High Courts

Dharam Pal vs State of Haryana

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 13 March 1990 · Citation: (1990) 2 RCR(Criminal) 278

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.S.Grewal, J
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 349-M of 1990
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 713 words

S.S. Grewal, J.

1.

This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of complaint dated 25111982, Annexure P/1, filed against the petitioner under Section 7 read with Section 16 (1)(a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as well as the impugned order dated 10121987, Annexure P/3, passed by the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Jagadhari, whereby, the petitioner had been ordered to be tried under Section 7 read with Section 16 (1)(a) (i) of the Act.

2.

In brief facts relevant for the disposal of this petition are that on 14101982, at 1 P.M., Rain Singh, Government Food Inspector, District Ambala, inspected the premises of the petitioner at main Bazar, Bilaspur and found that the petitioner had about 70 kgs. of iodized edible salt meant for sale in his possession. The sample of salt was duly taken. One of the bottles containing sample was sent to the office of the Public Analyst along with memorandum in form VII in sealed cover As per report of the Public Analyst the contents of the said sample were in contravention of Food (Health) Authority notification No. 3/142 PH79/5898 dated 1051979.

3.

The trial Court initially proceeded with the trial of the case as a warrant case but later on vide impugned order. Annexure P/3, dated 10.12.1987 it ordered to drop the previous proceedings and to proceed with the trial summarily, as prescribed under Section 16A of the Act.

4.

The learned counsel for the parties were heard.

5.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the year 1982 the trial against the petitioner commenced before the trial court which followed the procedure prescribed for warrant case instituted on a private complaint and after more than five years the trial Court has stopped the earlier proceedings and had proceeded to try the petitioner again, by summary procedure, and, that the trial of the petitioner concerning the same offence has unnecessarily prolonged for the last about eight years resulting in miscarriage of justice and denial of inherent right of speedy trial enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

6.

Reliance in this respect has rightly been placed on Full Bench, authority of Patna High Court in Madheshwardhari Singh and another v. State of Bihar, 1990(3) RCR(Crl.) 302 (Patna) : 1986 Crl. L.J. 1771 , wherein it was held that the right of a speedy public trial is now an inalienable fundamental right of a citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution. It has further been ruled that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of seven years or more (which was not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in investigation and original trial for offences other than capital ones, plainly violates the constitutional a guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.

7.

The aforesaid authority is fully applicable to the case in hand, Obviously the inordinate delay in completion of the trial has occurred solely due to the negligence on the part of the trial Court, which initially erred in trying the accused by warrant procedure and suddenly in the midst of the trial realised its mistake, and, in order to rectify the same ordered to drop the proceedings already taken against the petitioner and again proceeded with the trial of the petitioner summarily in view of amended Section 16A of the Act, which had come into force on 141976 much before the impugned complaint was filed in the trial Court. Thus pendency of criminal proceedings against the petitioner for the last more than seven years certainly amounts to miscarriage of justice and abuse of the process of the Court. Besides, it amounts to negation of fundamental right of speedy trial to which the petitioner was entitled.

8.

Even otherwise the trial Court had no jurisdiction to quash the charge already framed by it against the petitioner. It was not legally competent to proceed with the retrial of the petitioner in respect of the same offence by following a different procedure.

9.

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint, Annexure P/1 and the resultant proceedings including the impugned order, Annexure P/3, are ordered to be quashed. This petition is accordingly allowed.