Bakhtawar Singh Bishan Singh vs The State of Pepsu

Teja Singh, C.J.—Bakhtawar Singh who was arrested under the orders of the District Magistrate, Sangrur and was detained u/s 3, Preventive Detention Act, has made a petition, u/s 491, Code of Criminal Procedure for his release. Several grounds have been taken in the petition, but the only one urged before me is that the grounds-of detention supplied to the Petitioner were vague and consequently the order of detention was illegal. Since this ground by itself goes. to the root of the case, it is not necessary for me to go into other points taken in the petition.

The first ground of detention was that a. group of dacoits consisting of Kripal and others was at large and was engaged in committing dacoities, murders and other" heinous crimes in the ilaqa of police station Longowal and other villages of Sangrur, Bhatinda and Barnala districts and as a result of the nefarious activities of the said gang, residents of the said police stations were terror-stricken and public order was seriously disturbed. The second ground was that from the material in possession of the District Magistrate he was satisfied that the Petitioner had formed a party with two of his relatives the object of which was to harbour the said gang of dacoits, afford them protection and give them food, with the result that the police was being seriously handicapped in arresting the dacoits. The remaining two grounds, i.e. grounds 3 and 4 related to incidents alleged to have happened on 24-12-1952 and 4-1-1953 when the detenu harboured the dacoits mentioned above, supplied them tea, meals, liquor etc. and the dacotts requested one of the Petitioner''s relatives for supply of cartridges. The Petitioner''s counsel argued that since the first two grounds were altogether vague and indefinite and it was impossible for the Petitioner to make a representation in regard to them, the order of detention made on the basis thereof was not-legal.

Mr. Chetan Das, learned Counsel for the State, took up the position that the first ground did not constitute a ground of detention at all. He argued that it merely referred to certain facts which when taken into consideration along with the facts referred to in the other grounds, explained the reason why the Petitioner had been detained. In my opinion this contention is devoid of force, because in the grounds of detention supplied to the Petitioner by the District Magistrate at the time he was detained, which have been placed on record by the Petitioner and the correctness of which is not denied by Mr. Chetan Dass, four grounds of detention are given and the first relates to the existence of the group of dacoits consisting of Chiri and others. The opening words OF the document supplied to the Petitioner are,

In pursuance of the provisions of Section 7, Preventive Detention Act, 1950 as amended up-to-date, you, (Then Follows the name of the Petitioner) are hereby informed that the grounds of your detention ordered by me u/s 3 of the said Act are as follows",

and after this are given the four grounds including the one mentioned above which is described as No. 1. But even if we assume that the first is not a real ground of detention, the same cannot be said with regard to the second ground and after reading it I have not the slightest hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it is vague and indefinite inasmuch as it gives no particulars except stating that according to the material in the possession of the District Magistrate the Petitioner had formed a party with his other relatives the object of which was to harbour dacoits etc.

The question now is what is the effect of the vagueness of the two grounds. Previously the view taken by this Court and some other High Courts was that when a person is detained on a number of grounds but one of the grounds is beyond the scope of the Act, even though other grounds are not vitiated by that defect, the order of detention should be regarded as legal, but when one or two grounds out of the number of grounds supplied to the Petitioner are merely vague and indefinite, the legality of the order is not affected provided there are other grounds which are definite and specific. In view, however, of what has now been held by the Supreme Court in - Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj Vs. The State of Delhi and Others, this view cannot be regarded as correct. In that case it was urged by the detenu''s counsel that one of the grounds of his detention was extremely vague and gave no particulars to enable the detenu to make an adequate representation against the order of detention and thus infringed the constitutional safeguard provided in Article 22(5). The learned Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the Bench made the following observations on this point:

On the interpretation of Article 22(5) two questions arise for consideration; first whether the ground mentioned in sub-para (c) is so vague as to render it difficult if not impossible, for the Petitioner to make an adequate representation to the appropriate authorities and second, if it is vague, whether would infringe the constitutional safeguard provided in Article 22(5)(a).

As regards the first question his Lordship held that the ground with which he was dealing was vague. As regards the second question this is what he remarked:

On the second question, there is no considered pronouncement by this Court, though in some cases it would appear to have been assumed, in the absence of any argument, that one or two vague grounds could not affect the validity of the detention where there are other sufficiently clear and definite grounds to support the detention.

Then he referred to the counsel''s argument that because the ground was vague prejudice would be caused to the Petitioner and added:

The question however is not whether the Petitioner will in fact be prejudicially elected in the matter of securing his release by his representation, but whether his constitutional safeguard has been infringed. Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the Petitioner has the right under Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court (by majority) to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him. We are of the opinion that; this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each ground communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under Clause (6) of Article 22. That not having been done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-para (e) of para of the statement of grounds the Petitioner''s detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 21. The Petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.

These observations clearly lay down that all the grounds supplied to the Petitioner must be clear and specific and even if one of them does not satisfy this condition the right of representation guaranteed to the detenu is affected and consequently the order of detention is illegal. In the present case, as I have already pointed out, out of four points two are vague and indefinite. Accordingly following the principle laid down in the Supreme Court case I hold that the order detaining the present Petitioner was illegal and allowing his petition direct that he be released forthwith.