Carritt Moran and Company (P.) Ltd. vs Roneo Ltd.

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—These three appeals are by the Plaintiff. They arise out of three suits for ejectment, brought by the Plaintiff, which was the common landlord, against three different tenants. The suits involve common questions of law and fact except that in one of the suits there was an additional special defence.

Ejectment was claimed by the Plaintiff on the allegation, inter alia, that the tenancies in suit had been duly determined by appropriate notices to quit and, further, there was also service of the requisite notices of suit and that the suit premises were required by the Plaintiff for its own occupation. In the original plaint this latter allegation was made along with a rider that the suit premises were required for building and rebuilding and were to be built and rebuilt for the purpose of the Plaintiff''s occupation.

In the course of the suit the Plaintiff applied for amendment of the plaint by striking out the case of requirement for building and rebuilding and confining it to a case solely of requirement for the Plaintiff''s own occupation. The learned trial Judge rejected this prayer for amendment, but at the same time at the final hearing of the suit he appears to have conceded the Plaintiff''s request for consideration of the question of the Plaintiff''s requirement of the suit premises for its own occupation. In substance, however, there was no material difference, as even in the original plaint and the original case, made by the Plaintiff, the requirement pleaded was for the Plaintiff''s own occupation though, as we have said above, with the added rider ''after building and rebuilding''. We feel, therefore, that in the circumstances the Plaintiff''s prayer for amendment even on the learned Judge''s own showing, should have been allowed. That, however, would not be of much material consequence as eventually, in our view, the learned trial Judge''s decree of dismissal of the suits will have to be affirmed.

The suits were contested by the Defendants, and their defence was a denial of the Plaintiff''s plea of reasonable requirement in whatever shape or form the same was to be put. The defence also pleaded that there was no valid notice to quit to terminate the suit tenancies and further that, in any event, the Plaintiff was not entitled to a decree, as the Plaintiff was merely a lessee, though for a long term, and not the owner of the suit premises.

The Plaintiff admittedly was a lessee of the disputed premises for a term of 66 years. The Defendants were tenants under the original owner and, by virtue of the above lease of the Plaintiff, they became by operation of law tenants of the Plaintiff. In the context, the Plaintiff''s position, vis-a-vis the Defendants, was that of a landlord in its capacity as the holder of the lease for the term of 66 years and the principal question, which will arise in these appeals, will be whether such a landlord is entitled under the law to ask for eviction of the tenants under the relevant West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, Section 13(1)(f), for requirement of the disputed premises for its own occupation.

On the question of the Plaintiff''s reasonable requirement the learned trial Judge has on the evidence recorded his finding in the Plaintiff''s favour and on the materials, as they stand, we find no reason to differ from him. Mr. Mackenzie, Plaintiff''s principal witness on this point, has conceded that there was never any case of building and rebuilding and, in fact, after the construction of the new building on the adjoining land, which has admittedly taken place, the Plaintiff never claimed that there was any necessity for building or rebuilding of the disputed premises. The Plaintiff''s case, therefore, so far as requirement was concerned, was purely a case of requirement for its own occupation and upon that point the evidence is overwhelming that such requirement did exist in fact.

It is abundantly clear from the materials on the record that the Plaintiff''s business has expanded enormously and further that on account of want of accommodation in its office, which is situate in one of the floors of the same municipal premises, the Plaintiff had to rent or hire space from one of its neighbours for accommodation of its employees in that department. In such circumstances, apart from anything else, the learned trial Judge''s view that the Plaintiff''s case of reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for its own occupation has been amply made out, must be affirmed.

On the question of validity of the notices also, it is clear that the notices of ejectment in the instant cases, whether viewer from the point of view of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act or Section 13(6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, would be perfectly valid. The objection that the notices, in the instant cases, were given not by the Plaintiff itself but by its Solicitor, is of no substance, as a notice by the Solicitor, purporting to act on behalf of his client, that is, as his authorised agent, is in law a notice by the client himself. Vide in this connection Radharani Dasi and Anr. v. Angurbala Dasi 65 C.W.N. 1119.

The second objection that the above notices must be deemed to have been waived, as there was acceptance of subsequent rents by the Plaintiff, must also be overruled in the facts and circumstances of this case. There is no evidence, in the instant cases, that by such payment or acceptance the parties ever intended to continue the old tenancies. As a general rule, so far as the Rent Control legislation is concerned, acceptance of rent, where such legislations apply, does not by itself mean waiver of the notice to quit, and there are no circumstances, in the instant cases, which will induce or enable the Court to hold the contrary and find waiver. In one of the suits there was a special point urged that the tenant in that case had taken the suit premises for the purpose of running a press and that, accordingly, the lease in that case must be held to be for manufacturing purposes and would require for its termination a six months'' notice which had admittedly not been given. It is to be noticed, however, as noted by the learned trial Judge, that the evidence does not show that at the inception of the said tenancy there was any question or talk or idea of taking the tenancy for running a press. The press came to be installed and the printing machines in question were brought only sometime after the inception or commencement of the said tenancy. At that time also express permission appears to have been taken from the landlord for the purpose of installing the machine. In the circumstances, the tenancy in question cannot be held to be for manufacturing purpose, merely because the tenant chose to use the demised premises for the purpose of running a press. We are, therefore, satisfied that the learned trial Judge was right in overruling the defence objection on the above point of notice too.

In spite of the above, however, the Plaintiff''s instant suits must fail and must be held to have been rightly dismissed by the learned trial Judge, as the requirement pleaded is a requirement for the Plaintiff''s own occupation and under the law, vide West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, Section 13(1)(f), to refer to its relevant part and its significant expression ''if he is the owner thereof--the premises must for the above purpose, that is, where it is reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation be owned by him. The Plaintiff, therefore, in order to succeed in the instant suits, must prove that it is the owner of the disputed premises. Admittedly, as we have said above, the Plaintiff is only a lessee, though for a long-term, namely 66 years, and according to the decision of this Court in Sm. Yogamaya Pakira v. Sm. Santi Sudha Bose S.M.A. No. 29 of 1964 decided on February, 15, 1968, with which we entirely agree, even a permanent lessee cannot claim to be the owner within the meaning of the aforesaid statutory provision.

In the above view, we hold that the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the Plaintiff''s suits on this ground, even though his findings on the other questions were in favour of the Plaintiff and those findings have been affirmed by us.

We would accordingly dismiss these appeals; though in the circumstances we would direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

Chatterjee, J.

I agree.