High Courts

Baldev Singh vs State of Haryana

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 25 August 1983 · Citation: (1984) ILR (P&H) 263 : (1984) PLJ 84 : (1984) RRR 289

HON’BLE JUDGES
Pritpal Singh, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 216 of 1977
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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 1,194 words

Pritpal Singh, J.—Baldev Singh, petitioner has sought the relief of quashing of order dated 12.7.1976 of the Land Acquisition Collector, Panchkula Urban Estate, Haryana, Chandigarh (Annexure P.1) whereby it was directed that payment of compensation regarding the Ghair Mumkin land in the nature of Rasta and Kool, pertaining to acquisition proceedings, be made to Suresh Chand and Asha Devi respondents Nos. 3 and 4 and not to the petitioner.

2.

The relevant facts are that land measuring 57 Kanals 18 Marlas described in paragraph 3 of the writ petition was purchased by the petitioner from respondents Nos 3 and 4. The Haryana Government issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of certain land including the land mentioned above proposing to acquire this land for a public purpose. The land was eventually acquired and an award under section 11 of the Act was given by the Collector on 27.6.1975. By this award the petitioner was held entitled to receive compensation in respect of the aforesaid land purchased by him from respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Thereafter respondents Nos. 3 and 4 moved an application before the Collector on 19.8.1975 stating therein that out of the compensation awarded to the petitioner they were entitled to receive the amount regarding Ghair Mumkin land measuring 6 Kanals 9 Marlas consisting of Rasta and Kool as this area had not been sold by them to the petitioner. In their application they prayed that either the Collector may decide this matter himself or may make a reference to the Court under section 30 of the Act. The Collector embarked upon the enquiry himself and vide impugned order, Annexure P.1, held respondents Nos. 3 and 4 to be entitled to the compensation relating to the said Ghair Mumkin land and ordered that proportionate compensation in respect thereof be paid to them instead of the petitioner. The latter has assailed the legality of this order in the present writ petition and has prayed that it be quashed.

3.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties I am of the firm view that impugned order cannot be sustained. The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that under section 4 a notification is published by the State Government whenever it appears to it that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. Thereafter objections of the interested persons are heard and disposed of by the Collector under section 5A. Then under section 6 another notification is issued by the Government declaring that land is required for a public purpose and in pursuance thereof as provided in section 9 the Collector has to cause pubic notice to be given at convenient places on or near the land to be taken, stating that the Government intends to take possession of the land and that claims to compensation for all interests in such land may be made to him. If any objection is made by any interested party it is heard and disposed of by the Collector and he then makes an award under section 11 of the Act. This award attains finality in view of section 12. The Collector however retains the limited jurisdiction only to correct clerical mistakes in the award in view of section 12A. On making an award under section 11 the Collector is required to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons entitled thereto according to the award under section 31 of the Act. In case of a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment thereof, the Collector has to deposit the amount of compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 has to be made. Section 30 of the Act clearly provides that when the amount of compensation has been settled under section 11, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may make a reference of such dispute to the decision of the Court. These provisions of the Act make it unambiguously clear that after the making of the award under section 11 the Acquisition Collector has no jurisdiction to embark upon an enquiry in case of any dispute arising thereafter as to the apportionment of the compensation or as to the persons to whom the same is payable. If such a dispute arises after the finality of the award under section 12 the only course open to the Acquisition Collector is to refer the dispute to the decision of the Court. In the present case, the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in their application claiming proportionate compensation in respect of the Ghair Mumkin land prayed that the dispute be referred to the Court under section 30. However, the Acquisition Collector illegally assumed the jurisdiction of disposing of the application himself instead of referring the matter of the Court and there can be no doubt that he had no jurisdiction to do so. A bare reading of the impugned order, Annexure P.1, would show that the Acquisition Collector passed this order under section 30 of the Act. He was, however, entirely incompetent under this section to order payment of compensation in favour of respondents Nos. 3 and 4 which was originally awarded to the petitioner. All that he could do was to refer the matter to the Court for decision. The impugned order is, therefore, clearly illegal and without jurisdiction and it deserves to be quashed.

4.

The learned respondent''s counsel placed reliance on the judgment reported as Chennai Sri Ekambareswarar Devastanam by Trustees A.N. Parasuram and others v. Collector and Land Acquisition Officer, Madras, A.I.R. 1966 Madras 385, in support of his contention that even after the making of the Award under section 11, the Acquisition Collector can make a fresh inquiry regarding the apportionment of compensation. A perusal of this judgment would show that the contention is misconceived. The proposition laid down in this judgment is that when the proceedings prior to the making of the Award are tainted with any invalidity the petitioner can claim in a writ petition that since the procedure was not in accordance with law, it should be treated as null and void and a fresh inquiry should be ordered. If the Court finds that the procedure prescribed by law preparatory to the passing of the Award was not followed it can order the making of a fresh inquiry. This judgment talks of the authority of the High Court to ensure that the procedure prescribe by law preparatory to the passing of the Award is faithfully followed by the Acquisition Collector. It does not say that the Acquisition Collector can himself assume this power after his award had become final.

5.

In the light of what is stated above this writ petition succeeds and the impugned order, Annexure P.1 is quashed. It will, however, be open to the Collector to proceed in the matter in accordance with section 30 of the Act. The parties will bear their own costs.