Ajmer Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited @APPELLANT@Hash Smt. Radha Devi

Ajmer Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited (AVVNL)Â through its Officers has laid this first appeal under Section 96 CPC to question the legality and

propriety of judgment and decree dated 14th of October, 2017, passed by Addl. District Judge, Sagwara, District Doongarpur (for short, ‘learned

trial Court’).   By the impugned judgment and decree, learned trial Court has partly decreed the suit filed by respondent for compensation

under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (for short, 'Act') and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,58,000 with interest thereon @

6% per annum from 22.08.2013, the date of institution of the suit.

The bare necessary facts, for the purpose of this appeal, are that respondent-plaintiffs filed a suit (Civil Misc. Case No.10/2015 (old No.12/13) (Civil

Case No.38) for compensation under the Act on 22.08.2013 claiming a sum of Rs.20,53,000 before learned trial Court, inter-alia, on the ground that

deceased Mr. Kishu Khat while irrigating his agricultural field came in contact with wire supporting the electric poles and as his leg got stuck with the

wire he died. Alleging negligence and careless of the defendants it was stated in the claim that at the time of his death Kishu Khat was 30 years of

age. Under different heads, the loss of income was claimed to be Rs.15,00,000, Rs.5,00,000 as compensation, Rs.50,000 for love and affection and

Rs.3,000 for funeral expenses. Thus, the respondent-plaintiffs quantified the total amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 20,53,000. The cause

of accident, which resulted in death of Kishu Khat was attributed to the appellants precisely on the ground that they are expected to take safety

measures to prevent any mishap including loss of human life.  After service of summons, appellants contested the claim of respondent-plaintiffs

and filed detailed reply to the claim refuting their negligence as alleged in the plaint and stated that the incident occurred due to negligence of deceased

himself as he himself was careless. The appellants also denied their responsibility and prayed for dismissal of the suit filed against them.

The learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed issues for determination. For substantiating their claim, respondent-plaintiffs

examined two witnesses including first respondent wife of deceased AW1 Radha and AW2 Ashok Khat. In counter, appellants tendered evidence

of NAW1 Vinod Kumar and NAW2 Nimesh Kumar. Both the sides also exhibited certain documents. After recording evidence of the parties, learned

trial Court heard final arguments and by the impugned judgment and decree partly allowed the claim of the respondent plaintiffs.

Although in first appeals normally the Courts are summoning the record of the trial Court but looking to the peculiar facts of the case and considering

the amended provisions under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC, it is not necessary to call for the record of the learned trial Court.  Reliance in this behalf

can be placed on U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Sheo Narain Kushwaha & Ors. [(2011) 6 SCC 456], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while

interpreting the amended Rule 11(1) of Order 41 CPC, has held that dismissal of first appeal in limine is permissible but has put a rider that it is

required to be dismissed by a reasoned order. The Apex Court made following observations in Para 7, 9 & 10:

It is evident from sub-rule (1) that an appellate court can dismiss an appeal after a preliminary hearing without calling for the records of the trial

court and without issuing notice to the respondent, if it is satisfied that the appeal has no merit. Sub-rule (1) does not however state that such dismissal

can be without assigning any reasons.

Sub-rule (4) of Rule 11 does not enable the HighCourt to dismiss first appeals by one-line orders to the effect that ""appeal is dismissed"" or by non-

speaking orders. The order of the High Court dismissing the first appeal should be sufficiently reasoned to disclose the application of mind to the

grounds of appeal and make out that the High Court was resorting to dismissal in limine as it found the appeal either to be vexatious or wholly without

merit. Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from the obligation to write a ""judgment"", does not dispense with the obligation to

assign reasons in brief, when summarily dismissing the appeal.

Unless the order is reasoned, there will be no wayof knowing whether the appellate court has examined the appeal before deciding that it did not

deserve admission. As a limited right to appeal to the Supreme Court is available against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless there are

reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be possible for the Supreme Court to examine whether the High Court has rightly rejected the appeal. The

appellant who has filed the first appeal in pursuance of a statutory right to file such appeal, paying necessary court fee, can legitimately expect

reappreciation of the evidence and redetermination of the questions raised, unless the statute providing for the appeal provides otherwise.â€​

In the instant case, learned trial Court, on appreciation of evidence and available material, decided Issue No. 1 about death of Kishu Khat on account

of electrocution in favour of respondentplaintiffs and against the appellants. While deciding issue No.2 about negligence in maintenance of electric

lines despite information of current by the villagers, the learned trial Court has found evidence of respondent plaintiffs more reliable and convincing by

invoking doctrine of strict liability.  The learned trial Court finally fastened liability to pay compensation on the appellants after considering the

decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Reshma Kumari & Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Anr. [(2013) 9 SCC 65] and Manager, Kerala

State Road Transport Corporation, Trivendrum Vs. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176]. Â

Hon'ble Apex Court, in M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari & Ors. [(2002) 2 SCC 162], examined the doctrine of Strict Liability and observed

that irrespective of any negligence of careless, State Electricity Board is liable to pay damages for the snap electrocution. The Court held:

Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is

liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the

managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such

person is known, in law, as ""strict liability"". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of

negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be

done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in

cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.

Therefore, the findings and conclusions of learned trial Court are just and proper on the touchstone of evidence and available material as well as law

on the subject. In totality, decision of the learned trial Court on both the issues is infallible.

Regarding quantum of compensation for which the respondent claimants are held entitled, in absence of any cogent evidence, more particularly any

adverse evidence by the appellants for determining the age of the deceased, the learned trial Court has rightly arrived at the same. Moreover, the

learned Tribunal in the light of available material has moderately assessed notional income of the deceased at Rs.30,000 per annum and worked out

total amount of just compensation for loss of dependency after making deduction of his 1/5 income. In my considered opinion, the approach of the

learned trial Court in assessing the compensation is just and reasonable and even the multiplier which is pressed into service by the learned Court

below is appropriate and in conformity with the dictum of Hon'ble Apex Court.

Therefore, viewed from any angle, findings and conclusions of the learned Court below on the issues and quantifying compensation by the learned

Court below is just and reasonable which requires no interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

Resultantly, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. The present appeal, therefore,

fails and same is dismissed summarily.