Jangir Singh vs State of Pepsu

Teja Singh, C.J.—On 23-1-52 Jangir Singh and four other persons, whose names are given in the margin, were ordered to be detained u/s 3, Preventive Detention Act, and they were all actually arrested on 26-1-1952. They have now made separate petitions u/s 491, Cr.P.Code, and Article 226 of the Constitution of India for their release. Since the points raised in the petitions are common they will be disposed of by one order.

On the last hearing it was urged by the Petitioners'' counsel that since the Government fixed the period of the Petitioners'' detention upto 31-3-1952 and the Preventive Detention Act was to remain in force upto that date, the orders of detention in respect of them came to an end on that day and the Petitioners are, therefore, entitled to be released. To this the reply of Mr. Chetan Dass, counsel for the State, was that by virtue of the Preventive Detention (Amendment) Act of 1952 the life of the principal Act has been extended to the end of October, 1952 and according to Section 3 of the amending Act the ''Petitioners'' detention ''ipso facto'' remains in force so long as the principal Act is in force unless the Government revokes or modifies the order which it has not done so far. The words of Section 3 are:

Every detention order confirmed u/s 11 of the principal Act and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall have effect as if it had been confirmed under the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act; and accordingly, where the period of detention is either not specified in such detention order or specified (by what-ever form of words) to be for the duration of until the expiry of the principal Act, or until the 31st day, of March, 1952, such detention order shall continue to remain in force for so long as the principal Act is in force, but without prejudice to the power of the appropriate Government to revoke or modify it at any time.

It is not denied on behalf of the Petitioners that their detention order was confirmed u/s 11 of the principal Act and it was in force at the time the amending Act was passed It is also admitted that the Government has not considered it fit to revoke or modify that order, In the circumstances the period of their detention which was to last upto 31-3-1952 is now extended upto the time for which the principal Act is now to remain in force i.e., the end of October, 1952.

As regards the legality of the Petitioners'' order of detention the point stressed the most before me was that the grounds of detention-supplied to the Petitioners were vague and outside the scope of the Act. The first ground is:

From the material in its possession the Government is satisfied that you are constantly engaged in instigating the tenants of the village Khatriwala to take forcible possession of the lands of the Biswedars of the said village.

Counsel argued that since no particulars of the Petitioners'' activities were given, it was not possible for them to make any representation showing that the ground was false and consequently the requirement of law that the ground should be such as to enable the detenu to make an effective representation against his detention was not satisfied. The position taken up by Mr. Chetan Dass, counsel for the State, was that all that the Government was required to do was to furnish the. detenu with grounds of detention and it was not necessary for them either to supplement the grounds with facts or particulars. In this connection he drew my attention to an unpublished decision of a Bench of the Punjab High Court - ''Madan Lal v. State'', and a ruling of the Supreme Court - Dr. N.B. Khare Vs. The State of Delhi, In my opinion, the facts of the Supreme Court case are quite distinguishable and that ruling does not apply to this case. As regards the Punjab-case there are certain observations made by the learned Judges that go to support Mr. Chetan Dass''s contention, but with all deference-I am inclined to think that they go very far and even though the Government is not bound to supply the facts and particulars of the detenu''s acts, on the basis of which it forms the satisfaction that it is necessary to make. a detention order with a view to preventing; the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to public peace, etc., merely saying that the detenu is constantly engaged in doing something without telling him anything further falls short of the requirements of law, because it does not give any information to the detenu which he can controvert and show that there exist no grounds for his detention. Accordingly I hold that the first ground is vague.

As regards the second ground which relates to the Petitioners'' visiting a particular village and inciting the tenants not to give Batai to the Biswedars and in giving beating to some of them in the process of intimidating them, all that the Petitioners'' counsel urged was that it was not correct. In case of Jangir Singh Petitioner he also urged that since he belonged to the very village which he and others were alleged to have visited it had no meaning, because he lived and worked in that village. In my opinion, there is no force in either objection because I have already held] in several cases that it is not within the scope of this petition to inquire into the truth or falsehood of the grounds and there is nothing unnatural in a man''s visiting his own place, for the simple reason that he may not be living there permanently and may be going there off and on. The ground definitely accused the Petitioners of inciting the tenants not to give Batai to Biswedars, of intimidating them and also of beating some of them. I have no hesitation in holding that these acts could well give rise to the belief that the Petitioners indulged in unlawful activities and it was necessary to keep them under detention with a view to preserving public order. Accordingly I hold that the ground was neither Vague nor was it beyond the scope, of the Act.

