Baldev Mittar Khullar and others vs State of Punjab and others

Pritpal Singh, J.

There are twentyfive members of the Municipal Committee, Batala. Eighteen out of those members are the petitioners. Raghubir Chand Puri, respondent No. 2, is the President of the Municipal Committee. The petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 10, 12, 13 and 17 moved a requisition to respondent No. 2 under section 25 of the Punjab Municipal Act (hereinafter called the Act) requesting him to convene a special meeting of the Municipal Committee to consider the question of ''No Confidence Motion'' against him. A copy of the requisition is (Annexure P.1). This requisition was received by respondent No. 2 on August 24, 1983. This respondent directed on September 6, 1983 for the convening of the meeting on October 17, 1983. According to the petitioners the convening of the meeting, for a date beyond 14 days from the receipt of the requisition by respondent No. 2, violated section 25 of the Act. Their contention is that this statutory period of 14 days expired on September 7, 1983 and since respondent No. 2 fixed October 17, 1983 as the date of the meeting, the requisitionists themselves convened a special meeting on September 16, 1983 at 3.00 p.m. at the Town Hall, Batala. Eighteen out of 25 members attended the meeting and they passed a resolution of ''No Confidence'' against respondent No. 2 by a more than 2/3rd majority of the total strength of the Municipal Committee. A copy of the proceedings of this meeting is Annexure P.6. These proceedings were conveyed to the Punjab Government through its Secretary, Department of Local Government, on the following day. A copy of the relevant letter is Annexure P.7. It is averred by the petitioners that they have learnt that the Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, respondent No. 5, had passed an order prohibiting the holding of the meeting dated September 16, 1983 in exercise of his powers under section 232 of the Act. It is submitted that the Deputy Commissioner had no power to pass this order and it has no effect upon the resolution of ''No Confidence'' passed against respondent No. 2 in that meeting. The case of the petitioner is that in terms of section 22 of the Act the ''No Confidence Motion'' passed against respondent No. 2 has the effect of his immediate suspension. Since respondent No. 2 is continuing to function in the office of the President and he has not so far been removed from the office by the State of Punjab, respondent No.1, the petitioners have claimed a writ of quo warranto restraining respondent No. 2 from acting as President of the Municipal Committee, Batala, and a writ of mandamus directing the State of Punjab, respondent No. 1, to remove respondent No. 2 from the office of the President. Respondents No. 3 and 4 have also been impleaded on the plea that they are related to respondent No. 2 and they form one group which is pressurising the State Administration not to take any action against respondent No. 2 in pursuance of the aforesaid resolution of ''No Confidence''.

Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 contested the writ petition. The Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, respondent No. 5, did not file any written statement. The case of the contesting respondents is that the meeting dated September 16, 1983 in which the aforesaid ''No Confidence'' resolution was passed against respondent No. 2, and the Punjab Government was requested to remove him from the office of the President of the Municipal Committee, having been forbidden by the Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, in exercise of his powers under section 232 of the Act, was illegal and void ab initio and as such the resolution passed in this meeting is ineffective in the eye of law. It is further contended that respondent No. 2 having convened the meeting of October 17, 1983 on the requisition received from the requisitionists, no such meeting could be held on September 16, 1983. Another objection taken by the respondents is that it was incumbent upon the petitioners to have forwarded the resolution passed by them on September 16, 1983 to the Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, under section 30 of the Act and as they did not comply with the requirement of this section the said resolution is meaningless and superfluous. It is also contended that the order of the Deputy Commissioner prohibiting the holding of the meeting on September 16, 1983 can be challenged only by the Municipal Committee as a corporate body and not by the petitioners. It is, therefore, said that the petitioners have no locus standi to file this writ petition.

The first point which arose for consideration is regarding the validity of the convening of the special meeting by the requistionists on September 16, 1983. It is argued by the learned respondents counsel that a meeting having been already called for October 17, 1983 in pursuance of the requisition, the requisitionists were not competent to themselves convene a meeting on September 16, 1983. This objection has no merit and is, therefore, unacceptable. Section 25(2) of the Act provides that on a requisition made in writing by not less than the 1/5th of the members of the Committee the President or in his absence of VicePresident has to convene an ordinary or a special meeting. Subsection (3) of section 25 which is relevant for our purpose is reproduced below :

" If the President or the VicePresident, as the case may be, fails to call a meeting of the Committee within a period of fourteen days from the date of receipt of requisition, the members who had signed the requisition may convene a meeting of the Committee in accordance with the byelaws of the Committee within a period of thirty days of the making of such requisition and notwithstanding anything contained in this Act such meeting shall be deemed to be validly convened meeting."

