AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
586 paragraphs · 12,984 wordsSubrahmanyam, J.—The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1955, as amended
by Madras Act XIV of 1956, and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, (Madras Act XXIV of 1956), in so far as the
enactments affect the petitioner''s right under the ""waram"" agreement entered into between him and the first respondent in 1955. Although the
Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 is alone specified in the petition, the scope of the challenge was with the consent of
the learned Advocate General, widened at the hearing so as to extend to the other two enactments as well, in so far as they affect the petitioner''s
rights under the said ""waram"" agreement. All the three enactments will for convenience be referred to as the impugned enactments.
The first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), filed a petition No. 1096 of 1957- in the Rent court at Mayuram in the Tanjore
district praying that the fair rent payable by him to the petitioner be fixed under S. 9 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act.
The petitioner appeared before the Rent court and alleged that the respondent was a tenant cultivating on ""waram"" basis from 1955 and that he
had never been a lessee of the land agreeing to pay fixed rent.
The petitioner contended that the Act was not applicable to ""waram"" tenure and that the Act. in any event, placed unreasonable restrictions on his
right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and was hence of no effect as against him.
Repeating those contentions, the petitioner files this petition in this court praying for an appropriate writ prohibiting the rent court at Mayuram from
enquiring into the respondent''s petition to fix fair rent.
In order to appreciate the petitioner''s contentions on the question of the constitutional validity of the impugned enactments, it is necessary to
pass in rapid review legislation enacted in this State since 1952 regulating the relations of landlords and tenants in the Tanjore district. Reports
were widespread in 1951 that the Government contemplated legislation regulating the relationship of landowners and tenants in ryotwari areas. The
apprehensions, entertained by landowners regarding the form and content of such legislation led, particularly in the district of Tanjore, to what the
legislature considered unjust evictions of their tenants.
Tenants thus affected tended to take the law into their own hands with a view to be restored to possession of the lands they had held. The
Government could not immediately find other means of livelihood for tenants who were thrown out of the lands they were cultivating and
considered it just that the great industry of agriculture should be so organised as equitably to support all the citizens who were for the time being
dependent upon it for their livelihood, viz., landowners, tenants and farm-hands or pannaiyals.
The Governor of Madras hence passed Ordinance IV of 1952, Ordinance V of 1952 and Ordinance VI of 1952 with a view to regulate relations
between landowners and tenants in the district of Tanjore. The substance of the ordinances was enacted by the legislature as the Tanjore Tenants
and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952). (The provisions of the Ordinances and of the Act regarding pannaiyals are not
relevant for our present purposes). In the Act, the expression ""cultivating tenant"" or ""tenant"" was defined as meaning ""a person who contributes his
own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or
implied...."" Ss. 7 and 8 of the Act prescribed the terms applicable to all tenancies.
They said in effect that every tenant who was in possession of land or who would be let into possession within five years thereafter would continue
in possession as such tenant until May, 1957, subject to payment of rent as prescribed in S. 8. No such tenant could be evicted unless he failed to
pay rent or did any of the acts specified in S. 10, which would render it undesirable that he should be continued as tenant on the land. During the
period prescribed by the Act for the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant might surrender the lease on six months'' notice, ending with a year of
the tenancy.
The tenancy would continue for a further term of five years from 1-5-1957 unless the landowner gave notice, not less than 12 months before 1-5-
1957, that the tenancy would determine on that date. The Act contained certain other provisions regarding restoration of lands to tenants who
having been in possession in 1950-51 or on 1st December 1951. had ceased to be in possession on the date of the commencement of the Act,
viz.. 23rd August, 1952. In regard to tenants who had been in possession on 1st December, 1951, but had ceased to be in possession on 23rd
August, 1952, the Act said that they would, on application to the officer named in the Act, be entitled to be restored to possession, any other
person admitted to possession as tenant after the 1st day of December, 1951, being evicted from the land.
In respect of tenants who were in possession during the agricultural year 1950-51, but were not in possession on 1st December, 1951, the Act
said that they would be entitled to be restored to possession, subject to certain stated terms and conditions. The constitutional validity of the Act
was upheld in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, .
For the protection of tenants in the Tamil areas of the State other than the areas in which the provisions of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal
Protection Act, 1952, were in force and other than the Gudalur taluk of the Nilgiris District, the Madras legislature enacted the Madras Cultivating
Tenants Protection Act, (Madias Act XXV of 1955). The Act was to be in force for a year. A cultivating tenant was thus defined in the Act:
''cultivating tenant'' means a person who cultivates by his own labour or by that of any other member of family or by hired labour under his
supervision and control, any land belonging to another, under a tenancy agreement, express or implied...
The Act said that no cultivating tenant should be evicted from his holding or any part thereof at the instance of the landowner, during the
continuance of the Act, whether in execution of a decree or order of a court or otherwise. The exceptions were that, if rent was not paid by the
date stated in the Act or if the tenant did any of the acts stated in the Act which disentitled him to be continued in possession of the land, he could
be evicted on application being made to the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Act contained a provision for restoration to possession analogous to
the provisions contained in the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act. Section 4(1) of the Act said :
Every cultivating tenant who was in possession of any land on the 1st December, 1953 and who is not in possession thereof at the commencement
of this Act, shall, on application to the Revenue Divisional Officer, be entitled to be restored to such possession on the same terms as those
applicable to the possession of the land on the 1st December, 1953.
Limitations on such right to restoration to possession are contained in sub-s. 2 of S. 4. The Act became law on 27-9-J955. The period of one year
expired with 26-9-1956.
In 1956, the Madras Legislature enacted Madras Act XIV of 1956, which amended Madras Act XXV of 1955. The amending Act came into
force on 1st October, 1956. The amending Act said that the principal Act should be deemed to have continued in force until 1-10-1956 and that
the Act as amended would remain in force for a period of three years. The Act was extended also to areas in which the Tanjore Tenants and
Pannaiyal Protection Act was in force and S. 10 of Madras Act XIV of 1956 said :
If any provision contained in the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952) is repugnant to any provisions
contained in the principal Act as amended by this Act, the latter provision shall prevail and the former provision shall, to the extent of repugnancy,
be of no effect.
Subject to the conditions and limitations stated in the Act, the Act entitled the landowner to resume from any cultivating tenant possession, for the
purpose of personal cultivation, of lands not exceeding one half of the extent of the lands leased out to the cultivating tenant.
By Act XXV of 1956 enacted on the 31st October, 1956, the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act was repealed in so far as it
related to tenants. Thereafter, relations of landowners and tenants were, in the Tanjore district, as elsewhere in the State, governed, in the matter of
eviction and personal cultivation, by Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956.
On the 31st October, 1956, the Madras Legislature enacted Madras Act XXIV of 1956, called the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of
Fair Rent) Act. The Act had effect from 1st October 1956. The Act says, ""with effect from the 1st day of October, 1956, every cultivating tenant
shall be bound to pay to the landowner and every landowner shall be entitled to collect from the cultivating tenant fair rent payable under this Act.
