Bhan Singh vs State of Punjab

K.S. Kumaran, J.

Heard counsel.

On the basis of a complaint given by Gurdip Singh, second respondent herein, FIR No. 112, dated 29.4.1996, of Police Station City Barnala (Annexure P2) was registered. The main allegations in the complaint are as follows:

That the petitioner herein Bhan Singh and two other persons by name Jaswant Singh and Harbans Singh wanted to grab the land of Sham Kaur and with that intention Jaswant Singh and Harbans Singh filed Civil Suit No. 262 dated 2.6.89 against Sham Kaur in the Court of Sub Judge Ist Class Barnala. It is also alleged that they produced some other woman to impersonate Sham Kaur and got a statement recorded in their favour. According to the complainant, Bhan Singh, the petitioner herein knowingly identified the said impersonator as Sham Kaur and, thus, these persons had fraudulently got a consenting decree to be passed in favour of Jaswant Singh and Harbans Singh on 6.11.1989. According to the complainant, Sham Kaur never appeared in the Court nor filed any written statement nor gave any statement. It is not necessary for our purpose to go into the other allegations made in the complaint. Part played by the petitioner is stated to be that he identified the impersonator as Sham Kaur. On the basis of this complaint, the abovesaid FIR has been registered and it is stated that the charge sheet has also been filed before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate Barnala. The petitioner has approached this Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C., for quashing this FIR and the consequential proceedings on the ground that the offences which the petitioners and other accused are alleged to have committed come within the purview of Sections 467, 468, 471, 193 and 1963 apart from Section 120B, IPC. The petitioner contends that so far as these offences falling under the above Sections other than Section 120B, IPC, could be taken cognizance of only on a complaint by the Court concerned. The petitioner contends that in view of the provisions contained in Section 195, Cr.P.C., when the complaint has not been given by the Court before whom certain proceedings had taken place and in relation to which the offences are stated to have been committed, the FIR and the other consequential proceeding are liable to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of this Court in Sardul Singh v. State of Haryana, 1992(3) RCR 545 in support of his contention. Of course, Section 195, Cr.P.C., refers to Sections 193, 196, 471, 475, 476 and 463, IPC and it does not specifically mention the offences punishable under Sections 467 and 468, IPC. But the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner supports the contention of the petitioner that Sections 467, 468 and 471, IPC are overlapping and, therefore, the provisions of Section 195(1)(b((ii) are applicable to these offences also by implication.

The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Gopalkrishna Menon and another v. D. Raja Reddy and another, AIR 1983 SC 1053 wherein it was held as follows:

"The offence which is made punishable under Section 467 is in respect of an offence described in Section 463. Once it is accepted that Section 463 defines forgery and Section 467 punishes forgery of a particular category, the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Criminal Procedure Code would immediately be attracted and on the basis of that, the offence punishable under Section 467 is an offence described in Section 463, in the absence of a complaint by the Court, the prosecution would not be maintainable ......."

Section 468, IPC, also punishes forging a document for the purpose of cheating. Therefore, it follows that Section 468, IPC will also be covered by Section 195, Cr.P.C. In the present case, the FIR has been registered only on the complaint by the second respondent and it is not stated by the respondents that the complaint was given by the court concerned. Therefore, I find that in view of these decisions, the FIR and the consequential proceedings under Sections 467, 468, 471, 193 and 196, IPC will have to be quashed since the complaint has not been lodged by the court concerned.

So far as the offence under Section 120B, IPC, is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that when the proceedings in respect of the main offence/offences are quashed, the proceedings under Section 120B alone cannot be continued. I do not wish to express any opinion on this aspect in view of the fact that on some other ground I am coming to the conclusion that the entire FIR and the consequential proceedings will have to be quashed.

Admittedly, the parties have compromised the matter between themselves. Second respondent, who is the complainant, has filed the reply, support by an affidavit wherein he has stated that he has compromised the matter with Harbans Singh, Jaswant Singh and the petitioner herein and therefore, this petition may be allowed quashing the Criminal Proceedings against the petitioner. He has also given the details as to how the matter has been compromised and also about the matter that have been compromised. It is not necessary for our purpose to go into those details. Suffice it to say that the matter has been compromised between second respondent on the one hand and the present petitioner and others on the other hand. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in Sohan Lal v. State of Haryana, 1994(2) RCR 105 wherein it was held in similar circumstance that no useful purpose is likely to be served in continuing the proceeding when the parties have already entered into a compromise. On this ground, the FIR and the proceedings not only under Section 120B of the Indian Penal code as also under other Sections have to be quashed in so far as they relate to the petitioner herein.

Accordingly this petition is allowed quashing the FIR in question and the consequential proceeding, in so far as they relate to the present petitioner and pending before the SubDivisional Magistrate Barnala.