= ds yxHkx 9%00 cts nksuksa i{kksa ds chp fdlh ckr dks ysdj vkilh fookn gks x;k] ftlesa izFke i{k ,oa f}rh; i{k ,oa

muds lg;ksfx;ksa dks xEHkhj ,oa [kqyh pksVsa vkbZa] bl dkj.k izFke i{k us f}rh; Ik{k ds uUgs] yky cgknqj] lwjt] lrsUnz ,oa jktsâ€k ds fo:)

Fkkuk&xnjiqj esa eqdnek la[;k&90@2012] ntZ djk;k x;k Fkk] rFkk f}rh; i{k us Jheku l{ke U;k;ky; ds le{kizd.khZ; izkFkZuk i= la[;k&103] lu~&2012

izLrqr dj fueZy] vt;] jRukdj] fotsUnz] /khjt] Jherh eatw ds fo:) vUrZxr /kkjk&156¼3½ ds rgr okn nk;j fd;k x;kA

;g fd orZeku esa nksuksa i{kksa ds mijksDr okn l{ke U;k;ky; :nziqj esa fopkjk/khu gSaA bUgsa fuiVkus ds fy, {ks= ds x.kekU;@laHkzkUr yksxksa

ds le>kus ij ge nksuksa i{kksa ds e/; vkil esa fcuk fdlh “krZ ds jkthukek djus ds fy, rS;kj gks x;s gSa] rFkk ge Lo;a o vius ifjokj ,oa lg;ksfx;ksa dh

lgefr ls ekuuh; l{ke U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu okn ,oa vkilh oknksa dks lekIr djuk pkgrs gSaA

vr% bl jkthukek esa ge nksuksa i{kdkjku us viuh vktkn ethZ vkSj [kqâ€kh ls fcuk fdlh ncko ds fuEu xokgksa ds le{k rgjhj dj fn;k gS fd lun~ jgs vkSj

oDr t:jr ij dke vkosA rLnhd LFkku :nziqj ftyk m/ke flag uxjA

fnukad 11-10-2018

g0 izFke i{k g0 f}rh; i{kâ€​

This terms of settlement was by way of a notarized affidavit, which the parties, who are present before this Court, they do not dispute the terms of

it.

Government Advocate opposes the compounding application on the ground that a cognizance, which has been taken by the learned Trial Court, for

the offences under Sections 325 & 452 of IPC they are not compoundable under Section 320 and thus, compounding application deserves to be

rejected.

Considering the terms of composition and the settlement arrived at between the parties in the compromise dated 11.10.2018 and also the allegations

as leveled by the complainant against the present applicant for the offences aforesaid, they seem to be absolutely a private offence amongst one

another having no public effect in an event if the same is permitted to be compounded. Opposition of the Government Advocate is only from a limited

view point that since it is not compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C., the compounding application may not be accepted by this Court.

The said argument of the Government Advocate is not acceptable by this Court for the reason that this Court while exercising its powers under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it can compound the offences by imposing conditions as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in various judgments, even

those offences which are not compoundable under Section 320 Cr.P.C. The rationale behind the above philosophy is based on the law that under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is prefaced with non-obstinate clause.

Principally, for the purposes of scrutinizing the ambit of power of the Courts seized with the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles

226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the prime consideration is that as to how on equitable balance in exercise of said powers could be struck down

for the purposes of exercising the powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. which deals with the composition of offences. The classification which has been

held out by the Hon’ble Apex Court is that a distinction has to be drawn between the ground of settlement of disputes by the offenders amongst

themselves in the terms acceptable by them as compared to the ambit and extent of the power, which has been given to the Court under Section 320

of the Cr.P.C.

