Akhilesh Chandra Porwal vs Union of India and Others

M.C. Tripathi, J.—1. Akhilesh Chandra Porwal @ A.C. Porwal is before this Court with a prayer to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 28.12.2013 passed by the Chief Executive Officer/Disciplinary Authority, Cantonment Board Office, Kanpur Cantt-respondent No. 2 by which he had proceeded to impose the major penalty of compulsory retirement under Rule 11 (2) (vi) of Cantonment Fund Servant Rules, 1937 on the petitioner.

As per order passed by this Court on 6.8.2015, the respondent No. 4, namely Sri N.V. Satyanarayna, the then Chief Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Kanpur presently posted as Defence Estate Officer, Cantt. Delhi, was permitted to be deleted from the array of parties.

Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition are that the petitioner applied for and was selected on the post of Junior Engineer in the Cantonment Board, Kanpur after facing due selection process. He was appointed as Junior Engineer vide order dated 20.1.1994 issued by the Cantonment Executive Officer, Kanpur. As per appointment letter, his services would be governed under Cantonment Fund Servant Rules, 1937 (in short, Rules 1937) as amended upto date and the appointing authority of the petitioner would be Cantt. Executive Officer. The post of Cantt. Executive Officer is now given the nomenclature of Chief Executive Officer. Rule 2 (aa) of Rules 1937 defines "appointing authority" in relation to a Cantonment Fund Servant and Rule 11 deals with penalties. Rule 2 (aa) and Rule 11 of Rules 1937 are reproduced hereinafter:--

"Rule 2 (aa) "appointing authority" in relation to a Cantonment Fund Servant means (i) the authority empowered to make appointments to the post which the servant for the time being holds, or (ii) the authority which appointed the servant to such post as the case may be, whichever authority is the higher authority.

11 (1). The following penalties may for good and for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be imposed by the Executive Officer on a servant, namely:--

Minor Penalties -

(i) Censure;

(ii) Fine

(2) The following penalties may, for good and for sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed by the appointing authority on a servant, namely:--

Minor Penalties -

(i) Withholding of his promotion;

(ii) Recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Board by negligence or breach of order;

Major penalties

(iv) reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period with further directions as to whether or not the servant will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the tenure increments of his pay;

(v) reduction to a lower time-scale or pay, grade post or service, which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the servant to the time scale or pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post or service from which the servant was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration to that grade, post or service;

(vi) compulsory retirement;

(vii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Board in whose service he was at the time of such removal or any other Board;

(viii) dismissal from service, which shall ordinarily be disqualification for future employment under the Board under whom he was employed at the time of dismissal or any other board."

As per Rule 11 (2) of Rules 1937, major penalty of compulsory retirement can be imposed on an employee only by the appointing authority and in the instant case, the appointing authority of the petitioner would be Cantt. Executive Officer, now given the nomenclature as Chief Executive Officer, Cantonment Board and in view of Rule 2 (aa) of Rules 1937, since Cantt. Executive Officer appointed the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer, the Chief Executive Officer would be higher authority.

It appears from the record in question that on account of contemplation of the disciplinary proceedings against him under the provisions of Rules 1937, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 20.3.2012 under Rule 10-A (1) (a) of Rules 1937 with immediate effect, with direction to handover the charge and all documents in his possession to Shri Kuber Singh, Junior Engineer. As per statement of imputation of misconduct contained in Charge Memorandum dated 28.4.2012, the articles of charges framed against the petitioner were that the petitioner, while functioning as Junior Engineer, Cantt. Board, Kanpur, allegedly failed to perform his duties with devotion and absolute integrity and involved in questionable and undesirable practice by calculating 3% to 4% on the grand total of the payments made to 3 firms (M/s. G.R. Enterprise, M/s. B.K. Associates & M/s. J.C. Oberoi) with the alleged intention of collection/receipt of gratification. In the month of September 2009, 3 work orders were issued to the aforesaid 3 firms for carrying out works within the dates specified in the work orders. Thereafter, the measurements were taken & recorded in the Mbs. The bills were prepared and the payments were released to the said firms on 28.1.2010.

