Bhagwan Dass vs State of Haryana

V.S. Aggarwal, J. (Oral)

By this common judgment Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 6895M of 1989 and 6292M of 1989 can conveniently be disposed of together. The facts in both the petitions basically are identical. For the sake of convenience, the facts in the case of Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 6895 of 1989 are being mentioned.

The prosecution case in brief is that on 30.1.1985 at 3.00 p.m. Munshi Ram, Food Inspector inspected the premises of the petitioner at Basai Road, Gurgaon. The petitioner was in possession of 5 kilograms of Red Chilly (Lal Mirch Kutti) in a tin for public sale. The Food Inspector purchased 600 grams of the Chilly. One of the sealed bottles prepared was sent to the Public analyst, Haryana. The sample was found to be adulterated. The sample was again sent to the Director, Central Food Laboratory, Ghaziabad. It was opined that Acid insoluble ash was on the maximum prescribed limit. It was mixed with wheat flour. The complaint was filed in Court on basis of these facts.

The entire prosecution evidence had been recorded and the case had been adjourned for the evidence of the accusedpetitioner and arguments. On 3.5.1989 the Court recorded that the case had been tried as a warrant case without passing any specific order under section 16A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The Court held that there was no escape but to try the case afresh either summarily or as a warrant case. It was decided to try the same as a warrant case. It was adjourned for precharge evidence.

The petitioner''s grievance is that after the entire evidence had been recorded, the learned trial Court was not justified in allowing retrial. He further contended that more than 12 years have expired since the time the sample was taken. Because of the inordinate delay the proceedings as such should be quashed.

The said submission pertaining to the delay must prevail. The decision in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 had set the law into motion. The scope of Article 21 was extended and it was held that expeditious disposal of the cases was an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty. In paragraph 5, it was held:

"Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be ''reasonable, fair or just'' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ''reasonable, fair or just'' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial, we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21."

The same question was considered by a Bench of the Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir and others, 1985 Crl. LJ 584. It was concluded that the word ''trial'' would bring within its sweep the appeal that would be pending against such an order. In paragraph 17 court had held:

"Therefore, there seems to be no option, but to hold that the word ''trial'' in the context of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial includes within its sweep a substantive appeal provided by the Code to the High Court whether against conviction or against acquittal. Thus, it would follow that the constitutional right of speedy trial envisages an equally expeditious conclusion of a substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of the proceedings in the original Court alone."

Subsequently, the Full Bench of Patna High Court in Anurag Baitha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 Patna 274 reiterated that same view and in paragraph 11 it was held :

"If Art. 21 and the right to speedy public trial is not a merely twinkling star in the high heavens to be worshipped and rendered vociferous lipservice only, but indeed is an actually meaningful protective provision, then a fortiori expeditious hearing of substantive appeals against convictions is fairly and squarely within the mandate of the said Article."

There is no reason to take a different view. The facts indicate that 12 years have expired and the petitioner has yet to face the trial which is to begin. He had already faced the trial but the learned trial Court at a belated stage had noted the mistake to allow the trial to begin again, would be adding fuel to the fire. It would defeat the ends of justice implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is in the fitness of things that the proceedings are quashed.

For these reasons, the petitions are allowed and proceedings pending before the trial court are quashed.