Subsection (3) makes it clear that if the President or the VicePresident, as the case may be, fails to call a meeting of the Committee within a period of 14 days from the date of receipt of requisition, the requistionists are competent to convene a meeting of the Committee within a period of thirty days of the making of such requisition and such meeting shall be deemed to be validly convened meeting. In the present case the requisition was received by the President, respondent No. 2, on August 24, 1983. It was, therefore, incumbent upon him to hold a meeting of the Committee within a period of fourteen days from the date of receipt of requisition. This statutory period of fourteen days expired on September 7, 1983. Admittedly, respondent No. 2 fixed the date of the holding of the meeting as October 17, 1983 which as much beyond the expiry of fourteen days. The requisitionists were, therefore, competent under subsection (3) to hold a meeting within a period of thirty days of the making of the requisition. In conformity with subsection (3) the requisitionists held a meeting on September 16, 1983 which was within thirty days of the making of the requisition. This meeting has, therefore, to be deemed to be a validly convened meeting in terms of section 25(3) of the Act.

The argument of the learned respondents counsel is that on interpretation of section 25(3) of the Act the respondent No. 2, was only duty bound to issue a direction for the holding of the meeting within a period of fourteen days from the date of the receipt of requisition and that it was not necessary that the meeting should have been held within those fourteen days. This interpretation is erroneous. The word ''convene'' used in subsection (3) cannot be equated with mere issue of direction for calling a meeting. On the contrary it means the fixing of a meeting or holding of a meeting within the prescribed period. In this context a reference to section 9 of the Gram Panchayat Act will make the position clear. Subsection (3) of this section provides that an application regarding intention to move a motion of no confidence against a Sarpanch may be made to the Block Development and Panchayat Officer by a simple majority of the total number of Panches of the Gram Panchayat concerned. Subsection (4) lays down that the Block Development and Panchayat Officer shall, then, within a period of fifteen days of the receipt of application under subsection (3) convene a meeting of the Gram Panchayat. In subsection (4) also the word ''convene'' has been used. A Division Bench of this Court in Harbans Lal v. Director Gram Panchayats and Development, Punjab and another, 1981 P.L.J. 538, equated the words ''convening of meeting'' with ''holding of meeting.'' In that case a notice of no confidence ''against the Sarpanch was delivered to the Block Development and Panchayat Officer on October 15, 1980. The Block Development and Panchayat Officer directed for holding meeting of the Gram Panchayat to consider the ''no confidence'' motion for November 5, 1980 which was beyond fifteen days of the receipt of notice of ''no confidence''. In such circumstances it was clearly held that according to subsection (4) of section 9 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1952, the Block Development and Panchayat Officer has to fix the meeting within the period of fifteen days on the receipt of such an application. As the date of the fixation of the meeting was beyond fifteen days it was considered to have violated section 9(4) and consequently the entire action was quashed. In the present case on the same analogy as the date of the fixation of the meeting was beyond fourteen days of the receipt of requisition it was in violation of the mandatory provisions of section 25(3) of the Act and as such the requisitionists were competent to hold a meeting on their own within a period of thirty days of the making of the requisition. Manifestly, therefore, the meeting held by the petitioners on September 16, 1983 must be held to be a validly convened meeting.

The next point for determination is whether the Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur, had the requisite jurisdiction under section 232 of the Act to prohibit the holding of the meeting on September 16, 1983 convened by the requisitionists. A copy of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is Annexure R.1. The Deputy Commissioner formed an opinion that if the meeting was held on September 16, 1983 it was likely to lead to breach of peace. He, therefore passed an order prohibiting the holding of meeting in exercise of powers which he thought were conferred upon him under section 232 of the Act. To ascertain the validity of the order Annexure R.1 it is essential to understand the scope of section 232 which is reproduced as follows :

"232. Powers to suspend any resolution or order of Committee The Deputy Commissioner may by order in writing, suspend the execution of any resolution or order of a Committee or joint Committee or prohibit the doing of any act which is about to be done or is being done in pursuance of or under cover of this Act, or in pursuance of any sanction or permission granted by the Committee in the exercise of its powers under the Act, if, in his opinion the resolution, order or act is in excess of the powers conferred by law or contrary to the interests of the public or likely, to cause waste or damage of municipal funds or property, or the execution of the resolution or order, or the doing of the act, is likely to lead to a breach of the peace, to encourage lawlessness or to cause injury or annoyance to the public or to any class or body of persons."