Fair rent"" is defined as the rent payable under the Act. In regard to wet lands, fair rent is 40 per cent of the normal gross produce or its value in
money.
Normal gross produce in respect of any land"" means ""the produce which would be obtained, if the rainfall and seasons were of a normal
character, from lands of the same class as the land in question, similarly situated and possessing similar advantages."" Fair rent may be in cash or in
kind, provided that where the crop raised is paddy, the landowner shall have the right to insist that it shall be payable in kind. Where, in respect of
any land fair rent has been determined, it shall continue in force for five years. The Government may, by notification, constitute Rent courts and
Rent Tribunals for the purposes of the Act.
Notwithstanding any agreement between the landowner and the cultivating tenant, or any decree or order of a court, either party may apply to the
Rent Court for fixation of fair rent. From every decision of a Rent court, an appeal shall lie to the Rent Tribunal. It is under this Act that the
respondent applied to the Rent Court, Mayuram, to fix the fair rent in respect of the lands of which he claimed to be in possession as a cultivating
tenant.
In the petition filed in the Rent Court, the respondent said that he was in possession as a cultivating tenant under the petitioner of 1.80 acres of a
single crop wet land and 1.35 acres of double crop wet land in the Madirimangalam village, Mayuram taluk, Tanjore district. The respondent
alleged further in his petition in the Rent Court that, after duly estimating the share of the produce payable to the petitioner for the kuruvai crop of
the year 1956, the respondent gave the petitioner 25 kalams of paddy and that for the sambha crop of 1956-57, the respondent gave the
petitioner 65 kalams of Paddy as rent (kuttagai). The respondent prayed that the fair rent be fixed for fasli 1366-1370.
In the counter-statement filed by him in the rent court, the petitioner said that the respondent was only a tenant cultivating on ""waram"" basis for
two years from 1955 and had never been a lessee on an agreement to pay a fixed rent. The petitioner pleaded that the Act was not applicable to
cases of ""waram"" tenure and that the Act was ultra vires the legislature.
In the petition filed in this court, the petitioner alleges that the respondent was engaged by the petitioner to cultivate his land under ""waram
system and that the respondent agreed to accept 25 per cent of the net yield every year in respect of both the crops, kuruvai and thaladi The
petitioner contends in the petition that a cultivator under the ""waram"" system ""is not a tenant or lessee but only a person contracting with the
landowner from time to time under an agreement to receive a share of the produce as remuneration for his services.
The counter-statement filed by the petitioner in the rent court states that the respondent is ""only a tenant cultivating on waram basis"" and not a
lessee liable to pay fixed rent. The contention that the respondent is not a ""cultivating tenant"" and that the petitioner is not a ""landowner"", as those
terms are defined in the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956,
was not argued at the hearing of this petition, For the purpose of determining the constitutional validity of the impugned enactments, we shall
assume, without finding it, that the respondent is a ""cultivating tenant"" and the petitioner a ""landlord"" or ""landowner"" as the terms are defined in S.
2(a) and 2{e) of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and S. 2(b) and 2(f) of Madras Act XXIV of 1956.
It may be useful that we ascertain in the first instance the alterations effected by the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 and the
Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956, (assuming the Acts to be intra vires the legislature) in the tenancy agreement
entered into between the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent was let into possession in 1955 on the agreement that the respondent
would be in possession for a year as waramdar and would pay the petitioner 75 per cent of the net yield in respect of both the crops.
It is not clear whether, in arriving at the not yield, the expenses of harvesting alone would be excluded or whether the expenses of cultivation and
harvesting would both be excluded. When the respondent was let into possession in 1955 on the agreement that he would cultivate the land as a
waramdar for a year, the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act (Act XIV of 1952) was in force. I accept, with respect, the view
expressed by Rajagopala Aiyangar, J. in Dharmalinga Moopanar v. Anusamba Bi Trust, 1957-1 Mad LJ 211 (B), that a cultivating tenant,
inducted subsequent to the 23rd August, 1952, would, under S. 7(f) of the Act, be entitled to continue in possession till 1-5-1957.
The validity of Ss. 7 and 8 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act was not challenged at the hearing of, Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs.
Vaithilingam and Others, , in which the Act was contended to be ultra vires the legislature (Please see pages 328 and 329 (of Mad LJ) : (at pp.
54-55 of AIR). Under S. 7(f) of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, the respondent had the further right to continue in possession
for a fresh term of five years from May, 1957, unless the petitioner gave notice to the respondent in writing not less than 12 months before 1-5-
1957 that the respondent''s tenancy would end on that date.
There is no allegation that the petitioner gave any such notice to the respondent. The respondent was, therefore, entitled to remain in possession as
tenant until 1-5-1962. Under Madras Act XXV of 1955 (the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act), as amended by Madras Act XIV of
1950 read with Madras Act XXV of 1956. which repealed the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act in so far as it related to cultivating
tenants, the term of the tenancy of the respondent was cut down to three years commencing from 27-9-1955.
The result of the legislation of which the petitioner complains was that the respondent became liable to vacate the land in September, 1958, instead
of being entitled to continue in possession as tenant until May, 1962.
In regard to rent, the agreement between the petitioner and the respondent was that he should give the petitioner 75 per cent of the net yield.
Under S. 8 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, which was in force at the time of the commencement of the tenancy, the tenant
was entitled to 2/5ths of the gross produce, after deducting all harvesting and poradi charges in the case of paddy. The tenant was responsible for
all the labour and expenses of cultivation and had to bear the entire cost of natural manure used on the land.
When chemical fertilizers and other artificial manures or groundnut cakes were used on the land, the cost had to be divided between the landowner
and the tenant in the proportion of 3/5ths and 2/5ths. Under Madras Act XXIV of 1956 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent)
Act), all the cultivation expenses, inclusive of cost of seed, ploughing, manuring, harvesting and threshing, have to be borne by the cultivating tenant.
The landowner hears all the capital expenditure necessary to maintain the land and wells in a state of proper repair and pays the cist and other
public charges of the gross-produce, the cultivating tenant takes 60 per cent and the landowner takes 40 per cent.
If adverse seasonal conditions result in the reduction of the gross produce from any particular crop to the extent of more than 25 per cent, the
landowner has to remit a proportionate part of the fair rent due to him, subject to such conditions as the revenue court may impose. The rent which
under Madras Act XIV of 1952 was 60 per cent of the gross produce, after deducting harvest and poradi charges, becomes 40 per cent of the
normal gross produce under Madras Act XXIV of 1956.
In regard to rent, learned counsel for the petitioner does not contend that if the legislature of the State of Madras has the power to direct
fixation of fair rent in supersession of the terms of the contract between a landowner and his cultivating tenant as to the quantum of rent payable by
the latter to the former, objection can legitimately be taken to the fixation of fair rent in accordance with terms of and by the machinery created by
the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act (Madras Act XXIV of 1956).
