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Judgment
Srinivasan, J.—In these several writ petitions, the validity of the Madras Act XXXVI of 1958-the Tiruchirappally Kaiaeruvaram and
Mattuvaram Act -in its entirety has been questioned. The facts as they appear relevant for the different petitions would be set out later. Broadly
stated, these petitions are landowners who come within the mischief of this Act. The Respondents were persons employed as Kaiaeruvaramdars.
They moved the Special Tahsildar complaining that their service as Kaiaeruvaramdar has been terminated and sought for reinstatement as provided
by Section 5 of the abovesaid Act. Such reinstatement had been ordered and the complaint of the several landowners is that the provisions of the
Act offend the guarantees conferred by the Constitution and are liable to be struck down for that reason. Before setting out in detail the specific
contentions urged in this regard, it is desirable to refer to the circumstances under which this Act came to be passed and the provisions thereof.
The institution of Kaiaeruvaramdars appears to be peculiar to this district of Tiruchirappalli. In the Gazetteer of Tiruchirappalli, volume I, at page
150 the following passage explains the system:
Under the waram system, the landowner generally supplies the manure and seed and the lessee gets a share of the harvest which varies from one
half in the uplands to two-thirds in parts of Kulitalai. In the uplands, the straw always goes to the landlord. In the lowlands, the landowner often lets
his pannaiyals to cultivate part of his land. Considerable differences of practice occur. But the most common systems are what are called (1) the
Alwaram or Pannaiyal and (2) the Mattuvaram system. In the former the pannaiyal gets from one-fourth to one-tenth of the produce, the general
proportion amounting to 5/48ths of the whole, or 1-1/4 marakkals in every kalam. The Mattuvaram cultivator gets a larger proportion of the
produce generally 3/16ths and over the whole or part of the straw, But though the landlord supplies seed and manure, he has to find his own Oxon
for ploughing. The pannaiyals are engaged by the year and given a fixed rate of daily wages (usually paid in grain) and certain customary
presents.... They have to do any work which their masters require at any time....
It is seen from this passage that two sets of agricultural labourers are usually employed; both are generally paid by a share in the produce. The
Mattuvaramdar produces his own Oxen for the purpose of ploughing the land, besides attending to other duties upon the land. The
Kaiaeruvaramdar, on the other hand, has no bulls of his own. He has to attend to the ploughing, weeding and other operations upon the land just
as a Mattuvaramdar has to do, the only difference between the two being that the Kaiaeruvaramdar uses the bulls provided by the landowner. But
in either case the general practice in this district appears to have been that they have been remunerated by way of a share in the produce of the
land.
The question arose whether Mattuvaramdars and Kaiaeruvaramdars were cultivating tenants within the meaning of Act XXV of 1955. In certain
writ petitions that came before this Court, RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J., held that they were not cultivating tenants, the principal grounds for
the decision being that these persons had no possession or custody of the land and had no tenancy agreement with the landlord and had not also
taken part in the entire cultivation but only one part of it. Nor were they paying any rent to the landlord, but, on the other hand, were paid a certain
quantity of grain. This decision went up in appeal and a Bench of this Court held in Vaiyapuri v. Sethurama ILR (1958) Mad. 1073 that
Mattuvaramdar or a Kaiaeruvaramdar is not a cultivating tenant as defined in the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. After this decision
was rendered an ordinance, Ordinance I of 1958, was promulgated. By this ordinance, the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, and
the Madras Cultivating Tenants Payment of Fair Rent Act, 1956, were amended. It provided that a cultivating tenant defined in the above two
Acts shall include
in the district Tiruchirappalli a Kaiaeruvaramdar of Mattuvaramdar who works on the land under an engagement with the landlord for remuneration
by a share in the crop in respect of which the work is done.