As a matter of fact, on its precise reading, both the situations, i.e. when a criminal offence is being sought to be settled based on the compromise or

where the criminal offences are being sought to be settled by the invocation of Section 320 Cr.P.C., they are definitely not interchangeable with one

another because both are materially different as they deal with different parameters and grounds, to be considered, as in the first situation, the Court

has to exercise its inherent power under C-482 or under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India which cannot be circumscribed and limited by

the stipulations contained under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. which deals with second concept. Code of Criminal Procedure, so far as it relates to the

provisions contained under Section 320 Cr.P.C., it could very well be said, it only guides the consideration to be borne in mind by the Courts when the

Court exercises a power for composition of an offence in an absence of settlement under Section 320 Cr.P.C.. In such a situation, where the Court

exercise the power, obviously, the implication of Sub-section (2) of Section 320 and Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. has to be taken into

consideration which limits the scope of exercise of powers by the Courts. But, a situation where the criminal disputes, irrespective of its nature of

offences, its seriousness is being settled by the terms arrives at, the provisions contained under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. is not to be strictly made

applicable to athwart the settlement between the parties. Only rider which has been attached thereto which requires caution when the Courts are

settling the disputes in relation to the offences which are of serious in nature, for example Sections 302, 306, 307 and 376 I.P.C., and such other sexual

offences, the Court’s will have to consider to attract its inherent power depending upon the material and the nature of the offences which is under

consideration to be settled in terms of the compromise. There cannot be any strait jacketed formula for deciding the criminal controversy between the

parties based on the settlement as each settlement has its own facts and nature of offence and the circumstances in which it has been committed

which will call upon the court to consider pondering on the issue of exercising inherent powers of compounding the offence, and the controversy which

is to be decided is based on the attraction of Section 320 Cr.P.C., is altogether different ingredients.

The basic ratio and the extent of power which the constitutional Courts have, they are much distinct to the powers which could be exercised by

the criminal Courts for the purpose of compounding the offences. The inherent powers of the Courts, particularly, when seized with the powers under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, it has got a wide plentitude and the same cannot be circumscribed or limited to

be exercised so as to meet the ends of justice instead of strictly considering the inherent powers in relation to the powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C.

What is necessary to be considered by the Constitutional Courts, while deciding the matter based on the settlement, which is distinct to the composition

of scope under Section 320 Cr.P.C. These are the following wider parameters for compounding offences based on the settlement :

Whether such a settlement which has been arrived at between the parties for settling the criminal offence would secure the ends of justice.

As to whether it would prevent the abuse of process of Court unnecessarily forcing the litigants who has otherwise settled the disputes to undergo

the criminal trial.

It has to consider its social impact and its affect on the society in an event if offence is compounded.

The aforesaid ratio as discussed, came up for consideration in the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of

Punjab and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, wherein, in its para 57, 58 and 61, the Court has held as under :-

“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as

compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under

Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding

of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby

while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is

guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be

acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been

settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and

justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate

guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens

the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the

victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of

serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes,

like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the

offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour

having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly

relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes

between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of

its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any

likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.

The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed.

The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or

FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences

under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline

engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the

criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the

nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly

quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a

serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for

quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a

different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like

transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in

nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,

because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case

would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full

and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the

interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law

despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal

case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the

criminal proceeding.â€​

The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that settlement of criminal disputes by way of a compromise has to be distinctly treated from different

prospective and has not to be camouflaged and eclipsed by the provision of Section 320 Cr.P.C. but only rider imposed are the guidelines as framed by

the Hon’ble Apex Court. It has to consider as to whether despite the offences being of a serious nature, what was its gravity, whether it was of

private nature and such other factors which has been laid down in the said judgment.

The intention and purpose of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. is rather spirited to attain a public policy with regard to the composition of an offence and

that is why, it enlists the offences which are compoundable and the manner in which its composition could be made by the courts. But, it does not limit

the power of High Courts while exercising its inherent powers. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under :

“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.â€" Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to

make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice.â€​

Even on a simplicitor reading of provisions contained under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which is quoted hereinabove, on its simple reading of its language and

analyzing the legislative instant, it suggests that by virtue of the said provision, the power which has been vested with the Superior Courts, apart from

the fact that it intends to prevent the abuse of process, it also aims to achieve the ends of justice and that is why the provision of Section 482 Cr.P.C.

has been given an overriding effect to any other provisions contained in the Code because it precedes with the word “nothing in this codeâ€.

Obviously, it would over ride under Section 320 Cr.P.C. too.