In particular, no objection is taken either to the proportion of the normal gross produce which the Act makes payable to the landowner or to the
method of arriving at the normal gross produce or the allowances or deductions that are directed to be made. Petitioner''s learned counsel''s
objections to the impugned enactments are more basic in character. In regard to the extension of the respondent''s term of tenancy effected by
Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956, petitioner''s learned counsel contends that the extension is constitutionally invalid,
because there was no emergency in 1955 or 1956 to call for such interference with rights of landowners and tenants under the terms of their
respective contracts.
The proposition which petitioner''s learned counsel invites us to endorse is that legislation, which takes away from the owner of agricultural land his
right to recover such land from a tenant whose term under the contract of tenancy has expired, is an invasion of the constitutionally protected rights
of such owner, and that such legislation must be struck down in the absence of proof that such legislation is intended and is reasonably necessary to
meet an emergency in the relations of the classes of tenants and landowners with whom such legislation deals.
The argument by which that proposition is supported runs on the following lines: The petitioner''s right to hold, that is to say, enjoy the 3 and odd
acres described in the respondent''s petition in the Rent court, is guaranteed to the petitioner by Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. In 1955, that right
to enjoy the land included the right to evict the respondent in 1956, that, on the expiry of a year from the date of the respondent''s admission to the
land as tenant. Act XXV of 1955, as amended by Act XIV of 1956, takes away the petitioner''s right to evict the respondent at the end of the
year and recover possession of the land either for personal cultivation or for being let to another person.
The petitioner is thereby deprived of property. A citizen may be deprived of his property by the State only in one of three ways : (i) by the exercise
by the State of its police power; (ii) by the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain; and (iii) by the exercise by the State of its power
of taxation. No question of the power of taxation arises in this case. No compensation is paid or offered; hence, no question arises of eminent
domain. What remains for consideration is the State''s police power. The State cannot exercise its police power so as to ""take"" a citizen''s
property.
The deprivation of the petitioner''s property, although it does not amount to ""taking"" such as would bring Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution into play,
yet, the deprivation is ""taking"" beyond the reach of the police power of the State. Such ""taking"" is constitutionally prohibited. Hence Madras Act
XXV of 1955, as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956. is ultra vires the Madras legislature in so far as the enactments purport to affect the
petitioner''s right, on the expiry of the term limited by the contract, to evict the respondent from the land. That, in outline, is the petitioner''s
argument. The ability of the argument is apparent. Equally obvious is the way it is rooted in, and draws sustenance from doctrines of American
Constitutional law.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, viz.. Block v. Hirsh, (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C) and Chastleton Corooration v.
Sinclair (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D), are particularly relied on and that makes it necessary for us to consider them in some detail. In October,
1919, Congress passed the District of Columbia Rents Act. By S. 109 of the Act, the right of a tenant to occupy a building was to continue
notwithstanding the expiration of his term, at the option of the tenant, subject to regulation by the Commission appointed by the Act. so long as he
paid the rent and performed the conditions as fixed by the lease or as modified by the Commission. Mr. Justice Holmes said in (1920) 65 Law Ed
865 (C),
The statute embodies a scheme or code which it is needless to set forth, but it should be stated that it ends with the declaration in S. 122 that the
provisions of title 2 are made necessary by emergencies growing out of the war, resulting in rental conditions in the district dangerous to the public
health and burdensome to public officers, employees, and accessories, and thereby embarrassing the Federal Government in the transaction of the
public business. As emergency legislation the title is to end in two Years unless sooner repealed.
The learned Judge proceeded to state that the facts set out in the preamble to the Act were well known and that an emergency existed in relation
to housing. He held:
...circumstances have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law. Plainly,
circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter
of purely private concern.
As regards the argument that the use of the land and the rights of the owner to do what he would with his own and to make what contract he
pleased were cut down, the learned Judge said,
But if the public interest be established, the regulation of rates is one of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has
been settled since Munn v. illionois, (1877) 24 Law Ed 77 (E).
The validity of the legislation was upheld. Mr. Justice Mckenna dissented, the Chief Justice and two other Judges concurring in the dissent.
(1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), was heard along with Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Marcus Feldman, (1920) 65 Law Ed 877 (F). That case
related to a similar statute passed by the legislature of the State of New York regarding letting of buildings. The Attorney General of New York
filed a brief defending the constitutionality of the statute as a proper exercise of the police power of the State. The Attorney General defined police
power, ""as the power or duty of the legislature to enact appropriate and necessary laws in order to protect and safeguard the health, safety, order,
morals or general welfare of the public."" (page 882 of the report).
In this case also, Mr. Justice Mckenna for himself and the Chief Justice and two other Judges wrote a dissenting judgment. Mr. Justice Mckenna
said that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts embodied in S. 10 of Art. 1 of the Constitution was a limitation upon the
national legislation with which (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), was concerned and upon state legislation with which (1920) 65 Law Ed 877 (F), was
concerned. The opinion of the court said that police power warranted the regulation made in both instances, notwithstanding the prohibition against
impairing the obligation of contracts.
On that point, having regard apparently to the definition of ""police power"" given by the Attorney General of New York, Mr. Justice Mckenna said
The police power has some pretence for its invocation. Regarding alone the words of its definition, it embraces power over everything under the
Sun, and the line that separates its legal from its illegal operation cannot easily be drawn. But it must be drawn."" The learned Judge held that police
power should stop short of legislation of the kind impugned in those cases.
The Federal Statute considered in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), was limited to expire in two years from October 1919, the date of its
commencement. An Act of 24th August, 1921, purported to continue the earlier Act in force (with some amendments) until 22nd May, 1922. On
that day, a new Act declared that the emergency described in the original Act still existed, re-enacted with further amendments the amended Act of
1919 and provided for its continuance until 22nd May, 1924. The validity of the extension of the Act of 1919 until 22nd May, 1924, came up for
consideration in (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D). Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.
He said that, so far as the judges knew, the emergency could not be said to continue and that the court was not bound to accept the statement
made to the contrary in the Amending Act of 1922. The learned Judge added, ""we need not inquire how far this court might go in deciding the
question for itself."" The judge referred to certain precedents and wound up by saying,
These cases show that the court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for laying down a rule of law, and if the question were
only whether the statute is in force today, upon the facts that we judicially know, we should be compelled to say that the law has ceased to
operate. Here, however, it is material to know the condition of Washington at different dates in the past. Obviously, the facts should be accurately
ascertained and carefully weighed, and this can be done more conveniently in the supreme court of the District than here. The evidence should be
preserved, so that, if necessary, it can be considered by this court.
