Ram Singh vs State of Punjab and Others

Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.—The petitioner, a former President of Nagar Panchayat, Cheema, prays that the resolution of no confidence dated April 9, 1997 passed by the Municipal Committee and the notification dated January 14, 1998 issued by the State Government by which he has been removed front the office of President, be quashed. A few facts may be noticed.

On December 16, 1994 the petitioner was elected as President of the Nagar Panchayat, on April 9, 1997 a meeting for consideration of the motion of no confidence against the petitioner was called. The Deputy Commissioner sent a wireless message for the postponement of the meeting. Irrespective of that, the Municipal councillors met and the motion of no confidence was passed. On August 12, 1997 the State Government issued a show cause Notice to the petitioner calling upon him to explain as to why he be not removed from the Presidentship of the Nagar Panchayal. The petitioner submitted his reply on September 5, 1997. Vide notification dated January 14, 1998 the Government ordered the petitioner''s removal. Hence this petition. The petitioner challenges the impugned action on a twofold basis. Firstly, it is alleged that the Deputy Commissioner had stayed the meeting. The Municipal Councillors had no right to meet and pass the resolution. Secondly, it is alleged that the impugned action is vitiated as Mr. Bhagwan Dass Arora, M.L.A. had voted in favour of the resolution. The petitioner alleges that in view of the provisions of Section 20, an associate member could not have cast his vote.

A written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. It has been inter alia averred that the Nagar Panchayat consists of 12 members. The resolution had been passed on April 9, 1997 by 8 members. Since the resolution had been passed by 2/3rd members of the Committee, the petitioner was deemed to be under suspension immediately after the resolution was passed. It has been further pointed out that the provisions of Section 20 had been amended and that the disqualification which attached to an associate member docs not subsist.

Learned counsel for the parties have been heard.

Mr. G. C. Dhuriwala, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that in view of the provisions of Section 232 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the Deputy Commissioner had the power to stop "the doing of the act" which means that he could have restrained the Committee from meeting to consider the motion of no confidence. Since the Deputy Commissioner had admittedly sent a wireless message, the Committee could not have met on April 9, 1997 and passed the resolution of no confidence against the petitioner. The claim has been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents. They have also relief upon two decisions of this Court reported in Baldev Mittar Khullar v. The State of Punjab, 1984 PLJ 264 and Kala Ram Vs. State of Punjab and others,

A copy of the resolution passed by the Nagar Panchayat on April 9, 1997 is on record as Annexure P-1. A perusal of this resolution shows that the wireless message was received from the Deputy Commissioner "during the meeting". The members had considered the matter and decided that there was no need to postpone the consideration of the matter. Since the meeting had already commenced, the proceedings had continued and the resolution was passed.

Did the members act in violation of law?

In Kala Ram''s case (supra) a Division Bench has categorically held that the District Magistrate has no power "under any provision in the Municipal Act to postpone the meeting of the members of the Municipal Committee". We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Bench. Even otherwise the power of the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the doing of any act cannot take within its ambit the right of the members of the Committee to meet and decide. Still further, the resolution having been passed in April 1997, the Deputy Commissioner never invoked1 his power u/s 232 to suspend the resolution. In fact, the Government proceeded to act u/s 22 which was in conformity with law.

Taking the sequence of events into consideration, we are unable to hold that the action of the Committee in conducting the proceeding son April 9, 1997 was in violation of any valid order u/s 232 of the Act. The Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to postpone the meeting. His directions were not within the ambit of the aforesaid provision.

No other point has been raised.

In view of the above, we find no ground to interfere.

The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.