Under normal law of interpretation, by the use of aforesaid words, “nothing in this codeâ€, the provision of Section 482 Cr.P.C. would have an

effect of being an overriding provision and there is no doubt about the fact that the other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code will not limit or

restrict the inherent powers to be exercised by the High Court. Rather, it could also be said that the powers vested with the High Courts while

exercising powers under Section C-482 Cr.P.C. is not an addition to the power but rather it is the power which intends to safeguards the abuse which

may occur on account of enforceability of other provisions under the Code, and is spirited to meet the ends of justice in its wider social implication.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh (Supra), in its para 53 and 54 has held as under :-

“53. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior

court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, “nothing in this Codeâ€

which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or

restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any court

or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on the High Court; it merely

safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of

justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an

aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision

of the Code.

In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High

Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to

secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non.â€​

The aforesaid preposition is guided on a principle factor that it is judicial obligation on the constitutional Courts which has to be unfettered as aimed

by section 482 Cr. P.C. to prevent a public wrong which is a duty casted by implication of law, in the course of administration of justice, so as to

prevent unnecessary judicial process dispensation of justice amongst litigating parties. It also constitutes to be having an inherent element of the

administration of justice, which becomes an integral part of courts function.

The aforesaid principle is based upon a maxim, called as “quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non protest.â€​

The aforesaid maxim infers that whenever a particular action is to be taken as a matter in the course of discharge of duty, which is required to be

done to attain impossible, it attains to perform a real, complete and substantial justice for the purposes for which the Courts are created and possessed

with its plenary powers conferred under Section C-482 Cr.P.C.

The Five-Judge Bench of Haryana High Court, in the case of Kulwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2007) 4 CTC 769, was identically

called upon to answer the powers of High Court which it can exercise under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. while considering the composition of offence

under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and settling of a dispute on the basis of the compromise arrived between offender and the victim. Apart from laying down

the wide ratio pertaining to the nature of offence involved in the said case, it has laid down a broader guidelines to the effect that any offence in

relation to a human body, other than murder and culpable homicide, they can be permitted to be compounded when the Courts on the basis of material

on record, forms an opinion in terms of the settlement between the parties that such a settlement, when it is fair not ill motivated and voluntary, it could

be compounded. In addition to it, there is another test which has to be considered is that such type of terms of settlement for a heinous offence,

resulting to bodily injury, each terms of settlement has to satisfy the conscious of the Courts and it has to be seen that it has been fairly arrived at

without any duress or oppression being made by the offenders on the victim taking advantage of its autocratic capacity on the victim and also it has to

be seen that as to whether the weak victim have not been made vulnerable to the powers of the superiors. This judgment, too, has provided that the

only factors to be considered by the High Court under C-482 Cr.P.C. is to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court and to secure the ends of

justice, uphold law its intentions, under a given set of circumstances amongst the parties.

An issue which crops up for consideration before this Court at this stage to be considered is as to what would be the impact of Sub-section (9) of

Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. which absolutely creates a bar that the offences other than the offences referred under Section 320 Cr.P.C. cannot be

compounded. What has been dealt with and the ratio as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh (Supra), since having held that the

plenary power conferred on the High Court under C-482 is not circumscribed and restricted by the power under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. and it

would not in any way create an embargo or curtail the powers, as there is no statutory bar in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The

relevant part of the Five-Judges Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Kulwinder Singh (Supra), in its para 23 and 25 has

laid down as under:

“23. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) CrPC, or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 CrPC.

* **

The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under CrPC which can affect the inherent power of this

Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the court has the wide power to quash the proceedings

even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 CrPC, in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of

justice. The power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to prevent an abuse of process of court. There can neither be an

exhaustive list nor the defined parameters to enable a High Court to invoke or exercise its inherent powers. It will always depend upon the facts and

circumstances of each case. The power under Section 482 CrPC has no limits. However, the High Court will exercise it sparingly and with utmost

care and caution. The exercise of power has to be with circumspection and restraint. The court is a vital and an extraordinary effective instrument to

maintain and control social order. The courts play role of paramount importance in achieving peace, harmony and everlasting congeniality in society.