Before we proceed to consider the applicability of (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), and Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair (D), to the facts before
us, it may be useful to refer to Bowles v. Willingham, (1943) 88 Law Ed 892 (G). In January 1942, that is, immediately after Pearl Harbour,
Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act. Section 2(b) of the Act provided, in part, that ""whenever in the judgment of the Administrator,
such action is necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this Act. he shall issue a declaration setting forth the necessity for, and
recommendations with reference to, the stabilisation or reduction of rents for any defence-area housing accommodations within a particular
defence-rental area.
Pursuant to that authority, the Administrator, on April 28, 1942, issued a declaration designating 28 areas in various parts of the country, including
Macon, Georgia, as defence-rental areas. The Act was held valid as a proper exercise of the war-power, of Congress, just as the Acts considered
in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), and (1920) 65 Law Ed 877. (F), were upheld as a proper exercise of the police power of the State.
Petitioner''s learned counsel affirms that (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), is part of the Constitutional Law of this country just as much as of the
United States. But the value of Block v. Hirsh (C), in the Constitutional Law of our country is bound to be very limited by reason of the fact that
the findings recorded in it hinge on certain special features of American Constitutional Law which have no place in our system. Speaking of the
Government of the Union, Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland, (1859) 4 Law Ed 579 (H), ""This Government is acknowledged
by all to be one of enumerated powers.
To the powers of Congress enumerated in S. 8(1) to (17) of Art. 1 of the Constitution was added by S. 8(18) the power to make all laws which
would be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers, that is to say, powers necessary to enable the Congress to
deploy to the best advantage the powers expressly granted. Powers other than those thus delegated to the Congress were, by Amendment 10 of
the Bill of Rights, reserved to the States. The power thus reserved to the States to legislate for the protection and promotion of the people''s health,
morals, safety and general welfare has, since the time of Chief Justice Taney, been known as the police power. (""From Marshall to Mukherjea"" by
Mr. Justice Douglas 1956 Edn. 168 and ""The Growth of American Republic"" by Morison and Commager, 4th Edn. Vol. II, Page 170).
The police power of the State is subject to the prohibition enacted in S. 10(1) of Art. 1 of the Constitution. One of the prohibitions is ""No State
shall make any law impairing the obligation of Contracts."" It is one of the peculiarities of the American Constitutional system that the police power
of the States, though of wide amplitude, is subject to limitations to which Congress is not subject, in exercising its enumerated or delegated powers.
But situations arose in which some of the obstacles to beneficial legislation, apparently caused by the limitations placed on the police power of the
States, had to be surmounted.
In response to the demands made by the Granger Movement, States enacted laws subjecting business of a certain description to regulation in the
matter of rates and other terms and conditions of business. The validity of such legislation was upheld on the basis of a new doctrine regarding
businesses affected with a public interest. In (1877) 24 Law Ed 77 (E), the Supreme Court decided that terminal grain elevators were businesses
sufficiently affected with a public interest to enable the legislature to regulate the charges which they made.
Similarly, in Peik v. Chicago and North-Western Rly. Co. (1877) 24 Law Ed. 97 (I), the Supreme Court held in regard to railroads that the
property of railroads was clothed with a public interest which permitted legislative limitation of charges for its use. That case related to railroads in
intra-State commerce subject to the police power of the State. In regard to such railroads, it was necessary to hold that they were clothed with a
public interest before the State legislature could be held competent to regulate charges.
No such finding would be necessary in regard to railroads in inter-State commerce, because the commerce power of the Congress is subject to no
such limitation regarding obligation of contracts. Now, this doctrine of businesses affected with a public interest is one of those waves which
appear from time to time on the sea of American Constitutional law, have their day and disappear. This particular doctrine of businesses affected
with a public interest was in full force and effect a! the time of (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C).
That made it necessary that, before Mr. Justice Holmes could hold that, in the exercise of police power, the State legislature of New York, or
Congress in relation to the District of Columbia, could regulate rents of buildings, he had to find that circumstances had clothed the letting of
buildings in the district and in the State with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law. He held that the emergencies growing out of the
war, which resulted in rental conditions in the district and in the State becoming dangerous to the public health and burdensome to public officers,
constituted circumstances which clothed the letting of buildings with a public interest.
When the emergency ceased, the State''s police power to regulate the letting of buildings would terminate too. That is the reason why in (1923) 68
Law Ed 841 (D). the learned Judge directed the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to find the facts relating to the conditions about
housing accommodation and rates of rent and decide whether the statute continued to be enforceable. It is easy to see that a decision growing out
of these special features of the American Constitutional system cannot easily be transplanted on our soil. It is necessary to consider the use made
of those decisions, by this court in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, , and by the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh Vs.
The State of Rajasthan,
Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, considered the validity of S. 6 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Protection Act.
That section provided for a five-year term for certain tenants, subject to renewal for a further five-year term. That section provided further for the
restoration to possession of tenants who had been in possession on 1-12-1951 but who were not in possession on the date of the commencement
of the Act, and also for the restoration to possession, subject to terms and conditions, of tenants who had been in possession in 1950-51 but were
not in possession thereafter. Restoration to possession of a tenant who has been evicted or who has surrendered possession is an unusual feature in
tenancy legislation,
In Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, the court considered that the tenants who had been evicted after 1950-51 had not in
every case been evicted for just cause and that it was probable that those who surrendered did so in some cases under coercion. It would be right
for the legislature to provide for the restoration of such tenants to possession of the lands they had held. But to hold an inquiry as to who, among
the tenants who had been in possession in 1950-51 and were not in possession in August, 1952, had a moral claim to be restored to possession,
would cause delay in legislation which the emergency would now allow.
In that state of affairs, the emergency justified the enactment of all the parts of S. 6 of the Act. For that proposition, support was sought in the
principles enunciated in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C). In the case before us, the restrictions complained of by the petitioner as imposed by the
impugned enactments differ in quality from the group or restrictions imposed by S. 6 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Act. I am unable to
regard Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, , as authority for the proposition that statutory extension of a tenant''s term beyond
the period fixed by the contract would constitutionally be invalid in the absence of proof of emergency in the relations between landlords and
tenants of that category.
Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, dealt with legislation by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan by which, pending the enactment of
comprehensive tenancy law, eviction of tenants was prohibited, by successive extensions of temporary legislation, for seven years from June, 1949.
There was in that case no emergency of the kind found in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, Protection from eviction was
granted for the purpose merely of giving time to the State to decide on the form and content of comprehensive tenancy law. (1920) 65 Law Ed
865 (C), was considered. The Supreme Court said,
A law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller some fixity of tenure, cannot on that
ground alone be said to be unreasonable. Legislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee.
Thus, in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in possession even after the expiry of the lease, was held to
be valid.
I am unable to hold that (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), and (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D), are part of the Constitutional law of this country so as
to compel the courts to hold that tenancy legislation by which a tenant, whose term has expired, is authorised to continue in possession, subject to
terms as to payment of fair rent and proper use of the land, for a reasonable period after the termination of the tenancy, must be held ultra vires the
State legislature, unless such legislation is intended and is reasonably necessary to meet an emergency in the relations of tenants and landowners of
that description.
