Agnes Sequira vs The Land Tribunal

B.V. Nagarathna, J.—Petitioner has assailed order dated 10.10.1981 passed by the first respondent Land Tribunal, Mangalore Taluk. By that order occupancy rights of land bearing Sy. Nos. 163 Part C - Punja 0-87, 232-3 Part C Punja 0-70, 232-1B Part 3 Punja 0-34, 166-1 Punja 1 -86 were granted to respondent No. 3.

It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No. 3 had sold his rights in respect of the aforesaid lands to the petitioner under a registered document dated 04.02.1980. That after the enforcement of the Karnataka Land Reforms Amendment Act, respondent No. 3 had filed Form No. 7 seeking grant of occupancy rights of the aforesaid lands against respondent No. 4, Dharnu Shetty. The Tribunal by the impugned order dated 10.10.1981 granted occupancy rights to respondent No. 3. That order is assailed by the petitioner in this writ petition.

I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

Petitioner''s counsel states that petitioner had acquired right, title and interest in respect of Sy. No. 163 and that the said land is punja land. Therefore, the third respondent could not have sought grant of occupancy rights of all the lands in question. On the basis of the document at Annexure-D, petitioner''s counsel contends that the impugned order is not in accordance with law as the rights had enured to the benefit of the petitioner prior to that order.

I have considered this contention in the light of the material on record. It is noted from the impugned order that third respondent had filed Form No. 7 seeking grant of occupancy rights against respondent No. 4. By the impugned order, the Land Tribunal has granted occupancy rights of the aforesaid lands in favour of respondent No. 3. The landlord who is respondent No. 4 has not assailed that order. In fact, even respondent No. 3 who was granted occupancy rights has also not assailed that order which has attained finality by sheer lapse of 33 years. The petitioner who now claims to have some rights in the lands in question on the basis of the document dated 04.02.1980 has now filed this writ petition assailing the impugned order dated 10.10.1981. In fact the petitioner was not a party to those proceedings so as to have locus standi to question that order. That apart, petitioner herself claims right, title and interest in the lands in question through respondent No. 3. If respondent No. 3 has been granted occupancy rights of the lands in question and petitioner is seeking her rights from respondent No. 3, then she cannot assail the order passed in favour of respondent No. 3 her vendor. If there is any other dispute between the petitioner or respondent No. 3 or the legal representatives of respondent No. 3, then petitioner has to resort to civil remedy in respect of any such disputes on the strength of Annexures D, E, F and G which are the documents and also the record of rights which are stated to be in favour of the petitioner.

In that view of the matter, the writ petition has to be rejected both on the question of locus standi of the petitioner to assail the impugned order and also on the ground of delay and laches as the writ petition is filed almost 33 years after the date of impugned order.

In this context, a plethora of decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court on the issue regarding delay and as to how a Court of equity exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot extend its hands to such persons who approach the Court after several years can be relied upon. In fact, the Apex Court has held in several decisions that stale claims ought not to be entertained by High Courts exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The recent decisions in that regard are as follows:--

"a) In a recent decision of the Apex Court reported in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty, the consideration of an application where delay and laches could be attributed against a person who approaches in a writ petition is discussed by stating that though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to writ jurisdiction, however, the Doctrine of Limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions could be dismissed at the initial stage on the ground of delay and laches.

b) In the case of Shankara Co-op Housing Society Ltd. Vs. M. Prabhakar and Others, , the Apex Court at para 53 has given the relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches in approaching the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The same reads as follows;

"53. The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its owns facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay."

c) Similarly, the Apex Court in Sawaran Lata etc. Vs. State of Haryana and Others, has held that when the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in the year 2001 and the award was passed in the year 2004, writ petitions filed for quashing of the notification in the year 2009 have to be dismissed on the ground of delay as the litigants who dare to abuse the process of the Court in disregard of the law of limitation, delay and laches should not be encouraged.

d) Reference can also be made to another decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. D.R. Laxmi and Others, , wherein it has cautioned the High Court not to entertain the writ petitions where there is inordinate delay while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

e) Similarly, in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, , it has been opined thus:--

"The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the petitioner has moved the Writ Court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to disturb unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay."

f) In fact in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, , it has been held that delay defeats equity and that relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated persons who approach the courts in time."

The said decisions are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.

In the result, the Writ Petition is rejected.