Manipal Singh vs State of Punjab

T.H.P. Chalapathi, J.

This petition is filed to quash the FIR No. 31 dated 10.3.1997 registered under sections 420/468/471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and the subsequent criminal proceedings pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Phagwara, in view of the compromise dated 9.7.1999 entered into by the parties.

The allegations against the petitioners are that the second petitioner opened account in the name of second respondentHarivansh Mehta impersonating the 2nd respondent and Ist Petitioner identified the 2nd petitioner as Harivansh Mehta. The 2nd petitioner deposited the divident warrants issued in favour of 2nd respondent (complainant) and withdrew the amount immediately after realisation. Thus, according to the complainant, he has been cheated. On the basis of the complaint, a case has been registered and on the basis of the investigation, a challan has been filed against both the petitioners for the offences of cheating, forgery and impersonation. The petitioners are now seeking to have the FIR quashed on the basis of the compromise.

It has been held by the Supreme Court inRam Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, JT 1999(1) SC 147 and also in Surinder Nath Mohanti v. State of Orissa, 1999(2) RCR(Crl.) 683 : 1999(4) SLT 346 that no offence can be permitted to be compounded if it is not specified in section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Learned counsel for the petitioners tried to impress upon me by relying upon two decisions of this Court by showing that no useful purpose will be served if the trial is allowed to be proceeded when the complainant compromised the matter with the accusedpetitioner. In Satwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1996(4) RCC 21, the learned Single Judge of this Court has observed that it will not be of any reasonable consequences to proceed any further with the proceedings arising out of the FIR in question when all the disputes regarding the property including Bus in question has been settled and no purpose will be served when the further proceedings are allowed to continue. In that case, the offences alleged to have been committed are under sections 465, 467, 471 and 120B and IPC. He also relied upon the decision of another learned Single Judge in Mohinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, 1997(1) RCC 556, wherein it has been held that the parties have compromised and no useful purpose will be served when the proceedings arising out of the FIR are allowed to continue.

I regret my inability to agree with these two decisions. It cannot be said in the present case that no useful purpose will be served. Committing forgery to open an account in a bank impersonating the other persons, is a crime against the Society. It is not a crime against a particular individual. Even though the complainant may turn hostile and may resile from the contents of the FIR and the statement given to the police, the prosecuting agency may bring on record the evidence to show that the accusedpetitioner impersonated another and committed forgery of the signatures. In the instant case, the accusation against the petitioner is that they opened account with Jammu & Kashmir Bank at Phagwara. It is open to the prosecuting agency to examine the Manager to show the second petitioner came to the Bank and opened the account by giving his name as Harivansh Mehta and that the petitioner identified that person as Harivansh Mehta. These facts can be proved by the prosecuting agency by adducing evidence other than the evidence of the complainantHarivansh Mehta, who entered into compromise. The prosecution may also produce the documents for opening the account which may contain the photographs of the person who opened the account. The Court has to decide the matter on the basis of the entire evidence adduced before it and not on the solitary statement of one of the witnesses or the complainant alone. Therefore, it cannot be said simply because the original complaint will not support the case of the prosecution that no useful purpose will be served. There may be some other evidence which the prosecuting agency may adduce during the trial. When the Supreme Court itself said that the offences other than those mentioned in section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be compounded, this Court cannot quash the complaint on the basis of the compromise. The prosecution must be taken to its logical end. Admittedly the offences under sections 468 and 471 IPC are not compoundable. The offence under section 420 IPC is compoundable with the permission of the Court and the Court which can grant the permission is the original Court, where the complaint is pending, but not the High Court.

In view of what has been stated above, I am not able to follow the decisions, referred to above, of the learned Single Judges, particularly in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court. Consequently, this petition is dismissed.