I am in complete agreement with the learned Advocate General in his submission that the proper way of reaching a decision on the question of
the constitutional validity of an enactment of an Indian Legislature is not to start at the point at which the argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioner commences. Legislative powers in our country are not divided between the States and the Centre on the pattern of the division of
powers in the United States. We do not have a Centre with enumerated powers of legislation and the State with reserve power.
All the subjects of legislation are set out in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The first thing to do, in determining the
constitutional validity of an enactment in India, is to turn to Part XI and Schedule VII of the Constitution. Even where, as in this case, the attack on
the validity of the enactment is based solely on part III of the Constitution, a preliminary examination of the amplitude of the power of the
concerned legislature to legislate on the subject and the purposes which such legislation might attempt to achieve would create the necessary
atmosphere for a competent consideration of the questions arising under Part III.
In this case, we find that the subject-matter of the impugned legislation falls under item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, viz., ""Land, that is to
say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant"". The impugned enactments purport to regulate the relation of
landlords and tenants in agricultural lands in the State. The Act deals not merely with tenants whose terms are current but also with tenants who are
in possession after the expiry of the terms limited by their respective contracts.
The question arises whether an ex-tenant is a tenant within the meaning of that word in item 18. It is well settled that words used in the Seventh
Schedule should be construed in their widest sense as denoting only subject-matters of legislation. Tenancy legislation both in this country and in
England has always been regarded as not limited to the regulation of the terms of existing tenancies but extending also to the prescribing of terms
on which tenants, whose terms have expired, could continue in possession as tenants.
The Calcutta Rent Act (Bengal Act III of 1920) regulated letting of buildings in Calcutta in the years immediately following the First World War.
Questions arising under the Act were ultimately decided by the Privy Council in AIR 1928 227 (Privy Council) . Their Lordships held that the
word ""tenant"" used in that Act included a person whose term under the contract of tenancy had come to an end and added that the word ""tenant
had similarly been construed by the English Court of Appeal in considering questions arising under the Increase of Rent Act, 1920.
Tenancy legislation to which reference is made in the judgments of this court in N. Sundararaja Iyer Vs. Sub-Collector of Dindigul and Another,
and in R. C. No. 86 of 1954 (Mad) (M), related not merely to ""tenants"" strictly so called but also to ex-tenants. The statute considered in the The
State of West Bengal Vs. Subodh Gopal Bose and Others, , was enacted after the coming into force of the Constitution. By the Act, certain rights
of tenants, which had become extinguished by the operation of an earlier statute, were revived and kept in force.
Even in cases where decrees for the eviction of tenants had been obtained and the tenancies had been finally put an end to in that manner, the Act
restored the tenants to the position they had held before the termination of the tenancy. I hold that the term ""tenant"" in item 18 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution includes an ex-tenant. It follows that the circumstance that the Acts impugned in this case confer rights on
persons who were let into possession on tenancy agreements but who continue after the expiry of the terms of their tenancy would not take the
Acts beyond the scope of Art. 246(3) and item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.
The power to regulate the relations of landlords and tenants is granted to the legislature under item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution in addition to the power granted to the legislature to make laws with respect to contracts and transfer of property concerning
agricultural land. The legislature is therefore competent to modify, and introduce obligatory terms in, contracts of leases of agricultural land.
After determining whether the legislation is within the competence of the legislature under Part XI and Schedule VII of the Constitution, we
would have to turn to Part III of the Constitution to ascertain whether any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by that part are affected by the
legislation. It will be recognised that this is a totally different method of approach to the solution of the problem from the method adopted by the
petitioner''s learned counsel when he started with axioms of American Constitutional law and placed particular reliance on (1920) 65 Law Ed 865
(C). In Block v. Hirsh (C), Mr. Justice Holmes had to consider whether letting of buildings could be regarded as business, and if so, whether
circumstances had been proved which clothed that business with a public interest. It is obvious that, if we begin discussing questions relating to
tenancy legislation in this country falling under Art. 246(3) and item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution, in the light of the
principles governing legislation in the United States in the exercise of the power to regulate businesses effected with a public interest or in the
exercise of the war power of Congress, we are in danger of losing sight of the essential of our problem and the realities of our own Constitutional
structure.
We have found that the impugned Acts are within the competence of the State legislature under Art. 246(3) and item 18 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Now, except where a statute deals with a purely beneficial subject, like, for example, the regularisation of
titles acquired under Bhoodan, a statute is bound to affect personal rights strictly so called or rights to property or office. When a legislation is
impugned on the ground that it adversely affects rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, we would first have to ascertain whether the right
claimed is one of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, and secondly, whether the right is affected in a manner not warranted by the
Constitution. In this case, the legislation does affect rights to property. A citizen who owns land is under Art. 19 (1) (f) entitled to hold and dispose
of such land.
But it is not an absolute right, because Art. 19 (1)(f) subjects the right to the power of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the public
interest. The Constitution guarantees the citizen''s individual rights of property because it is considered in the public interest that property should be
quietly inherited, enjoyed and disposed of in accordance with the laws of Succession and Transfer made by the State from time to time. Every act
of inheritance, transfer and enjoyment is protected by all the sanctions at the disposal of the State.
It is obvious that, in return for those benefits, the citizen who holds property owes obligations to the State and his fellow-citizens. There is certainly
no modern State which does not, from sound reasons of policy, cure the rights of private property at a hundred points. It would be wrong to think
that, because Art. 19 of the Constitution mentions first the citizen''s right to hold land and then the State''s power to impose reasonable restrictions,
the citizen''s right is anterior to Society and the State and that the State''s power is a super-imposed evil which should be tolerated when it cannot
be avoided.
On the other hand, the citizen''s right and the State''s power are alike founded on social utility or public interest and are co-eval and of equal weight
in the ultimate scales of social well-being.
The Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Act conferred on tenants who had been let into possession of land under an agreement of tenancy and
who were in possession of such land on 1-12-1951, the right to continue in occupation as tenants until May, 1957. It further conferred on persons
let into possession subsequent to 1-12-1951. the right to continue in possession till the same date and to continue in possession thereafter for a
further period of five years unless the tenancy was put an end to by notice given before 1-5-1957.
The Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as amended by Act XIV of 1956, gave the tenants in the Tanjore district protection from
eviction until September, 1958. The question is whether these were reasonable restrictions to impose on the right of a landowner to evict from his
land a tenant whose term would under the contract of tenancy expire before May, 1957, or before September, 1958.
The"" right which a landowner has to evict a tenant on the expiry of his term under the contract of tenancy is vested in the landowner under the
general law of contracts and the principles enacted in the Transfer of Property Act. Clear authority for the proposition that the legislature has the
power to modify or curtail, for the benefit of the tenant (including in the term an ex-tenant), rights which are vested in the landowner under the
general law and the Transfer of Property Act is furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of West Bengal Vs. Subodh Gopal
Bose and Others, .