Resolution of a dispute by way of a compromise between two warring groups, therefore, should attract the immediate and prompt attention of a court

which should endeavour to give full effect to the same unless such compromise is abhorrent to lawful composition of the society or would promote

savagery.â€​

In view of what has been discussed, it could be said that the power of compounding on one hand under Section 320 Cr.P.C., and quashing of the

criminal proceedings, charge sheets, summoning orders or compounding of offence based on settlement in exercise of inherent powers are not to be

treated as synonymous to one other but only has to be restricted by the condition precedent to satisfy the criteria of these two different and distinct

aspects of law for compounding of an offence so as to render substantial justice. What is to be seen is also important, as to the communality, its

harmony of the offence which is to be settled in the exercise of powers in favour of the accused persons. This Court is of the view that if there are

sufficient element available that the settlement was fairly entered into without any oppression being exercised as against the victim, and it ultimately

results into resolving this discord amongst the parties to a lis, the bar of Sub-section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. for composition of an offence would

not come into play when the Court exercises its inherent powers under C-482, which also legislatively has administratively purpose of enforcing

justice.

The aspect pertaining to the composition of offence and its ambit and amplitude came up for consideration in the case of Nikhil Merchant Vs.

Central Bureau of Investigation and another reported in (2008) 9 SCC 677. Although it was in relation to the offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 and

471 of the I.P.C. read with Section 5 (2) and 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, but it has widely laid down the principles of compounding

and settlement under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Para 6 of the said judgment reads as under:

“6. Before the High Court, it was urged that since the subject-matter of the dispute had been settled between the appellant and the Bank, it would

be unreasonable to continue with the criminal proceedings which had been commenced on a complaint filed on behalf of the Bank having particular

regard to Clause 11 of the consent terms by which the parties had withdrawn all claims against each other. It was submitted that the learned Special

Judge had erred in rejecting the appellant’s prayer for discharge from the criminal case.â€​

It has been held in principle to the effect that once subject matter of the dispute, it has been voluntarily settled between the parties, it would be

absolutely unreasonable to continue with the criminal proceedings which has commenced on a complaint, though, despite the fact that the offences

alleged may prime facie have been made out. The Judgment of Nikhil Merchant (Supra) in its para 8 had more or less reiterated the ratio as laid down

by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp.

(1) SCC 335, which too, has provided the determination of powers of the High Courts under Section C-482 Cr.P.C.. Para 8 of the judgment of Nikhil

Merchant (Supra) reads as under :-

“8. Apart from the said decision, reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana wherein while dealing

with the proceedings under Sections 498-A and 406 of the Penal Code involving matrimonial disputes and offences, this Court held that even though

the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not apply to such offences which are not compoundable, it did not limit or

affect the powers under Section 482 CrPC and the powers conferred on the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the

Constitution of India. Referring to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal this Court observed that the categories indicated in the

said case which warranted exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC were only illustrative and not exhaustive. This Court ultimately held that the

High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or an FIR or complaint and Section 320 CrPC does not limit or affect the

power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.â€​

The High Court in the exercise of its power under Section 482 quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact of each case that dispute

between the offender and victim stood settled. It does so, as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice

in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace amongst parties is restored; securing the ends of justice being the

ultimate guiding factor for administration of justice. It is an inevitable conclusion that crimes committed between parties, do have a social effect as it is

a crime against a society and it defeats the very fabric of reformatic concept of criminal law of our country, at time composition of offence based on

settlement, may not be safe so as to leave crime doer. But still there are exceptions which have been carved out by judicial precedents where wrong

is against a private individual. The High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or

F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal

proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Gian Singh (Supra) has also dealt with the judgment in the cases of B.S. Joshi and others

Vs. State of Haryana and another reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 and Nikhil Merchant (Supra).

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.S. Joshi (Supra), has held as follows:

“6. In Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [(1998) 5 SCC 749], this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal’s case

observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where the court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying

rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole

purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of

course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye’s case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or

FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the

view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of

power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a

power.

In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Ors. [(1977) 2 SCC 699], considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this

Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that ends of

justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the

structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of

justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that

the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to

save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and

contours of that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence.

