High CourtsSingle Bench(2010) 10 MAD CK 0006

B. Sekar, C. Saravanakumar, S. Sureshkumar and A. Kandiyan vs Mr. Niranjan Mardi, Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, Mr. Senthil Kumar, The Commissioner of Municipal Administration and N.S. Prema, The Commissioner, Tambaram Municipality

Madras High Court · Decided on 5 October 2010

HON’BLE JUDGES
P. Jyothimani, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Cont. P. No. 1382 of 2009

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

164 paragraphs · 3,678 words

P. Jyothimani, J.—The contempt complained of is in respect of the order of this Court, dated 05.01.2007 passed in W.P. No. 36813 of

2006.

2.

The Petitioners who were employed as ''Non Muster Roll'' (NMR) under the third Respondent municipality stated to have been appointed on

12.08.1993, 03.08.1993, 10.09.1993 and 09.08.1993 respectively and they have worked in the said municipality till 13.02.2002 and thereafter,

they were not given employment. Apart from that there were 10 persons including the Petitioners who were working in the third Respondent

municipality, out of them, one Gunasekaran has moved the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. No. 3284 of 2003 and by an order

dated 30.09.2003, the Tribunal has directed the Respondents to regularise his service as per G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and

Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999. When the said order was not implemented, he has filed W.P. No. 33364 of 2004, and by order

dated 31.03.2005, this Court directed the Respondents to comply with the order of the Tribunal. The third Respondent filed an appeal with a

petition to condone the delay of 154 days and the said petition was dismissed by the Division Bench thereby confirming the order of the Tamil

Nadu Administrative Tribunal as well as the order of the learned single Judge. The Petitioners who are similarly placed as that of the said

Gunasekaran in respect of whom, the orders were implemented, have requested to regularise their services. The third Respondent by proceedings

dated 06.03.2006 has asked for certain particulars and the Petitioners have insisted that they have been employed as NMRs as admitted by the

Municipality and therefore, they have filed the above writ petition for a direction against the third Respondent to regularise their services in terms of

G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999 as permanent employees at the entry level

category and also grant them appropriate time scale of pay.

3.

Taking note of the fact that the dates of appointment of the Petitioners as NMRs as stated in the affidavit has not been denied and taking note of

the order of the Tribunal and the subsequent order of this Court in the writ petition stated above and as per G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal

Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999, the condition required is that the Petitioners should have been worked on daily

wage basis before 01.10.1996 and when that fact in respect of the Petitioners was not disputed, this Court by an order dated 05.01.2007 has

directed the third Respondent to consider the claim of the Petitioners in terms of G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply

Department, dated 27.05.1999 and in the light of the order passed by the Tribunal as confirmed in the writ petition in respect of a similarly situated

person like that of the Petitioners and to pass orders making necessary appointments, within a period of six weeks.

4.

However, the third Respondent has passed an order dated 27.02.2007 stating that the Petitioners were working in the municipality in its various

sections as part time section writers on the part time pay scale as fixed by the District Collector and considering that this Court in the abovesaid

order has directed only to consider the claim of the Petitioners as per the said Government Order, has rejected the claim of the Petitioners on the

ground that as per G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999, there is no scope for including

the Petitioners in the list of NMR. The passing of that order is construed to be a violation of the Court order and accordingly, this petition is filed. It

is also relevant to point out that as against the abovesaid order passed by this Court, the third Respondent has filed W.A. No. 830 of 2010 making

a plea that the order only directs the municipality to consider the claim of the writ Petitioners and cannot be taken as a positive order for a direction

to regularise them. The Hon''ble First Bench of this Court has dismissed the writ appeal with the following observation:

In our considered view, these are all submissions which should be placed before the learned single Judge before whom a contempt petition has

now been filed by Respondents 1 to 4. There is no reason for us to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge, with which we do not find

any error otherwise. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, M.P. No. 1 of 2010 is closed.

5.

While it is the case of the Petitioners as submitted by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that the order passed by this Court amounts to a

positive direction to appoint the Petitioners since it is not in dispute that the Petitioners were employed as NMRs between 12.08.1993 to

01.06.2002 and therefore, the letter of the third Respondent in rejecting the claim amounts to disobedience of the order especially when the

Hon''ble First Bench of this Court has dismissed the writ appeal.

