Ram Singh Dhawan vs The State of Punjab and Others

Shamsher Bahadur, J.—Ram Singh Dhawan in this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has questioned the validity of the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala Range on 28th of October, 1961 (Annexure E) dismissing him from the post of Sub-Inspector of Police.

The petitioner joined the Punjab Police Force in 1930 as a Foot Constable and in course of time came to be appointed to the rank of Sub-Inspector in 1945. While posted as Station House Officer of Police Station Assandh, the petitioner on 22nd July, 1959 caused recovery of 5 1/2 tolas of opium from one Mange Ram. The petitioner is said to have given a beating to Deep Chand, brother of Mange Ram and later confined him in the Police Station on the night between 22nd and 23rd of July, 1959. It was also alleged that the petitioner accepted a bribe of Rs. (300 from Deep Chand. Deep Chand made a complaint against the petitioner to the Chief Minister and it was examined by the Vigilance Department of the Government under the control of Deputy Inspector General of Police. Eventually, the complaint was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Karnal, Shri Harjit Singh, who in his demi official letter of 24th of December, 1960, wrote to the District Magistrate, Karnal, as under:

I am sending herewith a copy of the report of the Vigilance Department regarding the institution of departmental file against S.I. Ram Singh of this District. Necessary permission under rule 16.38 (2) of Police Rules for taking departmental action against the Sub-Inspector may please be accorded and the enclosure returned to this office immediately.

This was returned to the Superintendent of Police by the District Magistrate, Karnal, with the following endorsement of 28th of December 1960-

Returned in original. Permission under rule 16.38 (2) Police Rules accorded for departmental proceedings.

The Superintendent of Police by his memorandum of 31st of December, 1960, thereafter initiated the departmental enquiry which was conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police who framed a charge-sheet on 11th of March, 1931. In the enquiry full opportunity was given to the petitioner to show cause. Witnesses were examined by the enquiry officer who submitted his detailed report on 25th of May, 1961, giving his opinion that "the allegations against the accused officer do not stand proved, and therefore, under the circumstances, it may not be safe to punish him." On 21st of May, 1961, the petitioner was informed by the Superintendent of Police that he had been completely absolved in the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (Mr. Bhagwan Singh Rosha) went through the report of the enquiry officer and the order passed by the Superintendent of Police and being provisionally satisfied that the guilt of the petitioner had been proved called upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed. After considering the lengthy explanation submitted by the petitioner on 9th of August, 1981, Mr. Rosha passed the impugned order on 28th of October, 1961. In this order it was stated by the Deputy Inspector General of Police that the representation had been taken into consideration and the petitioner had been heard in person. The conclusion was reached by this officer that the charge of bribery had been proved and the petitioner was accordingly dismissed from service. The appeal against this order was dismissed by the Additional Inspector General of Police on 10th of September, 1963. Feeling aggrieved by the orders of the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the Additional Inspector General, of Police, the petitioner has filed the writ petition on 14th of October, 1963.

It has been contended by Mr. Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the enquiry is void ab initio for reason of non-compliance with rule 16.38 of the Police Rules. There is, in my opinion, no substance in this objection. Under clause (1) of rule 16.38 :

Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate of any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected magistrate having 1st class power.

Under clause (2) of this rule :

When investigation of such a complaint.establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proced departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed.

It is argued by Mr. Sharma that the Superintendent of Police hiving received the complaint from the Vigilance Department should hive forward the pipers to the District Magistrate for his independent judgment whether an investigation should be handed over to a Magistrate or be the subject-matter of a departmental enquiry. From the recapitulation of the facts it would be readily observed that the complaint was not received in the first instance by the Superintendent of Police. Deep Chand had approached the State authorities direct and the complaint had bee a forwarded to the Vigilance Department which hid made a recommendation for a departmental enquiry. The Superintendent of Police is enjoined under clause (1) of rule 16.38 of the Police Rules to submit the papers to the District Magistrate only when the complaint is received directly by him obviously for the reason that the head of the police force in a district is subordinate to the District Magistrate who is required to give directions on such matters. In the present instance, the complaint having been received from the Vigilance Department the Superintendent of police still observed the spirit of the rule by forwarding the papers to the District Magistrate for his orders though it was asked that the orders may be passed for departmental enquiry. As the report of the Vigilance Department was enclosed with this memorandum, the District Magistrate must be deemed to have made a perusal of it and the order passed for a departmental enquiry was a full compliance with the Police Rules.

That the Deputy Inspector General of Police was competent to annul the order of exoneration passed by a Superintendent of Police is not seriously contested and indeed under clause (1) of rule 16.28, the Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General and even a Superintendent of Police is authorised to call for the records of awards made by their subordinates and confirm, enhance, modify, or annul the same, or make further investigation or direct such to be made before passing orders. The argument, therefore, on this ground is insupportable and the contention is repelled.

It is next submitted by Mr. Sharma that the appeal against the order of dismissal should have been heard by the Inspector-General of Police and not by the Additional Inspector-General of Police who actually disposed it of. In clause (6) of rule 16.29 of the Police Rules, the appellate authority from the order of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police is mentioned as the Inspector-General of Police. u/s 4 of the Police Act, the administration of the Police throughout a general police-district shall be vested in an officer styled the Inspector-General of Police. In the contention of the learned counsel, the Additional Inspector-General of Police does not figure anywhere and he had no jurisdiction to pass the appellate order. In the written statement filed on behalf of the State, it is stated that :

An Additional-Inspector General of Police, enjoys all the powers of the Inspector-General of Police, and is legally appointed by the State Government under the Police Act, 1861. Thus, the order passed by the Additional Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, in the appeal of the petitioner was within his powers and competence.

The office of the Additional Inspector-General of Police has been in existence for some years in this State and though the relevant notification has not been produced there is nothing to suggest either in the Police Act or the Police Rules that such an office cannot be created or that no powers can be vested in him. In any event, the order which is called in question is that of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and he has dealt with the entire case in detail setting out the evidence on which reliance has been placed in passing the order of dismissal. There is no apparent error or jurisdiction in the order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police to warrant an interference of this Court in writ proceedings.

It has been very seriously urged by Mr. Sharma that Mr. Rosha was animated by a bias against the petitioner. It has been alleged in, the petition that the petitioner had been proceeded against at the instance of Shri Sahni, Senior Superintendent of Police Ferozepore, many years ago. The nephew of Mr. Sahni who is now a Superintendent of Police is married to Mr. Rosha''s daughter and it is suggested that on account of this relationship Mr. Rosha has thought it fit to pass an order of dismissal when both the enquiry officer and the Superintendent of Police had found in his favour. Apart from the denial of this assertion of mala fides the reason adduced by the petitioner does not commend itself to reason or common sense. It is worthy of note that the successors of Mr. Sahni had also taken a severe view about the antecedents of the petitioner In any case, Mr. Rosha though he has referred to the past record of the petitioner has not based his decision on it.

It was also vaguely asserted by Mr. Sharma that the petitioner should have been associated with the investigation which culminated in the enquiry against him. I do not think such a right could be claimed either under any statute or rules or even the principles of natural justice. All that is required is that the petitioner should be given an adequate opportunity at the time of enquiry and when he is to be removed from service. At both stages the petitioner was asked to furnish his explanations which were duly, considered by the appropriate authorities.

There is no force in this petition which fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.