What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier

noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. There

may be many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her husband and his other

family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly parted

company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on earlier marriage having been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or

fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be

proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences.

Answer clearly has to be in ‘negative’. It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for

any valid reasons including lack of bona fides.

In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [(1988) 1 SCC 692], it was held that while exercising inherent

power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to

consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an

ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while

taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings.

In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint

and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.â€​

These are the wider governing factors, which have to be borne in mind by the High Court when even serious offence, which happens to be in the

instant case, is sought to be compounded. The High Courts before whom such an application for composition of offence comes for consideration,

based on the settlement, the High Court is not denuded of its powers to consider its propriety while exercising its inherent powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C., which will not be eclipsed and overridden by the restriction of Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. because Section 320 itself as

already observed above, it will not in view of language used under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which has an overriding effect, derived power of the Court to

decide application for heinous offences also as inherent power is independent to the circumstances for compounding under Section 320 Cr.P.C.

Because the experience do not rule out a situation where on most of the occasions, the criminal act is taken on account of a spur of moment, on

account of verbal fighting, and on account of a heated discussion and moment, which are to be considered while considering the application for

composition.

The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narendra Singh (Supra), has laid down the wider principles and circumstances as to how the power to

compromise an offence should be exercised as there happens to be a subtle distinction between the composition of offence exercising inherent power

and the power which is given to the Court under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. Para 9 of the judgment of Narendra Singh (Supra) reads as under :-

“9. At the same time, one has to keep in mind the subtle distinction between the power of compounding of offences given to the court under

Section 320 of the Code and quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section

482 of the Code. Once it is found that compounding is permissible only if a particular offence is covered by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code

and the court in such cases is guided solitarily and squarely by the compromise between the parties, insofar as power of quashing under Section 482 of

the Code is concerned, it is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although the

ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.â€​

However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narinder Singh (Supra), in its para 29 has laid down the certain guiding factors to be adhered

to for dealing with the composition based on settlement.

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving

adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and

quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under

Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those

cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly

and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such

cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like

murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have

been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that

capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial

transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among

themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of

criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal

cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime

against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of

Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of

Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under

Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the

vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding

factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of

conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter

case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this

stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may

improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where

the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be

liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still

on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is

still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the

circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the

evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in

such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under

Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the

appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the

offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a

heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.â€​

On considering the aforesaid judgment and the ratio as propounded by his Lordships as a matter of fact even the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid

down that it would not be safe to hold that there is an absolute bar of compounding the heinous offence, but, only precautions are the guidelines which

have been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 29 of the Narinder Singh (Supra) case.

Often, whenever the question comes as to whether an offence is compoundable or not and whether the High Courts, which exercising its powers

under Section C-482 Cr.P.C. or under Articles 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, is seized with the settlement, what would be the extent of its

power, it has to consider it from the view point with regard to nature of offence, which is being sought to be compounded, if it happens to be of

personal nature, for example, that of matrimonial dispute, financial transactions, company matters or matter pertaining to the Negotiable Instruments

Act, the composition under Section 320 Cr.P.C. or based on a settlement, has to be entered into keeping in mind the personal nature of dispute as the

settlement will not at all affect a public policy, rather it would result into the settlement of personal dispute. This is the broader ratio as laid down by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 4 SCC 582. Para 5 of the said judgment has

dealt with the aforesaid ratio, the same is quoted hereunder :

“5. It is on the basis of this compromise that the application was filed in the High Court for quashing of proceedings which has been dismissed by

the impugned order. We notice from a reading of the FIR and the other documents on record that the dispute was purely a personal one between two

contesting parties and that it arose out of extensive business dealings between them and that there was absolutely no public policy involved in the

nature of the allegations made against the accused. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the

proceedings in the light of the compromise and also in the light of the fact that the complainant has on 11-1-2004 passed away and the possibility of a

conviction being recorded has thus to be ruled out.â€​

It is rather postulated that whenever the Court comes to the conclusion that the offence has the private element, it has to liberally exercise its power

while settling the dispute based on the compromise.