This section gives very wide powers of supervision and control to the Deputy Commissioner but requires a careful reading. It enables the Deputy Commissioner to suspend the execution of resolution or order of a Committee or to prohibit the doing of an act which is being done or is about to be done in pursuance of a sanction given by the Committee under this Act. The vital question to be answered is of the convening of the meeting by the requisitionists under section 25(3) of the Act is to be considered as "act" as envisaged by section 232. In my considered opinion the answer must be in the negative. The suspension of a resolution and the prohibition of the doing of an act must be taken to be similar things bound by similar limitations. If the Municipal Committee passes a resolution its execution can be suspended by the Deputy Commissioner. Similarly, if some order is passed by the Municipal Committee its implementation can be prohibited by the Deputy Commissioner. However, the statutory right of the requisitionists under section 25(3) of the Act to convene a meeting to consider a ''no confidence'' motion against the President cannot be deemed to be an act of the Municipal Committee as understood by section 232. The order of the Deputy Commissioner must be encompassed within the four corners of the section and it would not include power to prohibit the convening of a meeting of the Municipal Committee by the requisitionists under section 25(3) of the Act. Convening of a meeting under section 25 of the Act and passing of a resolution in the meeting so convened are facts of the same transaction. It is a statutory right of the Municipal Committee to call a meeting and pass a particular resolution. This function pertains to the daytoday affairs of the Committee. Section 232 of the Act does not authorise the Deputy Commissioner to interfere in such daytoday affairs of the Committee. Supreme Court in Shri Subhash Chandra and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 1275, has held in unambiguous terms that section 232 does not empower the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the Municipal Committee from passing a resolution. In other words the Deputy Commissioner has no authority to forbid the Municipal Committee to call a meeting for passing a particular kind of resolution. Thus, upon its true construction of section 232 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner cannot be deemed to have jurisdiction to prohibit the convening of a meeting of the Municipal Committee either under subsection (2) or subsection (3) of the section 25 of the Act. In this view of the matter the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Annexure R.1) is without jurisdiction and the petitioners were competent to ignore the same. By this order the resolution of no confidence passed by the petitioners against respondent No. 2 in the meeting held on September 16, 1983 is not affected and this resolution cannot be considered illegal and void.

The next contention of the learned respondents counsel is that the resolution of no confidence against the President Municipal Committee was required to be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner under section 30 of the Act and as the requirement of this section was not complied with the said resolution is ineffective and superfluous. I am not convinced by this contention. The purpose of enacting section 30 of the Act obviously is that resolutions passed at any meeting of a Committee should be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner within three days from the date of the meeting because under section 231 of the Act the Deputy Commissioner exercises control over the functioning of the Municipal Committee. If the Deputy Commissioner forms an opinion that any particular resolution is in excess of powers conferred by law or contrary to the interest of the public or likely to cause waste or damage of the municipal funds or property or the execution of the resolution is likely to lead to breach of the peace or to encourage lawlessness or to cause injury or annoyance to the public, he is authorised under section 232 of the Act to suspend the execution of the resolution. Thus, section 30 is applicable to the resolutions passed by the Municipal Committee its daytoday functioning. It seems to have no application to a resolution under section 22 of the Act requesting the removal of a President or a VicePresident of a Municipal Committee passed by 2/3rd of the members of the Committee. Such a resolution is beyond the supervisory powers of the Deputy Commissioner because it is specifically provided in the first proviso to section 22 of the Act that "if a resolution requesting the removal of the President or the VicePresident is passed by twothirds of the members of the Committee, the President or, as the case may be, the VicePresident shall be deemed to be under suspension immediately after such resolution is passed."

It is manifest that such a resolution cannot be interfered with by the Deputy Commissioner and the inevitable consequence of the passing of such a resolution is that the President or the VicePresident as the case may be, shall be deemed to be under suspension immediately. The procedure to be adopted after the suspension is laid down in the second proviso of section 22 in the following terms :

"Provided further that before the State Government notifies his removal, the reason for his proposal removed shall be communicated to him by means of a registered letter in which he shall be invited to tender within 21 days an explanation in writing and if no such explanation is received in the office of the appropriate Secretary of the Government within 21 days of the despatch of the said letter, the State Government may proceed to notify his removal".

This second proviso leaves no doubt that action regarding removal of the President or the VicePresident of the Committee is to be taken in accordance therewith by the State Government without the intervention of the Deputy Commissioner. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that compliance of section 30 is not necessary in the case of a resolution requesting the removal of the President or the VicePresident under section 22 of the Act. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that the noncompliance of section 30 in the instant case does not vitiate the resolution Annexure P.6.

The objection of the respondents that the order of the Deputy Commissioner under section 232 of the Act can be challenged only by the Municipal Committee as a corporate body and not by the petitioners, has evidently to be brushed aside because it has been held that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Annexure R.1) is without jurisdiction. Had the order been lawful, the merits of this objection could have been gone into. As the matter stands the objection, on the face of it, is untenable.

The sum and substance of the above, discussion is that the resolution Annexure P.6 requesting the removal of respondent No. 2 from the office of the President passed by twothirds majority of the members of the Committee is perfectly lawful having been passed in a validly convened meeting. The immediate result of this resolution is that respondent No. 2 shall be deemed to be under suspension.

For aforementioned reasons this petition is allowed. Respondent No. 2 Raghubir Chand Puri being under suspension is restrained from acting as President of the Municipal Committee, Batala. Respondent No. 1, State of Punjab, is directed to proceed in accordance with the provisions of second proviso to section 22 of the Act, within a period of three months, in the wake of the resolution Annexure P.6 wherein removal of respondent No.2 from the office of the President of the Municipal Committee has been requested by twothirds of the members of the Municipal Committee. No order as to costs.