Amrik Singh vs The State of Punjab and others

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—Amrik Singh Petitioner was recruited as a Foot Constable in the Punjab Armed Police on 29th of April, 1947, and in course of time came to be promoted to the post of an Assistant Sub-Inspector. In a charge sheet of 20th of December 1958, under the signatures of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Fort Bahadurgarh, the Petitioner was accused of having stealthily crept into the bed of one Mst. Chinti, wife of Dalip Chand, sweeper of the Fort, at about 11 P. M. on 26th of August, 1958, with a view to outrage her modesty. Having found the Petitioner in her bed, Chinti raised a hue any cry which awakened many persons sleeping nearby including her huband. They all gave a pursuit to the Petitioner who was eventually taken hold of from the place where he took shelter after he found that there was no possibility of escape. The crowd dispersed only after it was made known that the Petitioner who had been traced to be the culprit would be suitably dealt with. The enquiry was initiated after the full facts of the case had been submitted by -the Commandant, Fort Bahadurgarh, to the District Mrgistrate, Patiala, on 25th of September, 1958, and the opinion expressed that no cognizable offence warranting a conviction in Court was disclosed to have been committed. The order of the District Magistrate was passed on 30th of September, 1958, allowing a departmental enquiry to be held (Annexure C). Shri Ram Partap, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was appointed an Enquiry Officer, submitted his detailed finding and on its basis a showcase notice was given to the Petitioner and he was dismissed from service by order of the Commandant, Punjab Armed Police, Jullundur, on 9th of December, 1959. An appeal preferred to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, was dismissed by an order passed on 18th of March, 1960 (Annexure D) and the order of the Commandant upheld. In a revision to the Additional Inspector-General of Police the order of dismissal was kept undisturbed (Annexure E of 27th of February, 1961) but it was held that the statuts of the Petitioner should be considered to be that of Assistant Sub Inspector and not a Head Constable from the time of his suspension right till the order of dismissal. The subordinate authorities had treated the Petitioner throughout as a Head Constable.

In this petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, it is submittad by the learned Counsel that the order of the District Magistrate was not passed in accordance with Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume II. Now, Rule 16.38 deals with criminal offences commuted by a police officer "in connection with his official relations with the public" and on immediate information being furnished to the District Magistrate of such a complaint, the District Magistrate is to decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected magistrate having 1st Class powers. The District Magistrate under Sub-clause (2) of Rule 16.38 has to determine whether the matter has to be disposed of departmen-tally or otherwise. Rule 16.38 is obviously inapplicable as the criminal act with which the Petitioner was charged did not relate to his official relations with the public. Some confusion has been caused because it appears to have been assumed that the District Magistrate had passed his order on the report made to him by the Superintendent of Police allowing a departmental enquiry. The complaint was in effect under Rule 1623, which provides that when a definite complaint is made of misconduct on the part of a police officer, the superior officer can record statements in support of the complaint as may be immediately available. This is what appears to have been done in the present instance and the record of the statements was sent to the District Magistrate. The charge-sheet which has been framed against the Petitioner does not depart from normal procedure or the police rules.

another grivevance of the Petitioner is that the enquiry against him had been conducted in his absence. The charge-sheet was sent to the Petitioner on 20th of December, 1958. In paragraph 4 of the written statement filed by the State it is mentioned that the Petitioner was given full and fair opportunity to defend himself. At first the Petitioner proceeded on ten days'' casual leave from Fort Bahadurgarh on 16th of January, 1959, but instead of reporting back after the expiry of his leave on 27th of January, 1959, kept on sending medical certificates issued by private practitioners. The Petitioner was directed on many occasions through registered letters to resume duty or submit medical certificates from the Civil Surgeon, but he refused to take delivery of the registered letters addressed to him. The undelivered letters were received back at Fort Bahadurgarh. In the registered notice sent to him on 30th of May, 1959, the Petitioner was asked to report back immediately otherwise ex parte proceedings would be initiated against him according to the rules. The Petitioner did not choose to return to duties till 20th of August, 1959, when he was given a copy of the charge-sheet and was allowed to take notes of the evidence much of which had been recorded. He never made any request for re-examination of witnesses and according to the written statement the Petitioner had been present throughout when the preliminary evidence had been recorded. In the circumstances of this case, I do not think that there is any foundation for the complaint which has been made on behalf of the Petitioner that he has been denied a fair and full opportunity to defend himself. He knew the nature of the enquiry and charge levelled against him. Right from the end of December 1958, till the end of May, 1959, he was repeatedly asked to appear before the Enquiiy Officer and it cannot be controverted that the pretext for his absence was nothing more than a delaying tactic. I have carefully perused the finding of the Enquiry Officer and it seems to me that he went carefully into the evidence which was made available at the time of enquiry and he was satisfied that both the conduct and identification of the Petitioner had been established beyond any possibility of doubt.

The counsel has urged that the Petitioner was not furnished with copies of what he called "necessary documents". An application for these copies was made long after the enquiry had terminated and during the pedency of the appeal. There does nat apper to be any substance in this allegation.

It is contended that the provisions of Article 311 have been violated in as much as the order of dismissal had been passed by an authority subordinate to the one by which the Petitioner was appointed. There does not appear to be any force in this submission. Even on the assumption that the Petitioner was an Assistant Sub-Inspector he could have been dismissed u/s 7 of the Police Act by the Inspector-General, Deputy Inspector-General, Assistant Inspector-General and District Superintendent of Police. Whether the rank of the Petitioner was that of a Head Constable or an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police he remained a police officer of subordinate rank. Under Rule 12.1 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume II, Sergeants, Sub-Inspector and Assistant Sab-Inspectors are appointed by Superintendents of Police, Deputy Superintendent (Administrative), Government Railway Police and Assistant Superintendent, Government Railway Police. In the case of Head Constables and Constables, the appointing authorities are of the same rank. It is not understood how it can be argued that the dismissal of the Petitioner has been made by an authority subordinate to the one by which he was appointed whether he was of the rank of the Head Constable or the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police. The Appellate Authority, under Clause (6) of rule l6.29 of the Punjab Police Rules, Volume II, is mentioned as Commandant, Provincial Additional Police who, in the present instance is the one who had actually passed the order of dismissal against the Petitioner. The appeal was taken to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Provincial Additional Police. After hearing the arguments of the learned Counsel, I am firmly of the view that there has been a full and substantial compliance of the statutory rules and the Constitutional requirements. There has been no denial of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry which has been conducted by the approoriate authority.

In this view of the matter, there is no force in this petition which fails and is dismissed. There would, however, be no order as to costs of this petition.