Ramgarib Patel vs Vijay Kumar Patel @ Doctor

B.D. Rathi, J.—Heard on admission. This appeal has been preferred u/s 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") being aggrieved with the judgment passed by VII Additional Sessions Judge, Rewa on 30/9/2011 in Sessions Trial No. 9/2011, whereby respondent no. 1 has been acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 376 and 506B of the Indian Penal Code ("IPC" for short).

Prosecution case, in brief, is that in the night of 12/11/10 at about 10.30 p.m., respondent no. 1 entered into the room of prosecutrix and subjected her to sexual assault. As she raised alarm, neighbours Navneet Patel and Rajesh Patel reached there, and respondent no. 1, after threatening her to kill, fled. Prosecutrix was being sexually exploited by respondent no. 1 for the last three months. Her husband was a military personnel, posted at Haryana and the prosecutrix used to live with her children, on rent, at Shivnagar, Rewa. A written complaint (Ex. P/2) was made after a long period of 12 days on 24/11/10 at Police Station Anantpur. Crime No. 219/10 (Ex. P/6) was registered and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed.

Learned Deputy Advocate General, while making reference to the evidence on record, submitted that the learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and the impugned judgment deserves to be interfered with.

Having regard to the arguments advanced by the parties, we have gone through the impugned judgment and evidence on record.

In this case, prosecutrix (PW 2), aged about 28 years, was declared hostile. Material witness Rajesh Patel (PW 10) was also declared hostile and Navneet Patel has not been examined. It was also held that prosecution has failed to prove that prosecutrix was being threatened and sexually exploited for the last three months by the respondent.

After appreciation of evidence, the trial Court has found that the prosecutrix was a consenting party.

We agree with the findings recorded by the trial Court.

It is well settled that the judgment of acquittal should not be disturbed unless the conclusions drawn on the basis of evidence brought on record are found to be grossly unreasonable or manifestly perverse or palpably unsustainable.

Taking into consideration the reasons assigned on the face of evidence on record establishing the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the view taken by the learned trial Court was apparently a possible view. As such, no interference is called for with the order of acquittal in question. The appeal, being devoid of merit and substance, stands dismissed.