Record in question reflects that thereafter, a CBI raid was conducted against the then Chief Executive Officer and the Junior Engineers on 12.2.2010. The search of house of Shri Navendra Nath, the then CEO yielded a chit in the hand writing of the petitioner showing the names of aforesaid 3 firms and payments made to them along with the calculation of 3% & 4% of their grand total. The petitioner in an effort to cover his tracks had put up note sheets dated 11.2.2010 to the Chief Executive Officer reporting that the firms had delayed the execution of works and therefore, recommended for collecting compensation as per the terms and conditions of the contract. The compensation to the tune of 3% was collected from the aforesaid 3 firms. However, at the time of recommending/making payments to these firms, the petitioner did not mention about any delay of works or imposition of any compensation and as such, if there was any delay of works, the penalties/compensation should have been imposed and deducted from the payments made to the firms. However, no such action was taken at the time of making the payments. The petitioner was charged with exhibiting lack of absolute integrity and devotion to duty and involving in questionable and undesirable practice, which is unbecoming of a Government servant and thereby violated Rule 3 (1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964. He also failed to perform his duty with absolute integrity and devotion and allegedly involved in questionable and undesirable practice of alleged intention of collection/receipt of gratification from the payments made to the said firms.

The petitioner was issued a charge sheet on 28.4.2012 whereby he was required to submit his reply/reply of his defence and the enquiry officer was appointed on 17.5.2012. On the basis of the said charge-sheet, the inquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer, who submitted his report dated 10.05.2013. The petitioner thereafter was required to submit his representation or submission to the inquiry report by means of the letter dated 30.05.2013. The petitioner submitted his representation on 14.6.2013 denying the allegations. By the impugned order dated 28.12.2013 the Chief Executive Officer/Disciplinary Authority had decided to impose the major penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner under Rule 11 (2) (vi) of Rules 1937. He has also proceeded to inform the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority has decided his case after considering the report of enquiry officer, his representation and other connected documents and his attention has been drawn to Rule 13 (1) of Rules 1937 that any servant, on whom any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 has been imposed by the Executive Officer, shall be entitled to appeal to the Board within thirty days of delivery of the document showing the grounds on which the penalty was imposed and a copy of the decision of the Board thereon shall be delivered to him personally or by registered post.

Sri Rakesh Pande, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted before this Court that Rule 11 (2) clearly provides that major penalty of compulsory retirement can be imposed on an employee only by the appointing authority and in the instant case the appointing authority of the petitioner would be Cantonment Executive Officer, who is presently given the nomenclature as Chief Executive Officer, Cantonment Board. In view of Rule 2 (aa) since Cantt. Executive Officer had appointed the petitioner on the post of Junior Engineer and as such, the Chief Executive Officer would be the higher authority. The impugned order of punishment is wholly illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction as the respondent No. 3, who was substantively posted as Additional Chief Executive Officer, had been given additional charge on the vacant post of Chief Executive Officer. The respondent No. 3 was an officer in the Senior Time Scale and is subordinate to the appointing authority of the petitioner i.e. Chief Executive Officer. Since the respondent No. 3 was an officer of Junior Administrative Grade and thus, the impugned order is in violation of Rule 11 (2) of Rules 1937.

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the present disciplinary action against the petitioner was initiated by the then Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Kanpur namely N.V. Satyanarayana, having the grudge against the petitioner. The petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer in Ward Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 which included Harrisganj where the petitioner had restrained illegal constructions, which were carried out at property No. 365, Harrisganj, Kanpur and made extensive reports to the Chief Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Kanpur for taking appropriate action as per provisions contained in Sections 247, 248 and 249 of the Cantonment Act for initiation of demolition and ceiling of the unauthorized construction. The then Chief Executive Officer annoyed with the said recommendation of the petitioner and in collusion with the persons raising unauthorized construction, he had initiated disciplinary action against the petitioner and as such, the then Chief Executive Officer had started holding grudge against the petitioner. He further made submission that on this account immediately the petitioner had been transferred from the said ward by the then Chief Executive Officer on 9.9.2010 and subsequently the said illegal constructions were compounded by the Cantonment Board against the National Building Code of India, 2005, building bye-laws of the Cantonment and other Building Rules and the same was also highlighted as Defence Land Scheme.

In this background having ill-will and malice the then Chief Executive Officer had issued a notice on 25.6.2011 to show cause as to why he was absent without any due permission for leave on 20.6.2011. In fact for the said leave the petitioner had already moved an application on 13.6.2011 and the said show cause was suitably replied by the petitioner with full facts on 28.6.2011. Again just 7 days the then Chief Executive Officer had proceeded to issue another show cause notice on 5.7.2011 alleging that the petitioner was not attending office in time, and the petitioner also replied suitably to the said show cause notice. Thereafter the petitioner was required to put thumb impression before entering and leaving the office on the bio-metric attendance machine and just to victimise and harass the petitioner because of ill will and malice, the then Chief Executive Officer had proceeded to suspend the petitioner vide order dated 20.3.2012 allegedly under Section 10-A (1) (a) of Rules 1937.