In that case, the Calcutta High Court held that the landowner''s right to annul under-tenures and evict under-tenants, being a vested right acquired
by him under his purchase before S. 37 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act, 1859. the retrospective deprivation of that right by S. 7 of the
Amending Act was an infringement of his fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(f) to hold the land with all the rights acquired under his purchase; that
such deprivation was not a reasonable restriction on the landowner''s exercise of his vested right; and that consequently S. 7 was not saved by Cl.
5 of Art. 19 of the Constitution and was void.
In appeal, the Chief Justice of India differed from the High Court and held that the amending Act was in line with traditional tenancy legislation in
this country affording relief to tenants whenever the tenancy laws were found, due to changing conditions, to operate harshly on the tenancy. Das,
J. (as he then was) concurred, though, on points not material for our present purposes, his Lordship differed from the learned Chief Justice. In the
concurring judgment, his Lordship referred to certain provisions in the West Bengal Revenue Sales (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, which
conferred some benefits on the landowner and thus concluded the discussion on that point,
The cumulative effect of the foregoing facts which were not placed before the High Court much outweighs the consideration of the pecuniary loss
of the respondent, Subodh Gopal Bose, as the auction purchaser and in the circumstances, the infliction of the loss of the right to eject under-
tenants can only be regarded as a reasonable restriction permitted by Art. 19(5) to be imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed under Art.
19(1)(f).
It follows from that ruling that restrictions imposed on landowners for the benefit of tenants cannot be regarded as unreasonable or beyond the
competence of the legislature on the mere ground that the restrictions deprive the landowner of certain antecedent vested rights.
The petitioner admitted the respondent to possession of the land in 1955. Subject to the conditions stated in the Madras Cultivating Tenants
Protection Act, 1955, as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956, the petitioner is disabled by the said Act from recovering possession of the land
for a period of three years from September, 1955. The learned Advocate General told us that comprehensive tenancy law is under consideration
by the State Government. In Rajasthan, pending enactment of such tenancy law, eviction of tenants was prohibited, by successive extension of
temporary legislation, for seven years from 1949. The validity of such legislation was upheld in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, .
The denial to landowners in the State of Madras of the right to evict their tenants for a period of 3 or 4 years cannot in the circumstances, be
considered as an unreasonable restriction of their rights. The presumption is in favour of the constitutional validity of the legislation. I find that the
presumption holds. I need hardly add that the wisdom of the policy of the legislature is not in question here, but only the ambit of its legislative
power.
That, in the matter of rent, the legislature of the State has power, in supersession of the terms of the contract, between the parties, to direct the
fixation and payment of fair rent, appears, so to speak, on the face of the relevant provisions of the Constitution referred to in the preceding
paragraphs and is affirmed in some of the authorities cited above, to which it is unnecessary that any further specific reference be made. Fixing or
directing the fixation of fair rent is part of what the authorities call the pattern of tenancy legislation in this country. It is not contended that the
Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act is an unreasonable exercise of the power.
Out of respect for the petitioner''s learned counsel. I shall proceed to consider the more important decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States which were cited by him in support of the position that the impugned enactments impose unreasonable restrictions on the
landowner''s right to enjoy property. In Missouri Pacific RIy. Co. v. State of Nebraska, (1896) 41 Law Ed 489 (O), an order of the Nebraska
State Board of Transportation directing a railroad company to surrender a part of its land to certain individuals for the purpose of building and
maintaining an elevator upon it was held to be a taking of private property of the company for the private use of such persons, and, as such, a
violation of the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
All that has happened in the case before us is that the term of a tenant let into possession by the landowner has been extended by the statute
beyond the period fixed by the contract between the parties. Cases such as (1896) 41 Law Ed 489 (O), where A, an owner of land, is compelled
against his will to put another person in possession of his (A''s) land for a term or permanently are clearly distinguishable from cases where the
landowner, who has let a tenant into possession is compelled to allow him to continue in possession for a reasonable term.
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. H.J. Mahon, (1922) 67 Law Ed 322 (P), a statute forbidding the mining of coal under private dwellings or streets in
places where the right to mine such coal is reserved in the grant was held to be unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law. It is
in that case that Mr. Justice Holmes spoke his famous sentence, ""We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."" So far as tenancy law
in our country is concerned, however, we have the authority of The State of West Bengal Vs. Subodh Gopal Bose and Others, for the proposition
that legislation is not invalid on the mere ground that the landowner is deprived thereby of antecedent vested rights.
Petitioner''s learned counsel next relied on Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., (1935) 79 Law Ed 1468 (Q), and Louisville
Joint Stock Land Bank v. William W. Radford, (1935) 79 Law Ed 1593 (R). These decisions were handed down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in May, 1935. In those decisions, statutes which formed part of the New Deal legislation were declared void as violating the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Those decisions were criticised at the time as expressing political
and economic doctrines which the people had put behind them by the verdicts they recorded in the elections of 1932 and 1934.
In addition to the Acts struck down by those decisions, several other enactments of the Roosevelt regime were declared invalid by the Supreme
Court in the year 1935 and 1936. Historically speaking, it was perhaps necessary and proper that those opinions should have been rendered,
because they enabled the American people to think out the full implications of the new philosophy they were opting for and the increased
responsibility which they were placing upon the National Government, viz., the responsibility of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to
foster and promote free competitive enterprise, conditions under which there would be afforded useful employment for those able, willing and
seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power - a responsibility which the National Government
formally accepted under the Employment Act of 1946 - (Public Law 304 of the 79th Congress).
We must go back however to 1936. It is well known that, after the almost unanimous election by the people of President Roosevelt as president
for a second term in 1936, the outlook of the Supreme Court on the social and economic problems to which New Deal legislation attempted to
find solutions changed, and that the court took a more restricted view of its own jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of the legislature on
matters within its competence. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, (1937) 81 Law Ed 703 (S), the court expressly overruled its earlier decision in
Adkins v. Children''s Hospital, (1922) 67 Law Ed 785 (T), and upheld the validity of a Minimum Wage Law of the State of Washington. On the
same date, viz., 29-3-1947, the Supreme Court in Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank, (1937) 81 Law Ed 736 (U), upheld the validity of the
amended Frazier-Louke Act.
The earlier Frazier-Louke Act had been held void on 27-5-1935 in Louisvile Joint Stock Land Bank v. William W. Badford, (Public Law 304 of
the 79th Congress). ""In a series of notable decisions handed down on the 24th May, 1957 (Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., (1937)
81 Law Ed 1245 (V), Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Harwell G. Davis, (1937) 81 Law Ed 1279 (W) and Helvering v. Devis, (1937) 81
Law Ed 1307 (X), the Supreme Court sustained all the crucial provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 and thus announced a concept of
national welfare so broad that it constituted, in theory, if not in fact, a reversal of many of the conservative decisions of the earlier New Deal period
and a return to the Marshall interpretation of the Constitution.
