Brij Bhushan vs State of Haryana

Harmohinder Kaur Sandhu, J.

On 28.6.1984 the Government Food Inspector inspected the premises of Brij Bhushan petitioner at village Boh and found him in possession of 5 kilograms of chilies powder for public sale. 450 grams of chillies powder was purchased for analysis which was sealed into three dry and clean bottles. One sealed bottle was sent for analysis to the Public Analyst, Haryana, Chandigarh who reported that the sample contained added oil Soluble red coaltar dye. A, complaint was then presented in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala for trial of the petitioner for an offence under Section 7 read with Section 16 (1) (a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

On 1241985 a charge was framed against the petitioner and procedure of warrant trial was adopted. After recording evidence the trial Court convicted the petitioner vide order dated 1911988. An appeal was preferred against this judgment which was allowed but the case was remanded to the trial Court to try the petitioner in a summary way. A notice was issued to the petitioner by the trial Court on 11111988. The petitioner alleged that he was facing the ordeal of trial since June, 1984 and no witness had been examined by the prosecution after November, 1988 when notice was given to him. He thus invoked the inherent jurisdiction of his Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the complaint now pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala as the same amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court.

In the return filed by the respondent it was contended that the sample of chilli powder then from the petitioner was found adulterated by Public Analyst, Haryana and the petitioner was being rightly prosecuted. The case was remanded when the petitioner filed an appeal against his conviction. No prejudice had been caused to the petitioner by chane of mode of trial from warrant summary trial. The delay in the disposal of the case occurred on account of strike by the lawyers at Ambala. The witnesses could not be examined as Natha Singh PW had been transferred and Dr. H.P. Goshal died in the month of April, 1992.

I have heard Mr. K.K. Aggarwal, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Azad Singh, Assistant Advocate General, Haryana, for the respondent.

It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the sample in this care was taken in June, 1984 and the petitioner has faced trial for the last about 9 years. He has undergone sufficient harassment and agony. At first the trial Court adopted the procedure of warrant trial but subsequently the case was remanded with a direction that summary procedure may be followed. In pursuance of this direction given by the Appellate Court the trial Court gave notice to the petitioner on 11111988 but even after that the trial has not concluded. Rather a single witness was not examined for the last about four years. The delay in the conclusion of the trial itself amounted to miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of Court and the complaint was liable to be quashed on this score. In support of his argument the learned counsel placed reliance on the case of Balwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 1990(1) RCR 672 and Sunder Lal v. State of Haryana 1993 (1) C.L.R. 388. In this later case proceedings under Section 16 (i)(a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 were taken against the petitioner and the petitioner faced trial for about 9 years. It was held that the petitioner had been denied the right to claim a speedy trial and proceedings were liable to be terminated on that ground.

Speedy trial is the essence of justice and inordinate delay in the trial itself constitutes failure of justice. A Fall Bench of the Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and another Versus State of Bihar, 1990 (3) Recent Criminal Report 302, 1986 Criminal Law Journal 1771 laid down that the right to speedy trial is available in all criminal prosecutions irrespective of the nature of offence involved and that it is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Full Bench in this case referred to the case law and decided that 7 years delay in investigation and trial in a criminal case is the outer limit of concluding the proceedings in those cases which were punishable with imprisonment for life for death. It was further held that delay should not be due to the fault of the accused and exceptional reasons for such delay should be absent. In the present case the petitioner has faced the agony of trial for the last about 9 years. The trial Court once adopted a wrong procedure as a result of which the case had to be remanded but even after remand no progress was made in the case and even a single witness was not examined. There is nothing on record to show that since November, 1988 till the present petition was filed the lawyers, remained on strike. Rather it appears that the prosecution failed to procure the presence of the witnesses. The delay in disposal of the case is not attributable to any act on the part of the petitioner and there in no exceptional circumstance justifying the delay. In these circumstances pendency of the proceedings against the petitioner for the last about 9 years has clearly resulted in miscarriage of justice and abuse of process of Court affecting the fundamental right of the petitioner to have a speedy trial.

As a result I accept this petition, quash the complaint Annexure P/I and the subsequent proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amabala.