6.

On the other hand, it is the stand of the third Respondent as stated in the counter affidavit that the Petitioners were not at all engaged in the

municipality as on the crucial date namely, 1.10.1996 and therefore, they were not eligible for the benefit under G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal

Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999. It is also stated that the Petitioners have stated in the affidavit about their age as

35 years and if that is taken in 1993, they would have been 17 years and others are less than that and therefore, it is stated that the claim of the

Petitioners as if they were engaged as NMRs is false. It is also stated that in respect of Gunasekaran who stands in the different footing since his

name was found in the list of NMRs prepared in the first instance on receipt of the Government Order whereas the names of the Petitioners are not

found in any one of the NMR list of municipality. It is also stated that originally in the letter dated 25.01.2005 only five names were set out as it is

seen in the original letter sent to the Regional Director of Municipal Administration and to the Director of Municipal Administration and it is not

known as to how this has been increased to 10 including the Petitioners'' name.

7.

It is also stated that the contempt petition is barred by limitation and the Petitioners having waited for three years have come to this Court. In the

additional counter affidavit filed by the third Respondent while tendering unconditional apology without reservation the third Respondent has

reiterated whatever she has stated in the original counter affidavit insisting that the Petitioners have never worked as on the crucial date namely,

01.10.1996 as per G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999 and therefore, the claim of the

Petitioners was rejected in the order dated 27.02.2007. Inasmuch as the Petitioners have not chosen to challenge the said order, the same has

become final. It is also stated that by letter dated 05.04.2007 issued by Mr. T. Suyambukesan, Joint Secretary to Government, Municipal

Administration & Water Supply Department addressed to the Commissioner of Municipal Administration stating that the Petitioners have satisfied

the conditions of G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999, is not true and genuine. It is

stated that on verification from the Secretariat, it was found that the person who has written the said letter was transferred from the department on

04.07.2006 itself and another person by name Mr. J. Rajamohan had joined the said post on 04.07.2006. It is also stated that the letter, dated

07.11.2007, referred in the abovesaid letter, dated 05.04.2007, was not even connected with the concerned section and therefore, it is a

fraudulent document.

8.

Mr. P. Srinivas, learned Counsel for the third Respondent has taken enormous efforts to substantiate his case that the Petitioners have never

been engaged as NMRs especially on the crucial date namely, on 01.10.1996 as per the G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water

Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999 and therefore, they are not eligible for the benefits as per the said Government Order. He has relied upon

the genuineness of a letter written by Mr. T. Suyambukesan, Joint Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration & Water Supply

Department, dated 05.04.2007 wherein, the Joint Secretary to the Government, has stated that the Petitioners have worked as NMRs from

12.08.1993 to 01.06.2003 in Tambaram Municipality and therefore, they have fulfilled the conditions stipulated in G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal

Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999. In the said letter, it is also stated that the Petitioners were directed

recommended for inclusion in the NMRs list and absorb them in the vacant entry level posts as per the direction of this Court.

9.

The genuineness of the said letter is questioned by the learned Counsel for the third Respondent on two grounds namely that the said letter

contains the seal of the office of the Commissioner of Municipal Administration, dated 11.05.2006 while the letter itself, dated 05.04.2007 and

therefore, according to him, the said letter should have been manipulated. Secondly, it is his contention that in the letter dated 05.04.2007 written

by Mr. T. Suyambukesan, Joint Secretary to Government to the Commissioner of Municipal Administration, a reference has been made in

reference No. 1, referring to a letter of the Commissioner of Municipal Administration No. 14049/07/F2, dated 07.11.2007. He has also brought

to the notice of this Court that in the letter dated 05.04.2007, a reference has been made about the letter of November 2007 which also

probablise that there has been some mal-practice played in respect of the Petitioners services some where. He has also produced the entire

original records to show that no where in the records there is any reference or indications to show that the Petitioners were working as NMRs

especially on the crucial date namely, 01.10.1996. When the order was passed in the writ petition, on 05.01.2007, all the Respondents including

the third Respondent municipality have been represented by the learned Special Government Pleader, and even though no one of the Respondents

have chosen to file counter affidavit, the learned Special Government Pleader, on instructions has made his submissions and it was after hearing

both the counsels, the abovesaid order came to be passed. The operative portion of the order passed by this Court is as follows:

In view of the same, the writ petition stands ordered with the direction to the third Respondent to consider the claims of the Petitioners in terms of

G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999 and in the light of the decision of the Tamil Nadu

Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 3284 of 2003, dated 30.09.2003 as confirmed in W.P. No. 35364 of 2004, dated 31.03.2005 and the

subsequent Division Bench order and make necessary appointments with all consequential reliefs, within a period of six weeks from the date of

receipt of a copy of this order and the writ petition stands ordered in the above terms.

10.

On a reference to the file produced by the third Respondent, it is true that the letter of the then Commissioner of the third Respondent

municipality in Na.Ka. No. 6108/2004/E2, dated 06.03.2006 addressed to the Commissioner Municipal Administration, the copy of which is

partly available at Page-551 of Volume II of the file produced before this Court which contains a reference that the Petitioners have been working

on the crucial date as per the G.O.Ms. No. 125, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, dated 27.05.1999 and there are

nominal muster roll registers relating to MCR. No. 95 dated 21.05.1996 which contains the address of one of the Petitioners namely S.

Sureshkumar, and he has signed in the muster roll register. However, in respect of the other Petitioners except in page-567, which the contains

names of S. Sureshkumar, B. Sekar and S. Saravanakumar who have signed in the nominal muster roll whose names have been marked without

mentioning the month or year and without the signatures of the parties concerned other names are not found. It is also seen that in the letter of the

Commissioner of Municipal Administration in Na.Ka. No. 71166//F4, dated 27.02.2006 addressed to the third Respondent Commissioner of

Municipality, the Commissioner of Municipal Administration has referred to the names including the names of the Petitioners stated to have worked

from 1993 onwards and informed the third Respondent that the Commissioner alone is competent to appoint NMRs. The other letter of the then

Commissioner of the third Respondent municipality in Na.Ka. No. 6148/2004/E2, dated 23.05.2006 addressed to the Commissioner of

Municipal Administration which is found in page 583 of the volume II of the file, the third Respondent Commissioner himself has included the

names of the Petitioners and recommended the names of the Petitioners including 11 other persons to be appointed on daily wage basis and sought

permission. The said letter runs as follows:

In the said letter, the third Respondent commissioner has also given some numbers in respect of all the 15 persons including the Petitioners.

11.

It was only after hearing the learned Special Government Pleader on the basis of the said letter dated 06.03.2006, the order came to be

passed by this Court since it has been the admitted case of the third Respondent that the Petitioners were employed during the relevant point of

time namely 12.08.1993, 03.08.1993, 10.09.1993 and 09.08.1993 and on the crucial date namely 01.10.1996 they were in employment.

Unfortunately, the third Respondent who has chosen to raise the present point of discrepancy in the letters as stated above, has not chosen to raise

anything about that in the writ petition and even in the grounds of appeal filed it was not raised, even though third Respondent has stated that the

Petitioners were not employed at the relevant point of time.

12.

In such view of the matter, in my considered view, it is certainly not open to the third Respondent to raise the new issue at the stage of the

contempt proceedings. Even otherwise, as I have stated that on a perusal of the original records produced by the third Respondent, there is

certainly some clue to show that what is stated by the Petitioners is substantially true but the point to be decided is not that in the contempt

proceedings.

13.

Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is as follows:

20.

Limitation for actions for contempt: No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry

of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

14.

The period of limitation prescribed for initiating proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, is within one year from the date of when the

cause of action for contempt arises. It was in T. Deen Dayal Vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh, , the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that if due

to the conduct of the contemnors, the proceedings could not be initiated for contempt, such period has to be taken into consideration in cases

where contempt petition is filed beyond one year period. The relevant portion of the said judgment is as follows:

14.

