Jammu Development Authority through its Vice Chairman Rail Head Complex, Vikas Bhawan, Jammu vs Beli Ram

We have heard Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant/appellant, as well as Mr. A.V. Gupta, Senior learned counsel for the

respondent.

There is a delay of 177 days in preferring the LPA against the judgement an order dated 11.10:1999 passed by the learned Single Judge and an

application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. Notice was issued to the respondent and Mr. A.V. Gupta

appeared and filed objections.

The circumstances recited in the application, by which the applicant/appellant prevented from preferring an appeal within time, are detailed in

paras 2 to 8 of the application. According to the applicant/appellant, the presence of his counsel has though been recorded in the order of the

Learned Single Judge, bat in fact, the counsel was not present and, thus, he was not aware of the passing of the judgement. The applicant/appellant

came to know about the judgement in the last week of March 2000 an thereafter started collecting the relevant documents. That the original record

file of the brother of respondent's was misplaced when it was sent to the Secretariat several times by the applicant/appellant. On account of this

reason that the applicant/appellant could not file objections to the writ petition. The file was, however, traced out by the applicant and sometime

was consumed in collecting the Revenue Record and the relevant Government orders. That it was after examining the record thoroughly the

applicant decided to prefer an appeal against the judgement of the learned Single Judge dated 11.10.1999 and applied for the certifide copy of the

judgement. Lastly, it was contended that the applicant/appellant being an autonomous body, and having collective responsibility, taken some time in

deciding to prefer an appeal, due to which the delay has occasioned.

According to Mr. A.V. Gupta, sufficient cause as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been explained and, therefore, it is

not a fit case to condone the delay of 177 days. It is further contended that the case was heard on 14.09.1999 in which counsel appearing for both

the parties appeared and the judgement was reserved. The judgement came to be delivered on 11.10,1999. That these facts are clearly borne out

from the judicial orders recorded on the file. That the application for obtaining a certificated copy of the judgement was filed by the

applicant/appellant on 25.04.2000 and the certified copy delivered on 03.05.2000. The appeal, however, has been filed by the applicant/appellant

on 12.06.2000. Mr. Gupta further submitted that assuming that the applicant/appellant acquired the copy of the judgement in May 2000, there has

been no explanation for the delay between 03.05.2000 and 12.06.2000. The applicant also could not show sufficient cause for not applying for the

copy of the judgement between March 2000 to 25.04.2000. The delay has also not been explained between 03.05.2000 after securing the

certified copy and the period till the application for condonation was filed, i.e., 12.06.2000. There can hardly be said any reasonable or

satisfactory or even a proper explanation seeking condonation of delay shown by the applicant/appellant in the application.

Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned advocate appearing for the applicant/appellant, submitted that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an enabling

provision that confers power to condone the delay in order to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. His further

contention is that expression ""sufficient cause"" employed in the provision is adequately clastic to clothe the courts to apply the law in a meaningful

manner which subserves ends of justice. To support his contention, Mr. Adarsh Sharma, learned counsel, placed reliance on various judgements of

the Apex Court in catena of cases, in reiterating that ""sufficient case"" be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice. These judgements

pertain to the facts of those cases and the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable.

It would be noticed from the perusal of the application that the applicant/appellant has not been able to show sufficient and satisfactory

explanation for the delay in filing the appeal within time. Be fore granting condonation of delay, it is imperative for the Court to record satisfaction

that the explanation for the delay is either reasonable or satisfactory, which is essential prerequisite to condonation of delay. There was absolutely

no explanation for the period between March 2000 and 25.04.2000 when certified copy was applied after becoming aware of the judgment and

for the period between 0.3.05.2000 to 12.06.2000 when the appeal was filed after obtaining the certified copy of the judgement. We are not

satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, any explanation, much less reasonable or satisfaction one, has been offered by the

applicant/appellant in the application for the condonation of the inordinate delay of 177 days. Period of limitation so prescribed by the statute

cannot be extended by the court on equitable ground. The discretion to be exercised has to be either proper or judicious for condoning the delay.

In the facts and circumstances discussed above, we are clearly of the view that the delay has been caused due to laches and negligence of the

applicant/appellant. This application for the condo nation of delay is accordingly rejected and Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed as barred by

limitation as a consequence thereof.