Shri Rakesh Pande further submitted that the petitioner was posted as Junior Engineer. The enquiry officer as well as the punishing authority have proceeded to impose major penalty on the petitioner on a baseless finding that the alleged chit recovered by the CBI from Navendra Nath, the then CEO was in the handwriting of the petitioner and the amount @ 3% and 4% calculated on the said chit appeared to be calculated for the purposes of illegal gratification, when in fact the enquiry officer categorically found that there was no evidence to show that any illegal gratification had been demanded or asked or given and the enquiry officer as well as appointing authority have deliberately ignored the statement of Navendra Nath recorded before the CBI wherein he had clearly admitted that the said chit in question had been prepared by the petitioner on his dictate for calculating penalty sought to be imposed on contractors for the alleged delay and the penalties so calculated had been imposed and deposited by the contractors.

It has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire disciplinary action is vitiated as the enquiry officer, without giving any notice or opportunity to the petitioner, had dispensed with the examination of witnesses and summons appeared to have been withdrawn and officers were not called to give evidence during the course of enquiry and a such, the petitioner could not cross-examine the witnesses. Even Shri Navendra Nath, who has been mentioned as defence witness, has also not been summoned. The enquiry proceedings were initiated against the petitioner for malafide reason and due to influence of respondent No. 4, who was the then Chief Executive Officer of Cantonment Board, Kanpur, and as such, the enquiry officer had conducted the enquiry in violation of principle of natural justice denying the fair and reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to produce the witnesses in support of his defence and cross-examination of relevant persons. He has relied upon judgments in P.N.B. And ors v. Sri Kunj Vihari Mishra 1998 AIR (SC) 341; State Bank of India v. K.P. Narayan Kutti , 2003 (2) SCC 449; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of UP and 2 others , 2013 (4) SCC 301, Bimal Gussain v. Canara Bank and ors , LAWS (UTN)-2012-12-39 and Writ-A No. 17558 of 2015 (Santosh Kumar v. State of UP and 2 ors) decided on 16.9.2015. He submits that the quantum of punishment in the present matter is too harsh and disproportionate to the charges levelled against the petitioner and has placed reliance on Supreme Court judgments in Dev Singh v. Punjab Terrorism Development Corporation Ltd. , 2003 (8) SCC 9; Jai Bhagwan v. Commissioner of Police and ors , 2013 (11) SCC 187 and Shobha Sinha v. State of Bihar and others , 2014 AIR (SC 862.

Per contra, Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Shakti Dhar Dubey, learned counsel appearing for the Cantonment Board has submitted that by means of present writ petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 28.12.2013 passed by the Disciplinary Authority pursuant to the departmental proceedings as initiated on the recommendations of the CBI, Lucknow and subsequent directions issued by the Director General, Defence Estates, Delhi dated 21.10.2011. By the impugned order the petitioner, serving as Junior Engineer in Cantonment Board Office, Kanpur, has been imposed with penalty of compulsory retirement from the service and the petitioner had not availed the alternative remedy of appeal before the Cantonment Board within 30 days of receipt of the order of the disciplinary authority as provided under Rule 13 (1) of Rules 1937 and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. The charges levelled against the petitioner were serious in nature and the disciplinary proceedings were initiated strictly as per provisions contained in Rule 12 (1) read with Rule 12-A of Rules 1937 against the petitioner as per the statement of imputation of misconduct contained in Charge Memorandum No. CBK/CEO/INQ/ACP/K-692 dated 28th April, 2012.

Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate further submitted that a bare perusal of article of charges would clearly reveal to this Court that the petitioner had failed to perform his duties with devotion and absolute integrity and involved in questionable and undesirable practice by calculating 3% to 4% on the grand total of the payments made to the aforesaid 3 firms with alleged intention of collection/receipt of gratification. In the month of September, 2009, 3 work orders were issued to the said 3 firms for carrying out works within the dates specified in the work orders. Subsequently, the measurements were taken and bills were prepared and payments were released in favour of the afore-mentioned firms on 28.1.2010. In the present matter, on the serious allegations the CBI had conducted the raid against the then Chief Executive Officer Shri N. Nath and the Junior Engineers on 12.2.2010 and in the search of the house of Shri Navendra Nath, the then CEO, yielded the chit written in the hand writing of the petitioner showing the names of the afore-mentioned firms and the payments made to them alongwith calculations of 3% to 4% of their grand total. Just to give colour and to defend himself the petitioner had taken shelter that the firms had delayed the execution of works and consequently had recommended for collecting the compensation as per the terms and conditions of the contract agreement but in the present matter no such penalty had ever been imposed on the said firms and at no point of time, the same had ever been apprised to any superior officers regarding the delay in execution of works and even no such kind of alleged recommendation was ever made by the petitioner while recommending for release of the payments to the said firms on 28.1.2010.

Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate submitted that in the present matter the disciplinary authority had proceeded into the matter strictly in consonance with the Rules 1937 and the enquiry officer after giving full opportunity to the petitioner had proceeded to submit his report on 10.5.2013 and consequently the then Chief Executive Officer Shri N.V. Satya Narayana had forwarded the enquiry report to the petitioner for representation or submission as per Rules 1937. The petitioner submitted his representation on 14.6.2013 but at no point of time he had indicated any infirmity or illegality in the said enquiry and meanwhile the then Chief Executive Officer, after completing his full tenure, had been transferred and thereafter Shri Amit Kumar, DEO, Bhopal was transferred to Cantonment Board, Kanpur and had taken over charge at Cantonment Board, Kanpur on 27.6.2013. Therefore, as per provisions contained in rule 12A (4) of Rules 1937 the then Chief Executive Officer/Disciplinary Authority, Cantonment Board, Kanpur imposed the major penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner under Rule 11 (2) (VI) of Rules 1937 vide order dated 28.12.2013. He submitted that once the petitioner was informed vide letter dated 28.12.2013 about the provision of appeal as provided in Rule 13 of Rules 1937 but without availing the said remedy of appeal the petitioner at his own wisdom had proceeded to file the present writ petition and as such, the present writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. He has placed his reliance on , (2011) 2 SCC 575 (Para 14); , (2012) 11 SCC 651 (Para 10) and , (2013) 2 SCC 740 (paras 23 & 25). The petitioner could not substantiate any infirmity/illegality in the enquiry and at no point of time the principle of natural justice had been violated in the matter and punishment inflicted on the petitioner is commensurate with the serious charges. He further made submission that the disputed questions of facts cannot be looked into the writ petition and has placed reliance on judgment in , (2011) 7 SCC 605 (para 21). Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate has also submitted that Rule of Evidence Act as is applied to the criminal proceedings cannot be invoked in departmental enquiry and has placed reliance on 2008 (2) Supreme Today 28 (paras 19 & 20).

Shri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate submitted that on the point of violation of principles of natural justice, it was incumbent upon the delinquent employee to plead prejudice and relevance of the witnesses whom he wanted to produce in the departmental enquiry. He has placed reliance on S.B.I. v. B.K. Mitra , (2011) 2 SCC 316 (Paras 28, 30, 32, 43, and 44) and Union of India v. Ashok Kumar , (2010) 5 SCC 349 (paras 75 to 81, 83, 84, 85, 89 and 92). He further made submission that apprehension, as has been averred in the writ petition about Mr. Lakhan Lal Omar, Vice President of Cantonment Board that he may influence decision of appeal before Board, cannot sustain as he was only the member of Cantonment Board and in support of his submission, he has placed his reliance on the judgment in K.R. Chari v. Secunderabad Cantonment Board , 1960 CJ (AP High Court) 112 in which it was held that the prejudice of only one member cannot be ground for holding that Cantonment Board Resolution is malafide for the reason of one man being prejudiced.

Heard rival submission and perused the record.

Rule 11 (1) and (2) of Rules 1937 provides that the minor and major penalties set out in the said Rule may be imposed by the appointing authority. Compulsory Retirement has been defined as one of the major penalties in Rule 11 (2) (vi). Thus admittedly, Disciplinary Authority in the case of the petitioner is the Chief Executive Officer. Rule 13 (1) provides that a servant on whom any of the penalties has been imposed by the Chief Executive Officer is entitled to appeal to the Cantonment Board. Rule 13 (2) of Rules 1937 provides that in case the Cantonment Board rejects the appeal of a servant who has been reduced in rank, removed or dismissed from service, he will have a right to submit a further appeal to the Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Command against the decision of the Board. Thus, the right of appeal has been given against any of the major penalties imposed by the Executive Officer to be filed before the Cantonment Board. Thus, the Scheme of Rules 1937 is clear and provides for right of appeal to be preferred to the Board within 30 days of delivery of the document showing the grounds on which the penalty was imposed, in case the penalty has been imposed by the Chief Executive Officer.