Lastly, it was argued that the petition was barred by time u/s 20 of the Act. As rightly pointed out by the High Court Section 20 of the Act

merely provides for limitation to initiate the proceedings and not for the conclusion of contempt proceedings. The proceedings were initiated by

order dated 16.04.1985 whereas the allegations constituting contempt were contained in an affidavit filed on 27.03.1985. Therefore, the time

taken for disposal beyond one year partly on account of the Appellant himself, as pointed out earlier cannot be permitted to argue that the

application was barred by limitation.

15.

The construction of Section 20 has also been explained by the Hon''ble Apex Court in Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian and Others, , as follows:

44.

Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo moto by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the

court''s own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court

itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the

proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice

suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

16.

In Om Prakash Jaiswal Vs. D.K. Mittal and Another [OVERRULED], , it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, does not apply and

Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the Court to initiate proceedings of contempt. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is as follows:

15.

In the cases contemplated by (i) or (ii) above, it cannot be said that any proceedings for contempt have been initiated. Filing of an application

or petition for initiating proceedings for contempt or a mere receipt of such reference by the court does not amount to initiation of the proceedings

by court. On receiving any such document it is usual with the courts to commence some proceedings by employing an expression such as ""admit"",

rule"", ""issue notice"" or ""issue notice to show cause why proceedings for contempt be not initiated"". In all such cases the notice is issued either in

routine or because the court has not yet felt satisfied that a case for initiating any proceedings for contempt has been made out and therefore the

court calls upon the opposite party to admit or deny the allegations made or to collect more facts so as to satisfy itself if a case for initiating

proceedings for contempt was made out. Such a notice is certainly anterior to initiation. The tenor of the notice is itself suggestive of the fact that in

spite of having applied its mind to the allegations and the material placed before it the court was not satisfied of the need for initiating proceedings

for contempt; it was still desirous of ascertaining facts or collecting further material whereon to formulate such opinion. It is only when the court has

formed an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating proceedings for contempt is made out and that the Respondents or the alleged contemners

should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished; then the court can be said to have initiated proceedings for contempt. It is

the result of a conscious application of the mind of the court to the facts and material before it. Such initiation of proceedings for contempt based

on application of mind by the court to the facts of the case and the material before it must take place within a period of one year from the date on

which the contempt is alleged to have been committed failing which the jurisdiction to initiate any proceedings for contempt is lost. The heading of

Section 20 is ""limitation for actions for contempt"". Strictly speaking, this section does not provide limitation in the sense in which the term is

understood in the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act also does not, therefore, apply. Section 20 strikes at the jurisdiction of the court

to initiate any proceedings for contempt.

17.

On the facts of the present case, even according to the Petitioners, the contempt complained of is based on the order of the third Respondent,

dated 27.02.2007. When that is the cause of action, the Petitioners themselves have issued a legal notice against the Respondents for initiating

contempt only on 20.10.2009 which is beyond one year from the date of the act of the third Respondent. Even though in the notice, it is stated that

the Petitioners have approached the Respondents several times, it was dragged on, there is absolutely nothing on record to show that it was by the

conduct of the third Respondent, the Petitioners were made to believe that the order of this Court will be implemented so as to justify, that the

contempt petitions were not filed within one year from the date of the passing of the order by the third Respondent dated 27.02.2007. On record it

is clear that the Petitioners have filed contempt before this Court on 17.11.2009. Therefore, even if this Court holds that there is some substance in

the contention raised by the Petitioners, it is by virtue of the conduct of the Petitioners in not approaching the court within the period of limitation

prescribed by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is not possible to entertain the contempt petition filed by the Petitioners. It is for the Petitioners

to work out their remedies in the manner known to law based on the order of the third Respondent dated 27.02.2007. Further, it is relevant to

point out that in the contempt proceedings such probe about the fraud alleged by the third Respondent cannot be looked into and what is required

is as to whether there has been an intentional violation or disobedience of the order of the Court, of course, subject to the party coming to the

court within the period of limitation prescribed under the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, I am of the considered view that on the point of

limitation, the Petitioners are not entitled for any indulgence in the contempt proceedings.

18.

In such view of the matter, leaving it open to the Petitioners to work out their remedies against the order passed by the third Respondent,

dated 27.02.2007, the contempt proceedings against the Respondents are dropped. Accordingly, the contempt petition stands dismissed. No

costs.