The learned authors from whose monumental work ""The Growth of the American Republic"" the quotation given above has been taken, add ""Such
an interpretation of the Constitution, had it been adopted earlier, might well have sustained the Agricultural Adjustment Act, (the reference is to
United States v. Butler, (1936) 297 US 1 (Y), and the Railway Pension legislation, (the reference is to (1922) 67 Law Ed 322 (P)"") (The Growth
of the American Republic, Vol. II, page 611).
Decisions of the Supreme Court striking down legislation relating to rights of property as violating the due process clause of amendment V and
XIV of the Constitution, prior to March, 1937, are not considered authoritative in the United States at the present time and cannot be of much
assistance to us here in this country on the question of reasonable restrictions on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
I hold that, in order that the legislature of a State might enact legislation extending the term of a tenant of land beyond the period fixed by the
contract of tenancy, it is not necessary that there should be. a situation which can be called an emergency in the relations of such landowners and
tenants. I find further that the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952, the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as
amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956, and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956, represent a valid exercise of the
State''s legislative power under Art. 246 and item 18 of list II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and that the restrictions imposed by
those enactments on the landowner''s right to hold property are reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the general public.
Petitioner''s learned counsel contended next that the impugned legislation violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. The argument is that while
landowners, who were themselves cultivating their lands, are left free so to continue to cultivate them, landowners, who had admitted tenants into
possession, are denied freedom to evict the tenants on the expiry of the term limited by the contract but are compelled to continue such tenants in
possession after the expiry of such term. The impugned legislation deals with the relations of landowners and tenants.
Compelling landowners, who have no tenants, to admit tenants, is outside the scope of the subject-matter of the legislation. Further, even assuming
that landowners who have no tenants, and landowners whose tenants are continuing in possession after the expiry of the term limited by the
contract of tenancy, stand on the same footing, it is not necessary, in order to avoid the charge of discrimination that the State should legislate at
one and the same time for both these classes of landowners. The statute fixing minimum wages in (1937) 81 Law Ed 703 (S), related only to
women and children. It was contended that the statute violated the Article relating to equal protection because the statute did not extend to men as
well. In repelling that contention, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said,
The argument that the legislation in question constitutes an arbitrary discrimination, because it does not extend to men, is unavailing. This court has
frequently held that legislative authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach.
The legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be
clearest.'' If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have
been applied''. There is no ''Doctrinaire requirement'' that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms.
I hold that the statutes do not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. Petition is dismissed. No costs.
Ganapatia Pillai, J.
I also agree.
Rajagopalan, J. (Partly Concurring)
I had the advantage of reading in advance the judgment which Subrahmanyam Judge has just delivered. I am in complete and respectful
agreement with his conclusions, that the impugned Tenancy Acts do not infringe the fundamental right of equal protection of laws guaranteed by
Art. 14 of the Constitution, and that the restrictions imposed by those Acts on the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner by Art. 19(1)(f)
are reasonable and within the limits permitted by Art 19(5) of the Constitution. I wish, however, to add a few observations of mine to supplement
the discussion of my learned brother.
With reference to the challenge to the validity of the impugned Acts based on Art. 14, I only wish to add that a somewhat similar contention,
but even more restricted in its scope was repelled by the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, At page 620 (of SCR)
(at p. 516 of AIR), his Lordship observed,
The contention... is that under that section landlords who had tenants on their lands on April 1, 1948, were subjected to various restrictions in the
enjoyment of their rights as owners, while other landlords were free from similar restrictions.
There is no substance in this contention"". In the present case the classification was between owners of lands who themselves continued in
possession of their lands and those who admitted tenants into possession of their lands under contracts express or implied, after which the tenants
were in actual physical and lawful possession of the lands.
It was on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of America in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C) and in (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D), that
Mr. Venkatasubramania Aiyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied to a considerable extent to support his plea, that the restrictions imposed
by the impugned Tenancy Acts did not satisfy the test of reasonableness imposed by Art. 19(5) of our Constitution. The learned counsel urged that
the principles laid down in (1920) 65 Law Ed. 865 (C), and in (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D), have become part of the law which this court has to
administer, because those principles were approved of by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. when he delivered the judgment of a Division Bench of this court
in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, and again when the same learned Judge delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, . Before I examine which among the principles laid down by Holmes J. in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865
(C), were approved of, I should like to record my respectful agreement with what Venkatarama Aiyar J. stated at page 1129 (of ILR Mad) : (at p.
60 of AIR), in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others,
It appears to me that the question is one which has to be determined solely on a construction of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and that
there is no need to discuss at any length the American law on the subject. If what would otherwise be an invasion of the rights of a citizen under
Art. 19(1)(f) is reasonable and in the interests of the public, then all the requirements of Art. 19 (5) are satisfied.
A similar caution has been administered more than once by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. That is why I have refrained from undertaking
over again a detailed examination of the American cases, which have all been considered by Subrahmanyam, J.
One of the principles laid down in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), which was approved of in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, ,
was that explained at p. 620 (of SCR) : (at p. 516 of AIR). After pointing out : ""The preamble of the Ordinance recites that there was a growing
tendency on the part of the landholders to eject tenants, and that it was therefore expedient to enact a law for giving them protection"",
Venkatarama Aiyar J. observed:
We should add that the petitioners sought to dispute the correctness of the recitals in the preamble. This they clearly cannot do - vide the
observations of Holmes J. in (1920) 65 Law Ed. 863 (C).
We are not really concerned with the application of that principle in the case before us. Nothing in the preambles of the impugned Acts was relied
upon to sustain the constitutional validity of the legislation. I would however like to add that I do not understand the Supreme Court to have laid
down that the recitals in the preamble of an Act are conclusive of the facts stated therein. Such was not the view taken by Holmes J. in (1920) 65
Law Ed. 865 (C), even independently of what he said in his subsequent decision in (1923) 68 Law Ed. 841 (D). In (1920) 65 Law Ed. 865 (C),
at p. 870, Holmes J. stated:
No doubt it is true that a legislative declaration of facts that are material only as the ground for enacting a rule of law, for instance that a certain use
is a public one, may not be held conclusive by the courts... But a declaration by a legislature concerning public conditions that by necessity and
duty, it must know is entitled at least to great respect. In this instance Congress stated a publicly notorious and almost worldwide fact. That the
emergency declared by the statute did exist must be assumed....
In Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, Venkatarama Ayyar J. cited this passage with obvious approval and then proceeded to
refer to the affidavits filed in the proceedings before him. The learned Judge observed,
The affidavits filed in these petitions also amply established the seriousness of the general situation... Thus it is amply established that a state of
emergency had arisen and strong measures had to be taken for meeting the same.
No more in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), than in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, ), were the recitals in the preamble of the
impugned Act accepted as conclusive proof of the facts stated therein.