A similar preposition pertaining to the composition of an offence under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, has

been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gold Quest International Private Limited Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in

(2014) 15 SCC 235. Para 8 of the said judgment reads as under :-

“8. In view of the principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid cases, we are of the view that in the disputes which are substantially

matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facets, if the parties have entered into settlement, and it has become clear that there

are no chances of conviction, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 226 of the Constitution.

However, the same would not apply where the nature of offence is very serious like rape, murder, robbery, dacoity, cases under the Prevention of

Corruption Act, cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and other similar kind of offences in which punishment of life

imprisonment or death can be awarded. After considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the learned Single

Judge did not commit any error of law in quashing the FIR after not only the complainant and the appellant settled their money dispute but also the

other alleged sufferers entered into an agreement with the appellant, and as such, they too settled their claims.â€​

The aforesaid judgment of Gold Quest International (Supra) has been rendered considering the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

Gian Singh as well as in Nikhil Merchant (Supra) cases.

The wider amplitude of powers which the High Courts have held are not circumscribed to limit its plenary powers. The Hon’ble Apex Court in

the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others reported in 1992, Supl (1) SCC 335, while considering the contention in its para

102 has classified the situation where and the circumstances under which the constitutional Courts can exercise its powers, has held in para 102 as

under :-

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein

such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of

myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety

do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,

justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the

commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted

by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever

reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is

instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.â€​

An altogether a new aspect has been considered and propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and another

Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749. The Apex Court, while dealing with the powers of the High Court in the

matters of compounding the offences, has laid down that the exercise of powers of judicial review conferred to the High Courts is not only to ensure

administration of justice, but it is also of a judicial nature, which intends to prevent the abuse of the process by the inferior courts and also to see that

stream of justice remains clean and pure and attains the social objective. To attain the wider principle as considered by the Apex Court, it has been

held that the powers of the High Court is not limited but only thing is that while exercising the same, the Court has to be extremely cautious and due

care has to be taken and that is why it has been laid down that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which has been given an overriding power to

the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be an inflexible power and could be exercised depending upon the facts and circumstances of

each case.

In the aforesaid judgment, it has been observed that the guidelines in terms therein, where the Court while exercising the powers under Section 482

Cr.P.C. is inflexible and not laying down the rigid formula to be followed while exercising its jurisdiction. Para 22, 26 and 28 of the judgment of Pepsi

Foods Ltd. (Supra) read as under :-

“22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal this Court

examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said

could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down

certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or

laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the

sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations

made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of

administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by

the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be

exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be

necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High

Court under Articles 226 and 227 may be referred to.

Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it

possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the court finds that the

appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, the court can certainly treat the petition as one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the

Code. It may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in the Code of revision and appeal but some time for immediate relief Section 482 of

the Code or Article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate courts. The present

petition though filed in the High Court as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the

complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the

Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to

examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient

for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of

preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even

himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then

examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.â€​

In the matter of Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551, the Court has laid down that Section 320 Cr.P.C. would

not create a bar for the exercise of powers by the High Courts for quashing of a proceedings, summoning order or the charge sheet without being

affected by the powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and it would exclusively be governed by the factors depending upon the circumstances of each

case.

A harmonious interpretation can also be discerned from the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the judgment of B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State

of Haryana and another reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675. Para 5, 6, 8 and 15 of the said judgment reads as under

“5. After reproducing the seven categories of cases as given in para 102 of Bhajan Lal case the High Court has held that the parameters,

principles and guidelines for quashing of complaints, first information report and criminal proceedings have been settled in terms thereof and has

concluded therefrom that the instant case does not fall in any of the said categories. It is quite clear that the High Court has lost sight of the earlier

part of para 102 which made it abundantly clear that the said categories of cases were being given by way of illustration. Neither were the categories

of cases given exhaustive nor could it be so. Before giving those categories, it was said in Bhajan Lal case that: (SCC p. 378, para 102)

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law

enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein

such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be

possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of

myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.â€​

In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate this Court with reference to Bhajan Lal case observed that the guidelines laid therein as to where

the court will exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise

of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes

necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.

