Dharambir vs State of Haryana

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

On 26.7.1982 at about 6.30 p.m. Food Inspector S.K. Sharma intercepted the premises of Dharambir petitioner at Rohtak Road, Sonepat. Dharambir was having about 10 kilograms of mixed milk for public sale. Milk was demanded for sample and notice in writing on Form IV prescribed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules was given. The milk was purchased for Rs. 2/. It was divided into three equal parts. 18 drops of formalin 40% were added as preservative in each bottle. The bottles were stoppered and sealed. They were lebelled and then wrapped in strong thick paper. One sealed bottle which bears specimen thumb impression was sent to the public analyst. It was found to be adulterated. It is on these facts that a complaint was filed in the Court at Sonepat.

Petitioner prima facie seeks to quash the complaint and subsequent proceedings alleging that on 13.9.1987 after the evidence was recorded, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat, convicted the petitioner and imposed a sentence of 6 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Court of Session at Sonepat. On 22.5.1989, the appeal was remanded for fresh trial by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sonepat. After the case was remanded, it was adjourned for a number of times. On 20.12.1991, it was listed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat and keeping in view the provisions of Section 326(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court passed the following order :

"The case is fixed for defence and arguments today at which stage it is noticed that the accused was earlier convicted and sentenced by Sh. P.L. Ahuja, the then Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat, vide his judgment dated 30.9.1987, which conviction and sentence was set aside in view of the law laid down in the case titled Lila Krishan v. State of Haryana, 1989(1) PLR 327, on the ground that by virtue of Section 326(5) Criminal Procedure Code, the evidence recorded by one Magistrate cannot be acted upon by the succeeding Magistrate where the offence is being tried summarily. After the remand of the case, a fresh notice of accusation was served by my learned predecessor Shri R.C. Godara, vide his order dated 22.3.1990 on which date two PWs simultaneously present were examined by him and third PW was examined by him on another date i.e. 19.12.1990. None of the three witnesses have thus been examined in my presence and I am, therefore, unable to act upon their testimony. This fact was not brought to the notice of this court earlier by either the G.P.I. or the learned counsel for the accused after my having joined as CJM, Sonepat, w.e.f. 14.2.1991. In this view of the matter, all the PWs are ordered to be reexamined and be summoned accordingly for 29.1.1992."

It is alleged that there has been inordinate delay in the disposal of the case. It causes prejudice and almost 15 years have expired while the trial is still going on in the Court against the petitioner.

In the reply filed, the petition has been contested. The reason for delay given was that the Lawyers were on strike at Sonepat from August 1990 to December 1990. Under these circumstances, the delay occurred. It was further held that there was no ground for quashing the proceedings.

The sole submission made at the time of arguments was that there has been inordinate delay. Almost 15 years have expired in the zigzag procedural errors and still the trial is pending with the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Sonepat. It is still any body''s guess as to how many more years might expire before the final judgment is to be pronounced. The Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1360 considered this question. By virtue of the said decision scope of Article 21 had been extended. It was held that expeditious disposal of the cases was an integral and essential part of the fundamental rights to life and liberty. In paragraph 5 it was held :

"Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be ''reasonable, fair or just'' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as ''reasonable, fair or just'' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21."

The same question was considered by a Bench of the Patna High Court in the case State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir and others, 1985 Crl. L.J. 584. It was concluded that the word ''trial'' would bring within its sweep, the appeal that would be pending against such an order. In paragraph 17 the Court had held :

"Therefore, there seems to be no option, but to hold that the word ''trial'' in the context of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial includes within its sweep a substantive appeal provided by the Code to the High Court whether against conviction or against acquittal. Thus, it would follow that the constitutional right of speedy trial envisages an equally expeditious conclusion of a substantive appeal and not merely a technical completion of the proceedings in the original court alone."

The same question had arisen before this court more often than once. Wherever there is inordinate delay and the accused petitioner is not to be blamed, the proceedings have been quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner in this regard relied upon the decision in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 1991(2) RCR 87 wherein the trial Court also followed the procedure of warrant instead of summary procedure. This was not a correct procedure adopted. More than six years had expired. The result was that the judgment of the courts below was set aside. Close to evidence of the present case is the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Mulakh Raj v. State of Haryana, Cr.M. 7232M of 1996 decided on 3.1.1997. Almost in a similar circumstance 17 years have passed but the trial had not come to an end with respect to a complaint filed under the Prevention of Food and Adulteration Act. It was held :

"In the legal pugalities, the inordinate delay has been caused. The strict provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution have been forgotten. It would be, therefore, not in the interest of justice to allow the trial to again restart and drag on. In the peculiar facts even a direction after 17 years for expeditious disposal may also not meet the ends of justice. It would be appropriate to put an end of the agony of the petitioner. Accordingly the petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner on basis of the complaint filed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are quashed."

Same is the position in the present case. After almost 15 years when the sample was taken, this Court finds that the position is basically where it had started. The Court will not increase the agony of an accused who has taken such prolonged trial.

Accordingly, keeping in view the inordinate delay, proceedings pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonepat are quashed.