Competent Authority vs Ajay Gupta

We have heard Shri D.C. Raina, learned counsel for the appellant.

There is delay of 96 days in preferring the LPA. Notice was issued to respondents and Shri V.R. Wazir, learned counsel for the

coveterrespondents appeared and heard him. He has filed objections.

According to Mr.V.R.Wazir, sufficient cause as contemplated under section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been explained and, therefore, it is

not a fit case to condone the delay of 96 days. At the same time, it is contended by Mr. D.C. Raina that the writ petition has been disposed of

after admission without affording any opportunity to the applicant to either submit their counter or without issuing a notice after admission, depriving

the applicant of right of hearing and defend his case and, therefore, the substantial justice should not be made to suffer because of the impediment

of technicalities. The question of delay is to be considered in the background of the propounded principle by the Apex Court in catena of decisions

that where a technicality is pitted against the substantial justice, the latter must prevail over the former. If otherwise, a meritorious case would be

thrown out at the threshhold because of the impediments of the technicalities and it would cause injustice to the substantial justice itself. At the same

time, there cannot be any presumption for deliberate delay on the part of the parties seeking for condonation of delay because by resorting to

deliberate delay the parties' would be incurring a high risk. Therefore, a deliberate delay can never be presumed. On the other hand, if the writ

petition is disposed of without affording any opportunity to the other side, in our view that itself would constitute a sufficient cause for condoning

the delay because in such a situation, it has chained reactions, the parties would be getting a copy of the judgement late and thereafter that the case

must be processed for filing an appeal and in that process a reasonable delay is always expected. This apart, in a government department the

methodology of notemaking, filepushing and passing on the buck is not uncommon. Therefore, a reasonable delay in the process is always

expected and that cannot be attributed to a deliberate delay or the delay being caused by latches and negligence of the parties.

In the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, we are clearly of the view that the petition being disposed of without affording any

opportunity of hearing to the other party and without issuing of notice after admission would constitute a sufficient case for condoning the delay.

We may hasten to add that justice means justice to the parties. Justice does not mean justice to one party at the cost of injustice to the other party.

If such a situation arises, it would amount to perpetuation of injustice. At the same time, if a judgement is delivered after hearing both the parties it

would do complete justice to both the parties.

Keeping in view the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are clearly of the view that in the instant case sufficient cause has been shown for

condoning the delay. We, accordingly condone the delay. CMP is disposed of.

Let the LPA be numbered and listed for admission on 16/10/2001.