A new section, Section 4A in Act XXIV of 1956, was also inserted introducing a deeming provision that a Kaiaeruwaramdar or
Mattuwaramdar in the district of Tiruchirapalli in receipt of remuneration by a share in the crop shall, be deemed to be a cultivating tenant in
respect of that land. It is common ground that a bill was sought to be introduced in replacement of this ordinance, but that was dropped. But,
instead, a special Act, now impugned, Act XXXVI of 1958, was passed.
The long title to this Act describes it as an Act to
define the conditions of engagement and to provide for the protection of Kaiaeruwaramdars and Msttuwaramdars in certain areas in the district of
Tiruchirappalli.
The preamble to the Act sets out that certain peculiar kinds of relationship in respect of land called Kaiaeruwaram and Mattuwaram are
prevailing and
whereas the uncertainty regarding the incidence of those relationships have led to frequent disputes between the landowners and Kaiaeruvaramdars
and Mattuwaramdars leading to unsettled conditions and breaches of peace and causing fall in agricultural production.
The Act purported to define the conditions of engagement and to provide for the protection of Kaiaeruwaramdars and Mattuwaramdars.
Section 2 of the Act defines Kaiaeruwaramdars and Mattuwaramdars. I have earlier pointed out the distinctions between the two and the
definitions follow those distinctions. Section 3 of the Act specifies that the remuneration payable to any Kaiaerawaramdar shall be on the same
terms as were applicable to him immediately before the commencement of this Act. Section 4, Sub-Section 1, interdicted the dismissal of a
Kaiaeruwaramdar by the landowner after the commencement of the agricultural operations in a crop season. Sub-Section 2 enabled the dismissal
for misconduct or for neglect of duty. But the landowner dismissing a Kaiaeruwaramdar was bound to report the dismissal to the Tahsildar having
jurisdiction over the area. Sub-Section 3 provided for termination of the engagement by mutual agreement, or by giving notice in writing. But in
such an event the landowner was liable to pay to the Kaiaeruwaramdar such compensation as may be prescribed or such amount as may be
agreed upon.
Since a great deal of the argument in this case has centred round Section 5 of the Act, it may be set out in extenso:
Kaiaeruwaramdar to be re-engaged in certain cases.-Any Kaiaeruwaramdar whose engagement has been terminated on or after the 1st January,
1957, and before the commencement of this Act, shall, on application made within thirty days after the commencement of this Act, to the Tahsildar
having jurisdiction over the area in which the land is situated, be entitled to be re-engaged as kaiaeruwaramdar under this Act by the landowner
concerned,
There are two provisos thereto which are not important. The further sections in the Act provide for adjudication of disputes arising out of a
dismissal u/s 4(2) of the Act.
Mr. K.K. Venugopal, for the Petitioners, has argued that the Special Tahsildar who heard the matter and made the orders which have led to the
present writ petitions had no territorial jurisdiction. I can dispose of this point first before taking up the principal question as to the
unconstitutionality of the impugned provisions of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, Section 4(2), which calls upon the landowner, on
dismissing a kaiaeruwaramdar for misconduct or for neglect of duty, to report the fact of dismissal, refers to the authority to whom the report has
to be made as the Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the area. The very same expression is used again in Section 5 as the authority to whom any
kaiaeruwaramdar whose engagement has been terminated could apply for re engagement It is that authority so described who is empowered to
adjudicate the disputes between the parties. The explanation to Section 6 also states that where the land in respect of which the kaiaeruwaramdar
is engaged is situated in the jurisdiction of more, than one Tahsildar, it shall be open to the party aggrieved to apply to any of those Tahsildars. Mr.
Venugopal contends that the Act purports to empower an existing authority described as the Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the area as the
appropriate authority who has jurisdiction to deal with the matter referred to. It is contended by the learned Counsel that the Act confers no power
upon the Government to appoint any other authority, whether called a Special Tahsildar with jurisdiction under the impugned Act over the area in
question or in any other manner. In the rules framed under this Act, Tahsildar has been defined to mean
Tahsildar in whose jurisdiction the holding in question or any part thereof is situate, or any officer of the Revenue Department not below the rank of
a Tahsildar specially empowered by the Government, or other competent officer in this behalf.