The third ground was more explicit than the second. It was to the effect that the Petitioners along with other persons called the biswedars of village Khatriwala on the evening of 10-10-1951, asked them to leave the village within five days and instigated the tenants of the village to forcibly take hold of the maize and Narma crops of the biswedars whose names are mentioned in the ground which they actually did. I do not find any-thing vague in the ground nor do I think that it was not within the scope of the Act. This means that out of the'' three grounds two were in order, but one was vague, but as was held by a Bench of this Court in -''Gurbakash Singh v. State'' AIR 1952 Pepsu 126 if one out of the several grounds is vague but the others are in order the legality of the detention order is not affected thereby.

The second point urged by the Petitioners'' counsel was that the authority who made the orders of detention was not satisfied regarding the necessity of making the orders. According to the affidavits of S. Balwant Singh, Deputy Secretary, who authenticated the orders of detention, the orders were made by the Chief Minister. It was mentioned in S. Balwant Singh''s affidavits that he placed the entire material before the Chief Minister and on the basis of that material the Chief Minister satisfied himself that it was necessary to detain the Petitioners with a view to preventing them from acting in a manner prejudicial to public order, etc. Counsel argued that since it was the satisfaction of the person who made the order of detention that was necessary, S. Balwant Singh''s affidavits had no meaning and the State should have placed on record the affidavits of the Chief Minister. Had this been the Petitioners case as presented in the petitions that the orders for their detention were illegal for want of satisfaction, I would hove certainly insisted that satisfaction of the authority who made the orders of detention should be proved but the petitions being silent on the point I am not prepared to hold that because no affidavit of the Chief Minister who made the orders of detention had been produced, it should be held that he was not satisfied in the words of Section 3. Counsel referred me to certain observations made by me in -'' Hari Singh v. State'' AIR 1951 Pepsu 126 (C), but that case was decided on its own facts and the question of the want of satisfaction of the authority who made the order of detention was raised at the, outset. I may also mention that it was held by me in that case that onus to prove that the authority who makes the order of detention is satisfied about the necessity of detention in the words of Section 3 lies upon the State, but when an order duly authenticated by a compel tent authority is produced and it is mention ed in that order that the order was made after the authority was satisfied the onus shifts to the Petitioner. In this case, a duly authenticated copy of the order has been placed on record by the State so the onus to prove that there was no satisfaction in the words of Section 3 shifted to the Petitioners and they have not been able to discharge it.

Then it was urged by the Petitioners, counsel that the orders of detention were mala fide and were made for a collateral purpose The argument of the Petitioners'' counsel was that since cases u/s 379, I.P.C. in respect of the acts alleged to have been committed by the Petitioners which formed the subject-matter of ground No 3, had been put in court, the object of detaining them was to prejudice them in the trial of those cases and not to prevent them from doing anything pre judicial to public safety or order. Counsel also argued that when a person commits an unlawful act which amounts to an offence it is open to the Government either to prosecute the man under the ordinary Law for commit ting the offence or to order his detention and when once the choice is exercised and a prosecution is launched in a criminal court, it is not legal on the part of the Government to order the man to be detained under the Detention Act on the basis of the same act.

As regards the legal aspect of the matter, I had the occasion to discuss it in ''Giani Bachan Singh v. District Magistrate Sangrur'' Cri. Misc. No. 62 of 1951 (D), and recently in another case -''Ishar Singh v. The State'' AIR 1953 Pepsu 111 (E), where I held that it cannot be stated as a rule of law that when a person is accused of an offence, the only alternative is to prosecute him, and there is no legal authority to detain him and further that the right to prosecute a person under the ordinary criminal law and the right to detain him are mutually exclusive. After hearing the Petitioners'' counsel in the present case, I find no reason to change the view that 1 formed in the above mentioned cases,

As regards the question whether an order is made for a collateral purpose, if has to be decided on the facts of each particular case, and so far as the present Petitioners are concerned, they have not been able to substantiate their allegation. It is admitted by their counsel that cases u/s 379, I.P.C., were started at the instance of the Biswedars and the Government had nothing to do with them, Apart from this, it has not been shown how the orders of detention prejudiced them in the defence of those cases. Moreover, out of the two grounds of detention which I have held to be legal, only one relates to the Petitioners'' acts for which they were prosecuted This means, that even if we ignore that ground the orders for their detention could still be based on the other ground.

The result is that the petitions and are dismissed,