It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or

complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view

that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of

quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint

and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.â€​

Hence, on considering the aforesaid prepositions, it can be safely concluded that in view of the language used in the provisions contained under

Section 482 Cr.P.C., which confers the inherent power to the High Courts, cannot be limited by the provisions contained under Section 320 Cr.P.C. as

they being the plenary power and independent to Section 320 Cr.P.C and will not be eclipsed by the restrictions of sub-Section (9) of Section 320 of

the Cr.P.C. Hence, the composition for the heinous offence and, in particularly, the case at hand in relation to the offence under Section 307 I.P.C., it

would depend upon the factors as determined by para 29 of the Naarinder Singh (Supra) case.

The Coordinate Bench of this Court had also in the case of Criminal Misc. Application 1253 of 2012, Dilbagh Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand has

also held that the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324, 325, 427, 452, 504, 506 and 307 I.P.C. would be compoundable. An identical view

has been expressed by the Coordinate Bench of Allahabad High Court in a judgment rendered in Application under Section C482 No. 31751 of 2015,

Rajendra Sharma and 18 others Vs. State of U.P. and another, wherein, the Court has held as under :-

“A perusal of the aforesaid would indicate that this Court is competent to quash a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its

inherent jurisdiction, which is distinct and different from the power to compound an offence under Section 320 of the Code. The Apex Court went on

to hold that the inherent powers are of wide amplitude with the no statutory limitations, but the same is to be exercised either to secure the ends of

justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any court. Thus where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute in respect of an offence,

which is neither heinous and serious, nor involved any mental depravity relating to an offence like murder, rape, dacoity etc, such proceedings can be

quashed on the basis of settlement, but the offence should be private in nature and should not have any societal impact, such as an offence under the

Prevention of Corruption Act or an offence involving public servants in discharge of duties etc. But criminal cases having a predominantly civil flavour,

such as commercial, financial mercantile civil partnership etc. or family disputes are such instances, where prosecution could be quashed subject to a

settlement.â€​

Even recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and others Vs. Sate of Gujrat

and another reported in (2017) 9 SCC 641 was dealing with the powers of the Superior Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. The said judgment too

places reliance on the ratio as propounded in Gian Singh (Supra). The judgment of Parbatbhai Aahir (Supra) could widely be summarized as under :-

(1) Section 482 Cr.PC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of

justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has

been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While

compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. The power to quash under Section 482 is

attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(3) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the

High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plentitude, it has to be exercised to secure the ends of justice and to prevent an

abuse of the process of any Court.

(5) The decision as to whether a complaint or F.I.R. should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves

ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

(6) In the exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due

regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or fences such as murder, rape and dacoity

cannot be appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature but

have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in

punishing persons for serious offences.

(7) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil

flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

(8) The High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote

and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-

being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between the private disputants. The High Court would be justified

in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act

complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.

In view of discussions and reasons enumerated, the conclusion which could be safely deduced is that the powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. of

compounding of offences within its ambit will have to read distinct to the powers vested with superior Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Writ

Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and they cannot be limited and circumscribed, as they carry a distinct and wide powers

of exercising the inherent powers to eradicate the abuse of process of law. Thus, even heinous offences which are not compoundable under Section

320 Cr.P.C., can be compounded but with the frame work of guidelines laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and, in particular, testing each case

based on its own factual merits. It could also be concluded by saying that concept of compounding also achieves wider social objectives to bring peace

amongst people, increasing tranquility and saving the litigants from facing long drawn judicial proceedings, which would otherwise on its conclusion will

not have any legal conclusion.

In view of ratio as laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the catena of decisions cited hereinabove, Compounding Application No. 11089 of 2018,

filed by the parties will stand allowed and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 1838 of 2014 ‘Pappu vs. Nirmal and Another’ under

Sections 452, 325, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. at Police Station Gadarpur, District Udham Singh Nagar, which is presently pending before the Judicial

Magistrate, Rudrapur, stands quashed.

Consequently, this C-482 Application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. would also stand allowed. There would be no order as to costs.