The other passage from the judgment of Holmes J. in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), that was quoted with approval by Venkatarama Aiyar J. at
page 1122 (of ILR Mad) : (at pp. 56-57 of AIR), in Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, ), and at page 622 (of SCR) : (at p.
517 of AIR), in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, was ""The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in
possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the Commission established by the Act, and that thus the use of the land
and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut down. But if the public interest be
established, the regulation of rates is one of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has been settled since (1877)
24 Law Ed 77 (E)...The preference given to the tenant in possession is an almost necessary ingredient of the policy, and is traditional in English
Law. If the tenant remained subject to the landlord''s power to evict, the attempt to limit the landlord''s demands would fail.
In Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court relied on this passage to support the position :
Thus in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in possession even after the expiry of the lease was held to
he valid.
As I understand the judgment of his Lordship, it was only for that limited purpose that he relied on that passage from the judgment of Holmes J.
In Santhanakrishna Odayar Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, , however, the passage from the judgment of Holmes J. which has been set out
above, was relied on to sustain the view, that where the impugned Act was an emergency measure, in the sense that it was designed to meet an
emergency and was to be in force for a strictly limited period of time, that was a very relevant factor in deciding whether the restrictions it imposed
were reasonable within the scope of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution - see the observations at page 1122 (of ILR Mad) : (at pp. 56-57 of AIR).
It is needless for me to refer again to what my learned brother, Subrahmanyam J. has emphasised in his judgment, that we have been asked to
consider the Constitutional validity of the impugned Tenancy Acts on the basis, that they were not emergency measures in the sense I have
indicated above.
of course, the principles laid down by Holmes J. in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), have to be understood in the light of what that great Judge
himself held subsequently in (1923) 68 Law Ed. 841 (D). While there was no specific reference to the decision in (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D), in
the decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, , it was specifically referred to in Santhanakrishna Odayar
Vs. Vaithilingam and Others, Venkatarama Aiyar J. observed:
Reliance was also placed on the decision in (1923) 68 Law Ed 841 (D). But Holmes J. affirmed the correctness of the decision in (1920) 65 Law
Ed 865 (C), and held that the principle of that decision did not apply as in fact the emergency had come to an end. This decision would be in point
if the State of Madras should re-enact Act XIV of 1952.
Based on his plea, that the principles laid down by Holmes J. in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), have been approved of by the Supreme Court in
Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, , the proposition of law that Mr. Venkatasubramania Aiyar invited us to accept was that, when
legislation takes away from the owner of agricultural land his right to recover his property from the time expired tenant, who continues in
possession without the authority of the owner, such legislation is an invasion of constitutionally protected rights of property ''which can be justified
only upon proof of an emergency justification'' (I have underlined (here in '' '') the passage on which the learned counsel laid most stress). As I
understand the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, no such proposition of law was laid down there.
It is true at p. 622 (of SCR) : (at p. 517 of AIR), in Sardar Inder Singh Vs. The State of Rajasthan, , after referring to the passage from the
judgment of Holmes J. in (1920) 65 Law Ed 865 (C), which I have already set out above, Venkatarama Aiyar J. stated,
It should also be remembered in this connection that the impugned Ordinance is an emergency legislation of a temporary character and, as
observed in Dr. N.B. Khare Vs. The State of Delhi, that is a factor to be taken into account in judging its reasonableness.
But that does not sanction the acceptance of the contention of Mr. Venkatasubramania Aiyar, that the Supreme Court would have struck down the
Ordinance in question there as unconstitutional, but for the fact that it was an emergency legislation of a temporary character.
I did not understand Mr. Venkatasubramania Aiyar to contend that no restrictions could be imposed on the fundamental right to hold and
dispose of property guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(f) except in an emergency. His plea was, as I understand it, a more limited one, that the two sets of
restrictions imposed by the two Tenancy Acts (1) restriction on the right of the owner of the land to recover possession from the tenant, whose
period of tenancy as regulated by the contract between the parties, express or implied, has expired, and (2) the restriction on the right of the owner
to regulate by contract between himself and the tenant in possession of the land the rent the latter should pay for the period of his lawful occupation
of the land, were unconstitutional, as there was no case of emergency to be considered at this stage. I have already dealt with this argument, that if
at all these restrictions could be accepted as reasonable within the scope of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution, there should have been proof of
emergency during the limited duration of which the restrictions were to be in force. Whether without any consideration of such emergency, the
restrictions are reasonable and within the limits permitted by Art. 19(5) still remains for consideration.
Judged by the pattern of tenancy legislation during the last fifty years in this State and in the rest of India, which secured for the tenant-in-
possession a reasonable fixity of tenure subject to his paying a fair rent during the period he is permitted to remain in possession, both regulated by
legislation independent of the contractual obligations already incurred or which the parties are prepared to incur, the restrictions imposed by the
impugned Tenancy Acts, to which I have referred above, cannot be characterised as unreasonable.
That these restrictions have been imposed on owners of lands held under ryotwari tenure makes, in my opinion, no difference to the standards of
reasonableness to apply. In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts, due regard must be had also to
the economic background and the need for a planned agricultural economy in the interests of the country as a whole, both of which were explained
in some detail in N. Sundararaja Iyer Vs. Sub-Collector of Dindigul and Another, , by a Division Bench of this court of which I was a member.
I also see considerable force in the contention of the learned Advocate General, that in testing the reasonableness or otherwise of the restrictions
imposed by the impugned enactments, the court should consider whether those restrictions were greater than those needed for the proper
effectuation of the law, because such effectuation of the law itself is in the interests of the public. Legislative competence of the Madras Legislature
to enact the Tenancy Laws, the Constitutional validity of which has been impugned, in these proceedings, was never in issue.
It was only their constitutional validity that was assailed. The reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned enactment has also to be
judged in relation to the objective in view, what the intended legislation was designed by the legislature to achieve. That was one of the principles
explained in V. Guruviah Naidu and Brothers Vs. The State of Madras and Another, the observations are at pages 478-479 (of Mad LJ) : (at pp.
165-166 of AIR). See also Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney General for Quebee, 1951 AC 179 at p. 196 (Z-2). Though that is a
relevant factor, still the Court has to decide whether (he means to achieve the end in view are those within the limits set down by the Constitution,
in this case, by Art. 19 (5) of the Constitution.
To adopt the words of Holmes J. which my learned brother has already quoted in his exhaustive judgment, we should not forget that a strong
public desire to improve the conditions of the tenants of ryotwari lands is not enough to warrant an achievement of that desire by a shorter cut than
the Constitutional way.
Once again I must say that I have placed these views of mine on record only to supplement what my learned brother has dealt with
exhaustively in his learned judgment. I agree with Subrahmanyam J. that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts on the rights of
owners of ryotwari lands like the petitioner are reasonable and satisfy the requirements of Art. 19(5) of the Constitution.