The rules have been framed u/s 13 of the Act, which empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. The
contention of the learned Counsel however is that in so far as the provision of the Act itself describes the authority as the Tahsildar having
jurisdiction over the area, it is not competent to the Government to frame a rule to include any authority other than the one mentioned in the section.
It is true that a Tahsildar is a revenue officer possessing certain powers in relation to any specified area. It has not however been contended by the
learned Counsel that by the expression Tahsildar is meant an authority who has been empowered by any relevant statute to exercise any general or
special jurisdiction. If a Tahsildar so-called derived his powers under any statute which empowered a Tahsildar as such to exercise any jurisdiction
in or over any particular area, there would perhaps be some validity in the contention that a specific authority alone was described by the
expression Tahsildar having jurisdiction over the area. In the absence of any such feature no statute which recognises a Tahsildar as a defined
authority has been placed before me or has been brought to my notice the expression has to be given its normal connotation. That should
accordingly be taken to indicate a person appointed as a Tahsildar and conferred with jurisdiction over an area for the purpose of the provisions of
this Act. I am also not persuaded to agree with the learned Counsel that by defining Tahsildar in this particular manner in the rules, Government
have assumed a power which was not conferred upon them by Section 13 of the Act. Section 13 contains, to my mind, an implied power on the
part of the Government to appoint a Tahsildar for the purposes of this Act over any area.
The constitutional objection raised can be briefly stated to be that Section 5 of the Act is unworkable in a variety of conditions and
circumstances and that it also offends Article 19(f) of the Constitution. Mr. Venugopal argues that this provision gives a right to a discharged
kaiaeruwaramdar, discharged on or after the 1st January, 1957, and before the commencement of the impugned Act, to seek re engagement He
argues that during this period net less than five crop seasons have intervened and it is impossible to give effect to this provision, if there should be a
large number of persons who happened to be engaged during that period and should have been discharged on various dates within that period. He
also contends that a person who has been employed as a casual labourer for a particular work or for a specified period naturally ceases to be
employed at the end of that period or after the work is over and his service cannot be said to be terminated within the meaning of Section 5. He
also claims that this section cannot possibly be worked in the case of persons whose services are terminated by mutual agreement or by the giving
of notice and the payment of compensation provided for by Section 4(3) of the Act. Another conundrum raised by the learned Counsel is whether
the right to re-engagement would accrue to a kaiaeruwaramdar who was dismissed for misconduct or neglect of duty during the period in question.
Amplifying these arguments, Mr. Venugopal points out that if more than one person should seek employment by resort to Section 5, the section
could not possibly be worked, and the absence of any provision in the Act to meet situations of this kind is itself relied upon by the learned
Counsel to impeach its validity. A further argument is, what is to happen in the event of the landowner parting with his rights in the land or the land
becoming subject to division among the several different persons? Learned Counsel asks how in such an event the discharged kaiaeruwaramdars
could be restored or which of the several owners would be compelled to so employ them.
It seems to me that these considerations are hardly relevant to an examination of the validity of the provision. As the learned Advocate-General
points out, one can always imagine a variety of situations where even the most carefully drafted statutes may come in for criticism as unworkable in
a particular state of things. That that should not be the approach is well illustrated by a decision of the Privy Counsel in Pye v. Minister for lands for
New South Wales (1954) 1 W.L.R. 1410 (P.C). This part of the headnote would sufficiently indicate the view of the Privy-Council:
The fact that under the Act the compensation was to be determined by the Advisory Board in its report before the purpose of resumption was
finally determined by the Governor and confirmed by the Parliament, while technically presenting some difficulty, involved no actual difficulty in
practice and did not render the Act unworkable. In the present case, the Advisory. Board obviously knew of the intention of the Minister and
assessed the compensation accordingly, and the requisite steps prescribed by the Act were taken in due course. There was no justification for the
view that the Advisory Board could not know the purpose of the resumption until it had finally been effected.... The objection was theoretical only,
for in fact the Advisory Board do, and, in the present case did know both the purpose of the resumption and the owners concerned.
