Anita Jharia vs Akhilesh Jhariya

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This appeal has been preferred u/s 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment dated 5.5.2011 passed by Sessions Judge, Seoni, in Sessions Trial No. 69/2010, whereby respondent No. 1 namely Akhilesh Jhariya has been acquitted of the offence punishable u/s 376 of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short).

Prosecution case, in brief, is that upon a false promise to marry, respondent No. 1 not only persistently subjected the prosecutrix to sexual assault for a period of two years, but also caused her abortion by administering pills. The said report was lodged by the prosecutrix 25/2/10 at Police Station Kevlari, upon which Crime No. 38/10 was registered and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned Dy. Advocate General submitted that the trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and the impugned judgment deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the parties, we have gone through the impugned judgment.

In para 14 of the impugned judgment trial Court found that during the relevant period, prosecutrix was more than 22 years of age. Dr. Leela Kudape (PW1), who examined the prosecutrix and prepared report (Ex.C/1), did not notice any injury on her body and, according to her, no opinion could be given about recent intercourse. In her cross-examination she deposed that prosecutrix was habitual of sexual intercourse. Prosecutrix, in her cross-examination has deposed that she was acquainted with the respondent since childhood and for the last 31/2 years was having love affair with him and wanted to marry him. According to her, villagers were aware of their affair and, in this regard, Panchayat was convened twice. In the aforesaid premises, the trial Court found that prosecutrix had travelled and stayed with the respondent at her own accord without raising any objection despite having sufficient opportunity and was a consenting party, and, accordingly, held that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the judgment of acquittal in question. The appeal, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.