In the instant case, admittedly, the decision of imposition of major penalty of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner was taken by the Chief Executive Officer on 28.12.2013 and as per provisions contained in Rule 13 of Rules 1937, statutory alternative remedy of appeal is provided against the decision of the disciplinary authority and the petitioner had to approach to the Board within 30 days of delivery of the document, and admittedly the said period had expired and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy.

Moreover as indicated above, I have occasion to peruse the records in question and find that there is no infirmity or illegality in the impugned order. Whatever objections raised by the petitioner were highly technical and penalty, which has been imposed on the petitioner, is definitely in commensurate with the charges.

The plea of the petitioner, that the respondent No. 3 was not the competent authority, cannot be accepted on the ground that the petitioner was holding a non-supervisory post of Junior Engineer in Cantonment Board, Kanpur and as per Rule 7 of Rules 1937, all appointments to non-supervisory posts are to be made by the Executive Officer, who is thus the appointment authority. The next plea of the petitioner is that he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses during the enquiry proceedings. No such plea had been raised by the petitioner that he was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses. In the circumstances, the plea on behalf of the petitioner, that he was not allowed to cross examine the witnesses, and the enquiry proceedings are vitiated on account of it, cannot be sustained.

It is not necessary for the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to interfere in every case where there is violation of rights. For issuing a writ for any other purpose under article 226 of the Constitution of India, it has always been in the discretion of the High Court to interfere or not, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India , (1996) 5 SCC 54, the Supreme Court had held that "the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. The jurisdiction of the High Court, being extra ordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principle of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play.

This also cannot be disputed that the Court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness of the truth of the charges nor can it take over the evidence of the disciplinary authority. The High Court in discharge of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal on the findings of the disciplinary authority and assume the role of the appellate authority. It cannot interfere with the findings of the fact arrived at in the disciplinary proceedings except in the case of malafides or perversities i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where the finding is such that anyone acting reasonably or with objectivity could not have arrived at the same or where a reasonable opportunity has not been given to the charged officer to defend himself or if it is a case where there has been non-application of mind on the part of the enquiry authority or if the charges are vague or if the punishment imposed is shocking to the conscience of the Court. Reliance for this can be placed on State of U.P & Ors. v. Raj Kishore Yadav & Anr., , (2006) 5 SCC 673; V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC & Ors., , (2005) 7 SCC 338; R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab & Ors., , JT 1999 (6) SC 507; Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of Police, JT 1998 (8) SC 603; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., , AIR 1996 SC 484; Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy, , (1995) 1 SCC 332; Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. A. Rajapandia, , AIR 1995 SC 561; Union of India & Ors. v. Upendra Singh, , (1994) 3 SCC 357 and State of Orissa & Anr. v. Murlidhar Jena, , AIR 1963 SC 404.

The grounds, on which administrative action is subject to judicial review, are "illegality"; "irrationality" and "procedural impropriety". Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established by the charged official and mere assertion in this regard may not be sufficient. To be termed as "irrational" it has to be established that on material, it is a decision "so outrageous" that it is in total defiance of logic or moral standards.

If the power is exercised on the basis of facts, which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power shall be vitiated. Exercise of power will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary. To arrive at a decision on "reasonableness" the Court has to find out if the respondents have left out relevant factors or taken into account irrelevant factors. It was held in , (2006) 5 SCC 88, M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., that the Judicial review is of decision making process and is not the re-appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court in para 25 at page 96 had held as under:

"25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analyzing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.

The petitioner also contended that the Allahabad High Court had erred in treating the petitioner at par with the supervisory grade employees without going into the merits of the case and that the enquiry proceedings were in violation of the principles of natural justice. The petitioner cannot challenge the decision of the High Court of Allahabad in the present petition, pursuant to which he had filed an appeal which was considered by the Appellate Authority and his punishment of dismissal from service was modified to that of compulsory retirement. If the petitioner was aggrieved by order of Allahabad High Court, the petitioner ought to have challenged the same."

The petitioner has failed to make out any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety in the actions of the respondents. The punishment of compulsory retirement imposed by the disciplinary authority, cannot be held to be such which would shock the conscience of the Court or which a reasonable person would not draw.

In the entirety of the facts and circumstances, the punishment awarded cannot be held to be disproportionate so as to entail any interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The writ petition in the facts and circumstances is without any merit and it is, therefore, dismissed. Parties are however, left to bear their own costs.