In the course of that judgment it was also observed:
In reaching the conclusion as to the meaning to be placed upon an Act of Parliament ,it must always be remembered, as LORD DUNEDIN said in
Murray v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1918) A.C. 541: "" It is our duty to make what we can of statutes, knowing that they are meant to be
operative, and not inapt, and nothing short of impossibility should, in my judgment, allow a Judge to declare a statute unworkable."" A similar view
was expressed by LORD SIMON, L.C. in. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Limited (1940) A.C. 1014 in the words:
If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which should fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a
construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would
legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.
Whether or not any particular discharged employee would be entitled to be restored, or which or more than one discharge employee would be
entitled to be re-engaged, would certainly be a question that would call for determination in the course of a proceeding u/s 5 or 6 of the Act. The
mere circumstance that there may be such proceedings and that persons claiming equal rights may demand re-engagement as the kaiaeruwaramdar
of the same landowner may no doubt cause some difficulty in the actual adjudication of the disputes. It is the adjudicating authority whose judicial
determination that would settle that question. But I can see no ground for holding that the mere likelihood of such disputes and the difficulty which
the authority competent to adjudicate upon those disputes might face are sufficient to say that the scheme contained in Sections 5 and 6 is
completely unworkable.
Proceeding further on the same lines, Mr. K.K. Venugopal argues that in cases where the landowner changes the crop upon the land and
cultivates sugar-cane for instance, instead of paddy, in what manner is the kaiaeruwaramdar to be remunerated? According to the learned Counsel,
while there is a custom with regard to the sharing of produce in respect of lands cultivated with paddy, no such custom exists in the case of any
other crop. In the case of sugarcane cultivation, it is, also claimed that there is ho ploughing of the land in the absence of which the engagement of a
kaiaeruwarandar is, according to the learned Counsel pointless. He also argues that any landowner has a right to let his land lie fallow, and if the
land is left fallow, neither ploughing nor watering operations require to be done. In such, a case, what are the rights and liabilities of the
kaiaeruwaramdar and the landowner? It is urged that if a kaiaeruwaramdar is deemed to have been permanently engaged, the landowner has to
suffer uncompensated liabilities and, what is more important, from the point of view of the arguments advanced, is that learned Counsel asserts that
the Act contains no method by which disputes of that nature can possibly be adjudicated upon, and that is relied upon in support of the contention
that the Act is in various aspects of the relationship between, the kaiaeruwaramdar and the landowner distinctly unworkable.
Though there appears to be some measure of substance in these arguments, I am not satisfied that a close scrutiny of the provisions of the Act
leads to the conclusion that the Act is unworkable in certain situations. A kaiaeruwaramdar is defined to be a person engaged by a landowner to
do ploughing and watering operations or ploughing operations alone, the remuneration for such work being by a share in the crop on the land in
respect of which such work is done, or by payment of a fixed quantity of paddy, or by both such share and payment. As the definition stands, it
has certainly no relation to the particular crop that is raised upon the land. Whether it is paddy crop or not, it makes no difference to the terms of
engagement between the parties. If it is a fact that a kaiaeruwaramdar is not under the custom prevalent entitled to a share in any crop other than
paddy, it may be that he cannot claim a share in sugarcane crop, for instance. But, nevertheless ,for the work that he does on the land, he is entitled
to be paid the quantity of paddy stipulated between the parties. I am unable to accept the plea that no ploughing is required in respect of land on
which sugarcane is raised. There is undoubtedly the need for the initial ploughing, and the subsequent tending of the crop would call for periodical
watering operations. Cases will differ according as the kaiaeruwaramdar is engaged only for ploughing operation or for both ploughing and
watering operations, in which event the remuneration will probably differ. But that is not to say that the provisions in the Act became unworkable.
