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Ammunje Ramananda Nayak vs The Land Tribunal

Karnataka High Court · Decided on 10 December 2014 · Citation: (2014) 12 KAR CK 0096

HON’BLE JUDGES
B.V. Nagarathna, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 · Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 4
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 28230/2014 (LR)
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Judgment

19 paragraphs · 1,455 words

B.V. Nagarathna, J.—Petitioners have assailed order dated 19.9.1979 passed in LRY 69-151-TRI/8485/1979-80 by the 1st respondent - Land Tribunal, Udupi District, Udupi.

2.

The relevant facts of the case are that petitioners are the children of late Ammunje Madhava Nayak, who have assailed the impugned order. After enforcement of the Karnataka Land Reforms Amendment Act, 1974, father of respondent Nos. 2 to 8, late Deju Poojary had filed Form No. 7 seeking grant of occupancy rights in respect of land bearing survey No. 122/1B, consisting of 8 cents in khatha No. 276 of Shivalli Village, Udupi Taluk. He had arrayed Sri. Ammunje Ananda Nayak, who is stated to be elder brother of petitioners'' father and their mother-Smt. Rukminiyamma as respondents before the Land Tribunal. According to petitioners, their father was moolagenidar from 12th respondent-Temple. The Land Tribunal after issuing notices to the parties, by order dated 26.7.1979 granted occupancy rights in respect of the aforesaid survey number to the father of respondents 2 to 8 herein. That order is assailed in this writ petition.

3.

I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material on record.

4.

On a query with regard to delay of 35 years in filing the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioners sought to justify the fact that there is no delay in filing of the writ petition, as the petitioners were unaware of the order granting occupancy rights, that order is impugned in this writ petition, that the name of Sri. Ammunje Madhav Nayak appears in the RTCs along with Udupi Sri Krishna Devaru, who is respondent No. 12 herein till date. When respondents 2 to 8 sought to get their names entered in the revenue records petitioners became aware of the impugned order and therefore not having knowledge about the said order and being ignorant of the same, delay in the instant case cannot be a matter which can be taken into consideration while considering the matter on merits, is the submission. Learned counsel therefore contended that keeping aside the fact of delay, the matter may be heard on merits.

5.

I have considered this submission, in light of the material on record.

6.

It is noted that petitioners'' father''s brother and their mother were made as respondents before the Land Tribunal. From the impugned order, it is evident that notices were served on them and thereafter on 19.9.1979 the impugned order has been passed on the basis of the material on record to the effect that father of respondents 2 to 8 was cultivating the land in question. The respondents before the Land Tribunal namely, Sri Ammunje Ananda Nayak and Smt. Rukminiamma during their life time did not assail that order of the Land Tribunal nor did the petitioners father assail the impugned order during his lifetime. It is only after 35 years, petitioners have thought of assailing the order of the Land Tribunal. Merely because the names of Ammunje Ananda Nayak and respondent No. 12 appear in the R.T. Cs does not mean that delay has not occurred in assailing the impugned order. Even if there was delay with regard to mutation of the names of respondents 2 to 8 in the revenue records, that would also have no bearing on the delay in impugning the order dated 26.7.1979.

7.

In that view of the matter, there being no sufficient cause shown for condoning the delay of 35 years in assailing the impugned order, writ petition is liable to be rejected only on the ground of delay and laches by placing reliance on the recent judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court.

8.

A plethora of decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:--

"a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty, the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches.

b) In the case of Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, , the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows;

"53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."

c) Similarly, the Apex Court in Sawaran Lata etc. Vs. State of Haryana and Others, has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged.

d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. D.R. Laxmi and Others, , wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, , it has been opined thus:--

"The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay."

f) In fact in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, , it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time.

g) To a similar effect is the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. Vs. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao and Others, ."

9.

The aforesaid decisions are squarely applicable to the present case on hand.

10.

In the result, the writ petition is rejected on the ground of delay and laches.