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Judgment
20 paragraphs · 1,430 wordsSamarendra Pratap Singh, J.—Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
The petitioners who are nine in. number have challenged the order dated 4.12.2006 taking cognizance of the offence under Sections 323 and 498(A) of the I.P.C. and 4 of the D.P. Act and summoning them to face the trial.
The O.P. No. 2, one Anita Devi, filed a complaint before the A.C.J.M., Hilsa in the District of Nalanda, making allegation that accused petitioner tortured her for want of dowry. It has been alleged that some cause of occurrence took place in the District of Nalanda and some in Sonebhadra District in U.P.
The Complainant in support of her complaint examined three witnesses where upon learned A.C.J.M., Hilsa, vide his impugned order dated 4.12.2006 took cognizance of the offence under Sections 323 and 498(A) of the I.P.C. and u/s 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and summoned them to face trial.
Counsel for the petitioners raised the following points. He argued that from perusal of the complaint it would appear that petitioners No. 2 to 9 committed no offence within the District of Nalanda. The offence if any alleged within the territorial jurisdiction of Nalanda is attributed to petitioner No. 1 who is the husband.
Secondly, petitioners No. 8 & 9 are neither resident of Nalanda nor of Sonbhadra district of U.P. They have been implicated in this case because petitioner No. 8 happens to be brother-in-law of the husband of petitioner No. 1 and petitioner No. 9 is son of petitioner 8. Thirdly, O.P. No. 2 has tried to implicate all possible relatives of petitioner No. 1 including his sister Ankita Kumari who was born in 1996 and would be 7 to 10 years old on the date of the occurrence. Besides this even father-in-law of petitioner No. 3, namely, petitioner No. 6, O.P. Singh @ Om Prakash Singh, has been implicated. Fourthly, the impugned order is a mechanical one and does not reflect proper application of mind to the facts of the case.
Learned Counsel for the O.P. No. 2 submits that the Magistrate on perusal of the statement of complainant on S.A. and evidence of the witnesses during enquiry took cognizance on finding prima facie materials against the accused petitioners.
Now I will take the points raised by the petitioners one by one. The first point raised by the petitioner is that the complaint was not maintainable at Nalanda and in any view of the matter, there is no allegation that petitioners No. 2 to 9 committed any offence in the District of Nalanda. It is true that major part of the incident took place in the district of Sonbhadra. However, in the complaint, the complainant has also alleged that her husband came to her Naihar in the District of Nalanda, where he threatened her father that in case he would not give motor cycle, T.V. and Rs. 1.00,000/- he would not keep his daughter and would contract another marriage. The aforesaid incident took place at the Naihar of O.P. No. 2 in the District of Nalanda. As such the Nalanda court would have full jurisdiction to entertain the complaint case. Thus in view of Sections 177 and 178 of the Cr.P.C., the complaint was also maintainable in the district of Nalanda. It would be relevant to quote Section 177 of Cr.P.C. and Section 178 of Cr.P.C. is also quoted here for ready reference:
Ordinary place of inquiry and trial - Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.
Place of inquiry or trial - (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or
(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or
(c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or
(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court shaving jurisdiction over any of such local areas.
Thus, a complaint would also be maintainable within an area where some part of the offence was committed. The Code does not visualize filing of separate complaints and in piece meal at different places qua different accused in respect of a composite incident. The Code rather favours one trial for a composite incident committed in same transaction in preference to multiplicity of cases & trials.
The issues No. 2 and 3 are taken up together as they are interlinked. The petitioners states that the complainant has implicated all the far and distant relatives, as many as 8 in number living at different places, besides the husband. Further more there is allegation against O.Ps. No. 8 and 9 together with others of torture and demand of dowry. Learned Counsel asserts that relatives have been implicated by way of vengeance. In view of allegations contained in the complaint, I am not inclined to quash the impugned order taking cognizance on the ground that as they are relatives they have been falsely implicated at this stage save and except petitioner No. 4.
As far as petitioner No. 4 is concerned it is not disputed that her date of birth is 14.11.1996. The complainant alleged that torture and demand of dowry took place between 2001 to 2006. As such petitioner No. 4, Ankita Kumari, would be around 5 years to 10 years during the lime of occurrence. In such circumstance, in view of her tender age, the allegation that Ankita Kumari also committed torture seems absurd. As such the criminal prosecution and impugned order dated 4.12.2006 taking cognizance against her under Sections 323 and 498(A) of I.P.C. is quashed.
Now I come to the last submission of the petitioners that the learned court below took cognizance against all of them in a mechanical manner. The learned Counsel submits that the allegation against petitioners No. 8 to 9 alongwith others do not seem probable as they stay at Sonepur within the district of Chapra. No occurrence even as per the complaint is said to have taken place either in the district of Nalanda or in Sonebhadra in the district of U.P. The petitioner further states that the learned Magistrate while taking cognizance has not discussed the materials, on which his satisfaction is based. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel relied upon the decision reported in M.N. Ojha and Others Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav and Another, and in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others,
In the case of M.N. Ojha, the Punjab National Bank had earlier filed a case against the principal borrower and the guarantors for cheating and misappropriating hypothecated goods. Both the borrower and the guarantors did not repay the loan. Thereafter the accused borrower filed a complaint against the Bank officials for offence under Sections 409, 422, 426 and 120(B) of the I.P.C., as the Bank had appropriated the F.D.R.S. along with the interest accrued thereon. The Hon''ble apex Court noticed that the allegations against the Bank are so inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair-minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. The Apex Court observes that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, the Hon''ble apex Court observes that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and it cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The court has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record.
There cannot be any dispute to the proposition of law laid down by the Hon''ble apex Court in the aforesaid case. However, in the instant case, the court after perusing the complaint case, S.A. of the complainant as well as the evidence of the witnesses, enquiry u/s 202 of Cr.P.C. prima facie found a case u/s 498 A made out against the accused petitioners. As such, I am not in agreement with the submissions of the petitioners that the impugned order has been passed in a mechanical manner.
The application, thus, filed on behalf of the petitioners No. 1 to 3 and 5 to 9 is dismissed with an observation that they may take all these points at the time of framing of the charge.