Nor do I see any difficulty in dealing with a situation where the landowner prefers to let the land lie fallow. It virtually amounts to terminating the
service of the kaiaeruwaramdar. Section 4, Sub-Section 3, provides for such a course. It may no doubt involve the landholder in paying
compensation for such termination. Equally, on the landowner ceasing to be the owner, the rights and liabilities of the parties would appear to stand
transferred to the successor in interest of the landowner, for land owner in relation to a kaiaeruwaramdar has been defined to mean the owner of
the land who has engaged a kaiaeruwaramdar and to include any person deriving any right from such owner in respect of that land. The scheme of
the Act is that a kaiaeruwaramdar is associated with the land for the cultivation of which his services have been engaged, and that being so, parting
with, the land or ceasing to own a land may relieve the previous owner from any obligation in that regard; but that obligation being attached to the
land as it were, will be one that will have to be discharged by the person who succeeds to the interest of the owner.
The argument that she matters as the above are not adjudicable under the Act is one which I am unable to accept. No provision of the Act can
to my mind be struck down as being unworkable.
u/s 7 of the Act, certain larger privileges appear to have been accorded to mattuwaramdars. A mattuwaramdar is a person who supplies bulls
for ploughing operations for the landowner, and does ploughing and other operations on the land, whereas a kaiaeruwaramdar does not supply
bulls but duly ploughs the land with the bulls provided by the landowner and does ploughing alone or ploughing and watering operations. In the
case of a mattuwaramdar, Section 7 of the Act has given, him the status of a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Madras Cultivating Tenants
Protection Act, 1955, and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956. These are other provisions which provides for the
re-engagement of a mattuwaramdar, whose engagement has been terminated on or before the 1st of January, 1957, and before the
commencement of the impugned Act, provisions analogous to those contained in Section 5 of the Act. It may be mentioned that a
kaiaeruwaramdar has not been given the privilege of a cultivating tenant Mr. K.K. Venugopal argues that both the mattuwaramdar and
kaiaeruwaramdar do the same or similar kind of work on the land, but while the mattuwaramdar has been, granted the rights of a cultivating tenant,
the kaiaeruwaramdar has been treated differently. According to him, the differential treatment accorded to two classes of persons has no
reasonable relation to the object of the Act, and on this ground, the validity of the Act itself is challenged.
I am not disposed to agree with this contention. The statute did not bring into existence the two classes of persons. The system of
mattuwaramdars and kaiaeruwaramdars appears to be an ancient one and what the statute purports to do is only to confer a certain measure of
security in what may be called the service conditions of these classes of cultivators. According to the preamble, the Act was intended to define the
conditions of engagement and to provide for the protection of kaiaeruwaramdars and mattuwaramdars. The two classes of persons certainly do
form recognisable groups distinct from each other, and if the ancient system, which also treated these two groups of persons, differently in so far as
their rights to remuneration was concerned was given statutory shape by his Act, it cannot be contended that there being no real difference
between the nature of the services rendered by the two classes of persons, the conferment of larger rights upon the one by the Act than upon other
invites the taint of discrimination. The case of Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others, has been referred to in this case.
The principles which would justify a classification when the constitutionality of any particular enactment is attacked as discriminatory have been set
out in this decision. It is argued that when there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the Court
on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, it is not open to the Court to presume that there must be some undisclosed and
unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or classes to hostile or discriminating legislation. It is difficult to see any support to the present
argument from the decision cited. As I have pointed out it is not a classification which has been attempted for the first time by the statute. It is one
which has been in existence in the history of the agricultural economy in the district of Tiruchirappalli. There were two distinct classes of persons
engaged for certain specified work in relation to cultivation of land, enjoying certain unwritten privileges but controlled by custom prevalent in the
district. The Legislature did not attempt to discriminate one class against the other. It only recognised the fact that a mattuwaramdar was a person
who was connected with the cultivation of land much more closely than a kaiaeruwaramdar, who could under certain conditions be nothing more
than a casual employee, and if, recognising the customary higher rights always enjoyed by a mattuwaramdar, the Legislature also gave statutory
expression to it in a particular form, it cannot be argued that there is discrimination in favour of the mattuwaramdar and against the
kaiaeruwaramdar.
