Ajmer Vidyut Nigam Limited @APPELLANT@Hash Gattu

Ajmer Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited (AVVNL), through its Officers, has laid this first appeal under Section 96 CPC to question the legality and

propriety of judgment & decree dated 9th of March, 2018, passed by Addl. District Judge, Sagwara, District Dungarpur (for short, ‘learned trial

Court’).   By the impugned judgment & decree, learned trial Court has partly decreed the suit filed by respondents for compensation under

Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (for short, 'Act') and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.4,10,000 with interest thereon @ 6% per

annum from the date of institution of the suit.

Necessary facts, for the purpose of this appeal, are that respondent-plaintiffs filed a suit for compensation under the Act on 8th of May, 2015 before

the Court of Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Dungarpur, which was later on transferred to the learned trial Court. In the suit, respondent-plaintiffs

claimed a sum of Rs.26 Lakhs, on the ground that deceased Vinod died on account of electrocution, as current was flowing in the electric pole fixed

on the boundary of the field and he came in contract thereof. Negligence and careless of the defendants was alleged and it was stated in the claim

that at the time of his death Vinod was 22 years of age and engaged in agriculture work. On the fateful day, he had gone to irrigate the field where

maize crop was standing. The cause of accident, which resulted in death of Vinod was attributed to the appellants precisely on the ground that they

are expected to take safety measures to prevent any mishap including loss of human life.  After service of summons, appellants contested the

claim of respondent-plaintiffs and filed detailed reply to the claim refuting their negligence, as alleged in the plaint, and stated that the incident occurred

due to negligence of deceased himself as he was careless. The appellants also denied their responsibility and prayed for dismissal of the suit filed

against them.

The learned trial Court, on the basis of pleadings of rival parties, framed issues for determination. For substantiating their claim, respondent-plaintiffs

examined two witnesses PW1 Gattu, and PW2 Prem Singh and exhibited Exs.1 to 10. In counter, appellants tendered evidence of DW1 Arvind,

DW2 Ramesh and also exhibited documents Exs.A-1 to A-11. After recording evidence of the parties, learned trial Court heard final arguments and

by the impugned judgment & decree partly allowed the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs.

Although, in first appeals, normally the Courts summon the record of the trial Court but looking to the peculiar facts of the case and considering the

amended provisions under Order 41 Rule 11 CPC, it is not necessary to call for the record of the learned trial Court.  Reliance, in this behalf, can

be placed on U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Sheo Narain Kushwaha & Ors. [(2011) 6 SCC 456], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, while

interpreting the amended Rule 11(1) of Order 41 CPC, has held that dismissal of first appeal in limine is permissible, but has put a rider that it is

required to be dismissed by a reasoned order. The Apex Court made following observations in Para 7, 9 & 10:

It is evident from sub-rule (1) that an appellate court can dismiss an appeal after a preliminary hearing without calling for the records of the trial

court and without issuing notice to the respondent, if it is satisfied that the appeal has no merit. Sub-rule (1) does not however state that such dismissal

can be without assigning any reasons.

Sub-rule (4) of Rule 11 does not enable theHigh Court to dismiss first appeals by one-line orders to the effect that ""appeal is dismissed"" or by

nonspeaking orders. The order of the High Court dismissing the first appeal should be sufficiently reasoned to disclose the application of mind to the

grounds of appeal and make out that the High Court was resorting to dismissal in limine as it found the appeal either to be vexatious or wholly without

merit. Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code, while relieving the High Court from the obligation to write a ""judgment"", does not dispense with the obligation to

assign reasons in brief, when summarily dismissing the appeal.

Unless the order is reasoned, there will beno way of knowing whether the appellate court has examined the appeal before deciding that it did not

deserve admission. As a limited right to appeal to the Supreme Court is available against the appellate judgments of the High Court, unless there are

reasons in the order of dismissal, it will not be possible for the Supreme Court to examine whether the High Court has rightly rejected the appeal. The

appellant who has filed the first appeal in pursuance of a statutory right to file such appeal, paying necessary court fee, can legitimately expect

reappreciation of the evidence and redetermination of the questions raised, unless the statute providing for the appeal provides otherwise.

In the instant case, on appreciation of evidence and available material, the learned trial Court decided issue No. 1 about death of Vinod by

electrocution on account of negligence of appellants in maintenance of electric pole in favour of respondent-plaintiffs and against the appellants. While

deciding issue No.2 relating to entitlement of plaintiffs to get compensation, the learned trial Court finally fastened the liability to pay compensation on

appellants considering the decisions of Supreme Court in case of (1) Reshma Kumari & Ors. Vs. Madan Mohan & Anr. [(2013) 9 SCC 65], and (2)

Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivendrum Vs. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176]. Â

Hon'ble Apex Court, in M.P. Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari & Ors. [(2002) 2 SCC 162], examined the doctrine of Strict Liability and observed

that irrespective of any negligence or carelessness of an individual, State Electricity Board is liable to pay damages for snap electrocution. The Court

held:

Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is

liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the

managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such

person is known, in law, as ""strict liability"". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept of

negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be

done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in

cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions.

Therefore, the findings and conclusions of learned trial Court are just and proper on the touchstone of evidence and available material as well as law

on the subject. In totality, decision of the learned trial Court on both the issues is infallible.

Regarding quantum of compensation for which the respondent-claimants are held entitled, in absence of any cogent evidence, more particularly any

adverse evidence by the appellants for determining the age of the deceased, the learned trial Court has rightly arrived at the same. Moreover, the

learned Tribunal, in the light of available material, has moderately assessed notional income of the deceased at Rs.30,000 per annum, and after making

deduction of 1/3rd income for personal expenses, applied multiplier of 18 and worked out the total amount of compensation Rs.3,60,000 under the head

‘Loss of Dependency’ and thereafter adding Rs.50,000 for mental agony, pain and sufferings, finally, declared the respondent-claimants entitled

to total compensation of Rs.4,10,000. In my considered opinion, the approach of the learned trial Court in assessing the compensation is just and

reasonable and even the multiplier, which is pressed into service by the learned Court below is appropriate and in conformity with the dictum of

Hon'ble Apex Court.

Therefore, viewed from any angle, findings and conclusions of the learned Court below on the issues and quantifying compensation by the learned

Court below is just and reasonable which requires no interference by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

Resultantly, I am not persuaded to interfere with the impugned judgment & decree passed by the learned trial Court. The present appeal, therefore,

fails and same is dismissed summarily.