In this connection, I may refer to Santhanakrishna v. Vaithilingam ILR (1953) Mad. 1114, 1122, 1124. In that case, a sister enactment called
the Tanjore Tenants and Pannayals Protection Ordinance IV of 1952, as modified by Ordinances V and VI of 1952 and the Tanjore Tenants and
Pannayals Protection Act XIV of 1952 came under examination on the ground of attack of constitutional invalidity. In particular , certain new rights
were conferred on cultivating tenants and pannayals, and the controversy related to those sections which conferred such new rights. Pannayals, that
is, persons engaged by a landowner or by a cultivating tenant to look after a farm and do all cultivation work on the land whenever necessary in the
course of an agricultural year, excluding casual labourers, could not be dismissed on and after the 1st of March 1952, and could be ordered to be
taken back if the dismissal was not just and proper. These provisions were attacked as unconstitutional inasmuch as they contravened Article
19(1)(f) of the Constitution; a very similar ground has been taken in the present cases as well; A Bench of this Court examined the provisions and
had to consider whether the restriction imposed upon the light guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) was or was not in the interests of the general public.
A large number of authorities was examined and their Lordships observed:
A question of this kind has in general to be decided not on abstract principles, but on a consideration of the facts and circumstances which form the
background of that legislation and therefore, not much assistance can be derived from decisions given on other statutes.
and later,
In judging of the reasonableness of an enactment, it will be useful to bear two principles in mind. One is that when once it is found that the object of
the legislation and the means adopted to secure it are both reasonable, it is no objection to its validity that it incidentally confers rights on persons
who are not in themselves intended to be the beneficiaries. And the other is that in deciding on the reasonableness of a statute which deals with-
several matters and enacts diverse provisions, the correct approach is not to take each provision by itself, pound it into its component parts and
subject them to meticulous criticism, but to consider the scheme of the Act in its entirety and the cumulative effects of the provisions as a whole.
In that particular case, the learned Judges held that restrictions contained in the Impugned sections as not unreasonable, having regard to their
character as an emergency legislation of a temporary nature.
Whether it is a temporary legislation or a permanent one, the principles enunciated in the above passage equally apply. It cannot be contended
that the impugned legislation lies outside the sphere of legislative competency of the State. The extent to which a particular class stands benefited in
comparison with another distinguishable class cannot possibly form the basis of an attack-of discrimination. The Act itself was necessitated by
reason of unhappy agrarian relationship between the owner of the land and the actual person engaged to till the soil and perform the cultivation
operation thereon. If for the purpose of ensuring the safety of agricultural economy and for providing for employment and conditions of work, the
Legislature had to intervene and provide for definite conditions of employment and remuneration, that is fully within the scope of the relevant entries
in List 2 and List 3 of the VII Schedule. If the security for service tenure and conditions is called for, to safeguard against improper dismissals,
restoration to service or compulsory re-engagement would certainly be measures ancillary to the main intention underlying the legislation. I can see
no difference in principle between an industrial employer being under a disability to discharge an employee at his will and an agricultural employer
being placed under the same limitation. The contention that an employer should not have, thrust upon him an employee whom he does not wish to
entertain in service and that offends any guaranteed right under the Constitution is one which derive no support from any authority.
I am accordingly satisfied that the attack upon the provisions of the Act as being unworkable must fail; equally so, the attack upon the
constitutionality of any particular provision therein. The writ petition will be posted for further hearing on the special points relevant to each
individual application in due course.